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Preface
Preface
The seven years of  the post-conflict, state-building process in Kosovo have been marked with 
tremendous challenges to the political, economic, and social reconstruction of  the country. In par-
ticular, the establishment of  responsive democratic governance structures has posed a challenge 
not only to Kosovars, but also to the international peace-keeping community led by the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). As the Kosovar governance system was being gradually 
established, the UNMIK-centered governance began to transfer powers to local governance struc-
tures. 
That decentralization of  governance in Kosovo has taken primacy among political development 
priorities in the first four rounds of  the Final Status Talks in Vienna, between Pristina and Bel-
grade, attests to the importance of  the topic of  decentralized governance. Under the final status 
negotiations, decentralization is understood not only as a strategy to improve the delivery of  
public services, but also as a tool for improving ethnic relations in Kosovo. However, the very 
term decentralization is largely misunderstood by the majority of  Kosovar citizens and is, thus, a 
much politicized issue. No matter how the decentralization will be decided on the political level, its 
implementation will be a significantly challenging and long-term process. It will take a few years’ 
time to establish functioning, efficient, accountable, transparent and financially sustainable new 
municipalities. 
In this environment, Forum 2015 noticed that much of  the debate revolves largely around whether 
the government should decentralize or not—which is, indeed, a good and important question—but 
fails to address the questions of  how decentralized government would operate and what funda-
mental changes it would bring to the Kosovar public sector and, thus, to the relationship between 
Kosovar citizens and their governments. Accordingly, Forum 2015 decided to start up an initiative 
in which we have taken a deeper look into the very nature of  decentralization, in order to provide 
better information, not only to the citizens of  Kosovo but also to its policymakers and decision-
makers, and as such support the ongoing decentralization dialogue. 
For this purpose, in Pristina in June 2006, Forum 2015 held an international seminar, “Kosovo 
Decentralization Dialogue,” which brought together citizens, policymakers, practitioners and other 
experts to discuss the set of  key issues and challenges of  decentralization that Kosovo, following 
conclusion of  the status talks, will have to face as it embarks on a program of  public sector re-
form. The topics addressed at the seminar have been summarized in the present volume, Kosovo 
Decentralization Briefing Notes, a selection of  essays intended for Kosovar policymakers on the 
many challenges of  the decentralization process. The Briefing Notes has thus been designed to 
serve as a reference book to all those who have a stake in the decentralization process, or are 
simply interested to learn what the process is about and what it involves. As such, the publication 
addresses the fundamentals of  decentralization, which are relevant to any society that is commit-
ted to governmental reform with a view to improve levels of  accountability and transparency, and 
increase efficiency and effectiveness in responding to citizens’ needs. 
Forum 2015, the coalition for Euro-Atlantic integration, has undertaken this initiative due to its 
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belief  that Europe is a union of  minorities/communities where each of  its members, indepen-
dently of  size, has the power to speak its voice and influence the decision-making processes that 
affect all communities. This is the very model that Forum 2015 believes Kosovars should follow on 
the way to building a European state with full membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. Thus, Fo-
rum 2015 is confident that decentralization is an opportunity that deserves serious consideration 
if  we are to build a European future for Kosovo. 
        
Luan Shllaku
Executive Director, Kosovo Foundation for an Open Society
Forum 2015 Board Member
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1.
 Introduction and Scope of  the 
Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Book
Robert D. Ebel and Gábor Péteri 
A change of  government is not change of  a system, merely one of  the pre-conditions for it.
— János Kornai, The Socialist System, 1992
There are two policy revolutions occurring worldwide. The first is “globalization,” the integration 
of  the world’s markets and the shrinking role of  governments as manipulators of  economic af-
fairs. This trend is particularly dramatic in the former Communist countries as new political and 
economic infrastructure arrangements are being created to provide the foundation for a well-func-
tioning market economy. 
The other revolution, equally significant, is “localization”—the decentralization of  government 
itself. This is about pluralism, democracy, and citizens demanding a government system that they 
can understand and control. And, over the past decade and a half, most of  this action has been 
focused on the decentralization of  the socialist state as countries once part of  the Soviet sphere 
have either joined the European Union or are readying themselves as EU accession states. 
The issues that each decentralizing system (country, province) faces are at the same time very 
different and very similar. The differences arise from the diversity in economic and demographic 
structures, institutions, traditions, geography, and access to new technologies. That  there are many 
differences among the decentralizers makes clear that there is no one “correct” model of  inter-
governmental reform.
Clearly in many ways Kosovo is different. Its most recent intergovernmental fiscal history has been 
marked by a formal autonomy established (but, then promptly ignored by the government of  Josip 
Broz Tito) under the Yugoslav Constitution of  1945; a bit of  progress toward autonomy in the late 
1960s that was dramatized in part by the establishment of  an independent University of  Pristina; 
and further decentralization in 1974 when Kosovo gained powers associated with a republic (e.g., 
a seat on the federal presidency, an assembly). But, then, autonomy began to be inexorably eroded 
in the 1980s by a police-state. Though during the 1980s autonomy was formally maintained, even 
that formality disappeared with the July 1990 national referendum. 
But, there was also a positive development that made Kosovo unique as some of  Kornai’s “pre-
conditions” for change began to emerge. Although it may not have been fully recognized at the 
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time as a “positive” (and, of  course, in many ways it was surely not), Kosovo took “own local” 
control—not, as in many countries, in the form of  constitutional and legal reforms, but rather, 
through a system of  parallel institutions that, in hindsight, can be argued to be the rejuvenation of  
a Kosovar tradition of  local governance and self-management (Kostovicova 2005). Now Kosovo 
is engaged in  Final Status Talks (Vienna), witnessing the emergence of  open society associations, 
holding public forums focused on EU accession (Forum 2015, 2004), and  initiating a  dialogue 
that recognizes  that however well intentioned  and well designed it may be, the series of  intergov-
ernmental rules and practices imposed by the international community are not necessarily those 
that reflect a process of  “home rule”. 
So there are, indeed, circumstances that make Kosovo different from the other intergovernmental 
reformers. 
But, there are also similarities—and fundamentally important ones. Chief  among these are the 
twin and reinforcing economic developments of  globalization and localization that stem from 
the growing “openness” of  the world’s economies, to the increasing inability of  governments 
to constrain the flow of  goods and services and the movement of  capital and labor across their 
borders. 
There are also political similarities. Chief  among these is the reaction “from below” to long years 
of  extensive central government command and control policies, and the recognition that if  one 
can come up with a well-designed system of  intergovernmental relations and fiscal decentraliza-
tion, the result is not a “zero sum game” whereby one type of  government (e.g., central, provincial) 
is a “net loser” of  political and economic power in favor of  another set of  governments (e.g., 
provinces, municipalities, joint service districts). 
In addition, Kosovo has a multi-ethnic society, as do many countries in the Balkans. This fact 
should be acknowledged during the process of  elaborating the future status of  Kosovo. There are 
many hidden conflicts and issues that require peaceful solutions and reconciliation. But as it was 
accepted in a number of  countries, including those of  the  former Yugoslavia, decentralization can 
be a force for fostering solidarity among different ethnic (and/or religious, linguistic or otherwise 
diverse) groups (Bird and Ebel 2006). 
Indeed, the international practice record is clear that a well-designed intergovernmental system 
can increase the nation’s overall economic welfare relative to what would occur under the old fis-
cal rules of  the game. However, to get to this point of  welfare gain, it is important that both the 
“higher” and “lower” levels of  government redefine themselves. Thus for a central government, 
the days of  command and control are, or ought to be, long gone. For “subnational governments” 
it’s time to get down to the difficult business of  taking seriously the building of  institutions that 
make them worthy of  the term “local self-governments”  (Davey and Péteri 2006).
This is not to say the task of  decentralizing is simple, quick, and tension-free. Indeed, as the notes 
in this Briefing Book make clear, many of  the tasks are complex, will require some time to sort out, 
and are sure to create a tension among policymakers at different levels of  governments—a ten-
sion, it should be noted, that is far more likely to be healthy than destructive (much  depends on 
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the nature of  the newly established intergovernmental institutions and the clarity of  the sorting 
out process of  public sector roles and responsibilities). 
The “catch” is that all this decentralization can be done very well or very badly. Done well it can 
lead to the benefits promised by a well-functioning state and local system: better services (e.g., 
girls’ education, clean water, local transportation, and garbage removal); national cohesion; and the 
creation of  a potentially powerful tool for poverty alleviation (the proximity of  local governments 
to the poor and familiarity with the various situations and hostile environs which the poor inhabit 
in different regions and communities gives well-decentralized governmental systems a distinct 
advantage in designing and implementing anti-poverty policies). 
But if  decentralization is done badly, it can lead to a macroeconomic mess, elite capture of  the 
political system, corruption, and collapse of  the safety net—the same things that many big central 
governments have “delivered” so well.
_____________
This Kosovo Briefing Book provides a series of  technical notes designed to help frame  the Kosovo 
decentralization dialogue so that one does the job of  intergovernmental reform “right.” The book 
is broadly organized around the five fundamental questions facing any decentralizing society (Bird 
and Vaillancourt 2006).
• Which type or level of  local administration does what (assignment of  the expenditure 
function)? 
• Which level levies which revenues (finance or revenue assignment)? 
• How can fiscal imbalances and disparities among places be resolved when the case for 
decentralizing spending is almost always greater than that for decentralizing revenues (a 
role for intergovernmental transfers)? 
• How is the timing of  revenues to be managed and monitored (debt and the hard budget 
constraint)? 
• What institutional and capacity building arrangements are required to make it all work? 
The five questions frame the intergovernmental system—all pieces of  which must fit together. To 
be sure, there will be a sequencing of  reform that is likely to be uneven in its implementation and 
which will take time. There is also likely to be,  and probably should be, some “asymmetry” in how 
the intergovernmental roles and responsibilities get sorted out (e.g., the same system is not likely 
to fit both urban and rural areas). 
The Briefing Book is designed to systematically lay out the framework and issues for a robust and 
learned Kosovo “decentralization dialogue.” To accomplish this, it focuses on principles and les-
sons learned from Kosovo and elsewhere that can lead to a well-designed, sustainable, decentral-
ized system of  governance. Although the authors of  this set of  twenty-four briefing notes do not 
shy away from pointing out practices that “work” vs. those that fail,  these essays do not provide 
a set of  recommendations. 
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_________
The book is organized in seven sections. The first sets out the framework and principles for doing 
decentralization well, and includes a discussion of  the stages of  post-socialist reform in the region 
(Central and Eastern Europe). The next two sections (Expenditure Assignment and Service De-
livery, Financing Services) address the five questions listed above. Sections four and five (Planning 
and Accountability, Managing the Reform Process) highlight several key institutional and capacity 
development realities. The sixth section focuses on Special Topics that will arise as Kosovo em-
barks on the public sector reform. The  final section (Bringing It All Together) summarizes the 
benefits and costs of  fiscal decentralization and suggests some practical “rules” for successful 
implementation of  decentralization.  
Intended for citizens, policymakers and practitioners alike, this book can serve either as a quick 
reference document designed to allow one to quickly go to and focus upon a topic of  special inter-
est, and/or, a unified set of  chapters that can be approached as one would a research treatise to 
be read cover to cover. 
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Local Government in Kosovo 
An overview of  intergovernmental arrangements and local finances in Kosovo.
This briefing note provides an overview of  the institutional and financial arrangements of  local 
governance in Kosovo as of  mid-2006 and is intended to set the context for the  twenty-two brief-
ing notes that follow. The note is divided into four parts: institutions, local government structure, 
functional responsibilities, and revenues.   
The contents of  the note reflect several of  the issues that are high on the agenda of  the Vienna-
based Status Talks between Serbia and Kosovo. That decentralization was among the first topics 
discussed and is a continuing focus of  the Vienna talks, demonstrates the importance of  decentral-
ization not only in accomplishing the broader economic and financial goals of  Kosovo, but also in 
ensuring social cohesion (Bird and Ebel 2006). 
Institutional Context
After the 1999 NATO intervention and the supplanting of  Serbian rule, Kosovo came to be 
ruled by a bifurcated central government composed of  the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK)—which is headed by the Special Representative of  the Secretary General (SRSG) with 
reserved powers authority (RPA)—and the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of  Self-Government 
(PISG). PISG functions with a directly elected Assembly, which in turn elects the President (chief  
of  state) and the Prime Minister (head of  government). The Prime Minister is a member of, and 
accountable to, the Assembly.
The current constitutional basis of  local administration is found in the Framework for Provisional Self-
Government in Kosovo (UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9), which states that “Kosovo is composed of  
municipalities, which are the basic territorial units of  local self-government with responsibilities 
as set forth in UNMIK legislation in force on local self-government and municipalities in Kosovo 
(Article 1.3).”   
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of  the outcome of  the decentralization dialogue in 
Kosovo. Decentralization has two main purposes. The first is a theme that flows through all the 
briefing notes in this volume, to enhance the efficiency and accountability of  governance. If  this 
first goal can be accomplished, then so can the second: improvement in the perception of, and 
trust in, governance—both central and local. 
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Box 1. Transparency Matters
Promoting honest, non-corrupt and effective management of  public finances by local govern-
ment is essential to a well-functioning democracy. Fiscal transparency, which implies low-cost 
accessibility to relevant information, allows citizens to act like customers and demand the most 
value for their money. Transparent operations also make it easier for local governments to deliver 
such value.
Transparency can be an instrument to improve the quality of  public services and the efficiency 
of  government, while also enhancing the effectiveness of  public decisions. It is essential to de-
centralization that
i.   politicians and bureaucrats become more accountable to constituencies, which leads to 
     better public decisions;  
ii.  government decision-making capacity is improved through involvement of  all relevant 
     stakeholders in national and local public policy formulation; and 
iii. implementation of  policies becomes more efficient, as this will reduce corruption. 
 
Kosovo has inherited a formally decentralized local government structure from the prewar pe-
riod. All government institutions of  this period were under the control of  the Communist party 
(Union of  Communists). Having been under emergency military rule until the 1950s, Kosovo then 
obtained the status of  an autonomous province in 1960.  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Yugo-
slavia allowed more market access and local autonomy than many other Communist countries, but 
at the same time demands for the expression of  ethnic identity increased, particularly in Croatia. 
In 1987 Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist, became president of  Yugoslavia and proclaimed 
the goal of  a “Greater Serbia.”
  
Then came the forceful abolition of  Kosovo’s provincial autonomy in 1989 and the break up of  
the Socialist Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991–92, which was accompanied by the 
creation of  the newly declared Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia (FRY).  This was also a period (be-
ginning in 1989) when Albanians were dismissed in mass from state institutions and enterprises, 
and the development of  parallel institutions began in Kosovo (Sevic 2001; Kostovicova 2005). The 
1990s were a difficult period for local autonomy, with war breaking out in 1998 and ending with 
the NATO bombing campaign of  March–June 1999. Beginning in June 1999, the United Nations 
declared that the laws of  22 March 1989—the last date that Kosovo enjoyed autonomy within the 
SFRY—to be applicable (CEELI  2006). Serbia, however, remained largely centralized (see Box 
2). 
 
22
Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Notes
Box 2. Local Government in Serbia
The scope of  decentralization, as measured by local government expenditures, is relatively low in 
Serbia. In 2001, municipal expenditures were 4% of  GDP and municipal revenues were 24% of  
all budget revenues (Levitas 2004). Local governments were relatively large-size entities (central 
towns surrounded by villages or a collection of  rural settlements). As part of  the centralization 
process, 29 administrative districts (okrug) were established (in 1992). The district administration 
is an extended unit of  national government.
Although local governments in Serbia were responsible for a wide range of  functions (adminis-
tration, human and urban services), the national government exercised strict control over these 
formal municipal functions. Moreover, local governments lost control over municipal property 
(e.g., communal enterprises, school buildings, facilities) when the Milosevic government “nation-
alized” local assets. Local public utility services (e.g., water, solid waste management), originally 
provided by municipal public enterprises, became locally managed state-owned enterprises.
In the 1990s local financing consisted of  a clear separation of  services. On the one hand, there 
were services funded by own revenues for which there were no national expenditure appropria-
tions (i.e., municipal public spending), and on the other hand there were the remaining local 
services, funded by shared taxes and for which expenditure levels were set by “unique objective 
criteria” (Stipanovic 2004). 
Under the Yugoslav system (pre-1998) there was a great variety of  own source revenues. Based 
on the self-management model of  some earmarked taxes, charges were linked to specific groups 
of  expenditures (e.g., hotel tax to tourism, parking fees to road maintenance). In addition, self-
contributions were collected for specific capital investment projects, approved by referenda. The 
most significant own source revenues were property-related taxes and fees. Tax revenues were 
shared with local governments through complicated transfer mechanisms, and local govern-
ments received a fixed share of  the wage tax, sales tax and property transfer tax. There was also 
an equalization mechanism supplementing these shared revenues through a “gap filling” method 
of  transfers. 
Local Government Structure  
Kosovo is divided into thirty municipalities, although an additional de facto municipality can be 
found in the Serb part of  North Mitrovica. There are five regions that are used as deconcentrated 
units by some central government ministries. In Kosovo there are 1,468 villages, which have local 
communities or bashkёsia lokale/mesna zajednica (BL/MZ). The BLs/MZs operate not only in rural 
municipalities, but also as city districts or neighbourhood units (e.g., there are 21 in Pristina). 
Within the Yugoslav model, local communities were the lowest level of  self-government, but 
currently the relationship between the bashkёsia lokale/mesna zajednica and the elected local govern-
ments is not well regulated. BLs/MZs liaise with municipal offices and assist citizens. The typically 
non-elected village councils are headed by the village chair. Services and funding of  local commu-
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nity offices are decided by the municipality. 
The concept of  social self-management strongly prevails in other spheres of  the public sector as 
well. Various boards (e.g., school boards) and committees (e.g., regulatory bodies) at the local and 
national level operate according to a social self-management model. 
Municipal councils vary in size, starting from a minimum of  17 (in 5 municipalities), to 21 (in 4 
municipalities), 31 (in 12 municipalities), 41 (in 8 municipalities), up until a maximum of  51 for 
Pristina, according to the 2001 population figures. 
The 2001 population figures were established on 8 August 2001, using information then available 
to the UNMIK Department of  Local Administration (DLA) and the Central Fiscal Authority 
(CFA).  While the continued use of  the 2001 population numbers in municipal administration and 
financing is often questioned, using these population shares in setting intergovernmental grants 
to municipalities (see below) may not be such a bad choice. It is plausible that since 2001, due to 
internal migration, the population shares of  municipalities with greater economic activity such 
as Pristina or Prizen have increased. This means that using the 2001 population figures implicitly 
equalizes for the fiscal potential of  attractive municipalities such as Pristina. Why? Because attrac-
tive municipalities, which have greater local tax potential than poorer municipalities, receive less 
per capita through transfers than they would if  the current formula was used with updated popula-
tion figures. As a result more funding remains for less attractive municipalities.
However, the lack of  proper population figures and of  relevant socio-demographic information 
has the following consequences:
• poverty analysis, housing needs analysis, proper planning of  public service delivery and 
measurement of  willingness to pay is difficult, if  not impossible;
• implementation of  proper tax and spending analyses, given the link between demograph-
ic forces and  tax and spending, is hindered;
• private (market development) economic analysis is difficult since statistical informa-
tion—a public goods type of  input—is lacking;
• finally, accurate population and socio-demographic figures should play a key role in nego-
tiating a proper final status for Kosovo, whatever it may be.
The last valid census took place in 1981. The census data from 1991 are not reliable, as the census 
was not properly implemented in two municipalities in central Serbia and was boycotted by the 
Kosovar Albanian population. The 2002 census in Serbia did not cover Kosovo. The presently 
available estimates on resident population in Kosovo should be verified by a properly managed 
census. The law creating the legal framework for the Kosovo Census was approved in 2003 and a 
pilot census (six municipalities) was carried out in October 2005. 
Kosovo’s overall population is about 2 million. Ethnic Albanians constitute the majority, although 
there is a sizeable minority of  Serbs, and smaller minorities of  Roma and Turks, as shown in Ta-
ble 1. According to 2000 estimates, Kosovo’s population has increased by 20% over the past two 
decades, with the Albanian population accounting for much of  the increase (presently 88%). How-
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ever, the size of  ethnic minorities in Kosovo is still significant at 12%. The minority populations 
are primarily concentrated north of  the Ibar River, but also in scattered enclaves in the Eastern 
and Southern part of  Kosovo. The design of  intergovernmental fiscal relations must take into 
consideration the multi-ethnic character of  the Kosovo population.
 Table 1. Ethnic Composition of  Resident Population In Kosovo
2000 1991 1981 1971
Albanian 88% 82% 78% 74%
Serb 7% 10% 13% 18%
Other 5% 8% 9% 8%
Total 1.9 Million 1,956,196 1,584, 440 1,243,093
Sources: UNFPA 2003; 1991 estimates by the Statistical Office of   Kosovo (SOK) Yugoslavia; 1998 and 1971 data 
from Kosovo in Figures 2005.
Kosovo has a relatively young population. One third of  its population is below age 14 and the 
share of  elderly is low (6%) (see Table 2). These demographics will have an impact on public ser-
vices. Provision of  education services, for example, will be a major task in the coming years, while 
public spending on pensions and services for the elderly will not be immediately pressing.
Table 2. Kosovo Population by Age Groups
Years 2002 2001 2000
0-14 32.8% 32.3% 31.5%
15-64 61.0% 61.2% 63.0%
65- 6.2% 6.5% 5.5%
Source: UNFPA 2003: Demographic, social and reproduction situation in Kosovo, Statistical Office of  Kosovo 
(SOK), household survey.
The area of  Kosovo is 10,877 km2. and its population density is 175 inhabitants per km2, which is 
higher than the rest of  the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 66 inhabitants per km2; 
Croatia, 83; Macedonia, 81; Montenegro, 50; or Slovenia, 97) or Albania with 122 inhabitants per 
km2, but lower than that of  Belgium (337) or the Netherlands (464). Kosovo has a mainly rural 
population (55%). The per capita GDP is $1,400 (2005 estimates), compared to $5,000 in Serbia. 
(For a more detailed discussion of  how demographic, economic and institutional characteristics 
impact intergovernmental finances, see briefing note “Fiscal Architecture”).
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Municipal Elections
The last municipal election in Kosovo took place in 2002 under UNMIK regulation 2002/11.  A 
single multi-member (no wards) proportional system was used with a requirement that at least 
one third of  the candidates be women. Under the regulation, the mayor is elected by and amongst 
the councillors, and is known as the president of  the Municipal Assembly. Forthcoming elections 
should normally be held in the fall of  2006 (with the passing of  the legal four-year interval), but 
may be delayed as resolution of  Kosovo’s final status may bring a change in the number of  mu-
nicipalities. A governance system with a chief  executive officer, a board of  directors, compulsory 
public hearings, and a tight budget schedule is used to establish spending at the municipal level.
Functional Responsibilities
Responsibilities (competencies) of  Kosovo municipalities are set out in UNMIK regulation 
2000/45. These responsibilities range from those that municipalities “shall” undertake (e.g., pro-
viding conditions for sustainable economic development; licensing and regulating of  building and 
building activity; local public utility services; pre-primary, primary and secondary education; as well 
as health services), to those that they “may” address (e.g., tourism, cultural and sports activities). In 
addition, they are mandated to implement central authority regulations, including cadastre records, 
civil registries, and voter and business registration. Commensurate centrally provided resources are 
to accompany these mandates.
Of  this list of  expenditure assignments, three dominate: the specific education (47.6% of  total 
municipal spending) and health (12.4%) assignments, and the general municipal administration 
assignment (37.7%). 
The total 2006 fiscal year budget for Kosovo is € 700 million, with municipal spending represent-
ing 24% of  total (current and capital) public spending. Table 3 presents the evolution of  these 
amounts over the 2000–2005 period. Expenditures accounted at local government level are rough-
ly 7% of  GDP, which is comparable to neighboring countries in the Balkans. 
Table 3. Public Expenditures by Budgetary Entities (EUR Million), Kosovo, 2000–2005
UNMIK PISG Municipalities Total % Municipalities in Total
2000 49.76 152.81 - 202.57 0
2001 70.67 154.27 14.56 239.50 6
2002 144.07 169.02 88.99 402.07 22
2003 138.53 234.56 141.76 514.86 27
2004 167.50 430.83 188.85 786.91 24
2005a b 531.61 164.51 696.12 24
Source: Ministry of  Finance and Economy
a UNMIK reserved powers do not appear separately in 2005. They are reported as central government expenditures.
b Designated donor grant and privatization grant expenditures are not included.
In terms of  total public sector employment in 2006, municipalities employ 41,516 out of  76,717 
Full-Time Equivalent Civil Service Employees or 54% of  the total. This higher percentage of  
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municipal employment as compared to spending reflects the human capital intensive character of  
education and other municipal services. 
Table 4 shows that wages are the largest outlay for municipalities at about 60% of  spending (with 
operation and maintenance). Wage expenses are greatest in the area of  education. Capital expen-
ditures are also managed locally (20% of  total expenditures) and primarily comprise spending on 
roads.   
Table 4. Municipal Expenditures by Sector in FY 2006
Wages and Sala-
ries Capital Outlays
Other (Goods and 
Services, Subven-
tions)
Total
Distri-
bution 
of  To-
tal, %
Municipal Ad-
ministration
15,534,246 32,452,098   14,760,967 62,747,311 37.7
Education 68,126,491 671,516   10,432,435 79, 30 ,442 47.6
Health 14,684,362 765,309     5,200,193 20,649,864 12.4
Total 100,528,654 34,173,453   30,393,595 166,546,990 100.0
Source: Ministry of  Finance and Economy, Budget 2006 spreadsheet 
Note: The difference between the sum of  the three elements in the column rows and the column totals is for activities 
that are not separately presented here: firefighting, LCO (Local Community Office), ORC (Office of  Returns and 
Communities) and PMU (Pilot Municipal Units).
One should note here that water, sewers and garbage collection services are carried out by publicly 
owned enterprises (POE) administered by the KTA and financed by fees paid by citizens. Previ-
ously the responsibility of  the Public Utilities Department (PUD) of  the Joint Interim Administra-
tive Structure (JIAS), regulation of  the activities of  socially/publically owned providers of  water, 
wastewater and solid waste services now falls under the competence of  the Water and Waste Regu-
latory Office (WWRO). The WWRO sets and approves the tariff  rate of  services.  The 14 water 
and sewage POEs are organized on a regional basis, and thus cannot easily be sold to a specific 
municipality; the 13 garbage POEs can more easily be municipalized or privatized. Municipalities 
provide the local infrastructure (local pipes) for water and sewer services.
Fair Share Financing
To ensure equitable distribution of  municipal budget expenditures between minority and majority 
populations, Section 4 of  UNMIK Regulation 2003/41 stipulates that municipalities are required 
to allocate to non-majority communities a proportionate share of  their budget with due regard 
for the principle of  “Fair Share” Financing.  Twenty-seven municipalities  (Regulation 2005/12) 
are obliged to allocate to resident minority groups a proportion varying from 0.4% to 41.3% of  
their own source revenues and general grant for education and health. In 2005, total municipal 
funding allocated to minority groups was €16.1 million. However, it is unclear how municipalities 
determine which specific expenditures to allocate to minority communities and the process ap-
pears open to interpretation.
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Local Spending Autonomy
Municipalities are constrained in how they can spend their budget.
• Municipalities cannot choose the number of  employees they want to hire. Rather the 
number of  municipal employees is established by budgetary negotiations with the central 
government, which has the final say on the issue. This constraint is the result of  a letter 
of  intent (Memorandum of  Economic and Financial Policies)—which is also sometimes 
referred to as a memorandum of  understanding—signed by the SRSG and PISG in No-
vember 2005, in which both parties agreed to a 10% reduction in public employment for 
2006–2008 (with some protected employment categories, such as teachers and doctors).
• Municipalities cannot set their own pay levels to attract better skilled or better qualified 
employees.
• Municipalities must respect implicit or explicit central norms in the production of  public 
services.
• Municipalities must respect tendering rules imposed centrally when procuring goods and 
services with a tender for any spending above €500. The size of  a municipality or the 
types of  goods purchased are not taken into account when determining compliance with 
central tendering rules.
• Municipalities submit a list of  capital projects to the central government, which cannot 
be altered without its permission.
Revenues
Grants
Central government grants are the main source of  municipal revenues. Grants represent 80% of  
total municipal revenues, as shown in Table 5, while municipal own source revenues make up the 
remaining 20%. Municipalities may not borrow and their funds are held in the Central Govern-
ment Treasury; they receive no interest on these amounts but are provided with treasury services 
free of  charge. 
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Table 5. Municipal Revenues Grants and Own Revenues, Kosovo, 2006 Budget (EUR)
Wages and 
Salaries
Capital Outlays
Other (Goods 
and Services, 
Subventions)
Total Distribution 
Of  Total, %
Municipal 
Grant       15.555,598         7,966,338          9,965,879      33,487,815 20.1
Education 
Grant       68,126,491            631,516          8,325,805      77,083,812 46.3
Health grant       13,258,995            737,595          4,059,400      18,055,990 10.8
Own Source 
Revenues
        1,404,015       24,553,474 8,042,511      34,000,000 20.4
Total      100,528,654       34,173,453 30,393,595 166,546,990 100.0
Source: Ministry of  Finance and Economy, Budget 2006, unpublished spreadsheet. 
Note: The difference between the sum of  the three grant elements, the own source revenues and the 
total revenues comprise firefighting, LCO, ORC and PMU grants.
This creates a disincentive for municipalities to transform physical capital yielding income (such as 
shops, housing units) into financial capital by selling it because cash thus obtained would be held 
by the treasury and would not yield any income. Municipalities use private banks only to collect 
payments such as property taxes. Some municipalities are reported to have arrears with respect to: 
(1) utilities; (2) providers of  goods and services, and/or (3) capital projects. However, there are no 
arrears in salaries. Regulations have been introduced to ensure the payment of  arrears and to avoid 
their reoccurrence. 
Grants are determined in three steps: Overall Envelope, Specific Envelopes and Distribution. The 
two envelopes can be considered components of  the “distributable pool,” as discussed in the brief-
ing note on Intergovernmental Transfers.
Overall Envelope
The current procedure for setting transfers to local governments, as a share of  Kosovo generated 
revenues, was initiated in 2001–2002. Under the procedure, the share (a percentage of  central 
budget revenues) is proposed by the Grants Commission and must be ratified by the Government. 
The share of  forecast central budget revenues was set at around 22% for the 2006–2008 budget 
cycles.  
The Grants Commission was set up in 2003 and consists of  seven members: the prime minister, 
the minister of  finance and economy, another minister appointed by the government (in 2006 the 
minister of  local government and administration), the chair of  the Budget Committee of  the Na-
tional Assembly, and three representatives of  municipalities that are nominated by the Association 
of  Kosovo Municipalities (AKM) and appointed by the central government. 
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Specific Envelopes
There are currently four envelopes.
1. General Grant 
The amount of  this grant (about 20% of  municipal revenues) is calculated by subtracting from the 
22% proportion of  forecast central government budgeted revenues allocated to municipalities the 
amounts allocated for the following three grants: Education Grant (fixed in nominal terms at €75 
million in 2006); Health Grant (fixed in nominal terms at €18 million in 2006); and the Property 
Tax Collection Incentive Grant (set by the Ministry of  Finance and Economy at €6 million in 
2006). 
The General Grant is a two-part grant consisting of  (i) a fixed amount of  €100,000 per munici-
pality and (ii) the remainder divided up according to 2001 population figures. Allocations of  the 
General Grant to each municipality for FY 2006 must also cover expenditures of  local community 
offices, local returns offices and fire protection services, which levels are set by UNMIK and the 
Ministry of  Internal Affairs.  
2.  Education Grant
There are four parts to the formula for the Education Grant:
• Teachers Costs: calculated by dividing the number of  students in a municipality by the 
student to teacher ratio. Separate figures are calculated for majority students (using the 
ratio of  1 teacher to 21.3 students) and minority students (using the ratio of  1 teacher to 
14.2 students). The resulting number of  teachers is then multiplied by the Kosovo-wide 
average salary per teacher. 
• Non-teaching Personnel Costs: the number of  administrative and support staff  multi-
plied by the average salary per administrative and support employee.
• Goods and Services: a fixed amount per school (€500 for each pre-primary and primary 
school, €1,000 for each secondary school) is added to a fixed amount per student (€18 per 
Albanian student and €22.5 per student of  other ethnic background).
• Capital Outlays: €5 per student is allocated to the municipality. 
3. Health Grant 
The Health grant is allocated according to 2001 population figures.
4. Property Tax Incentive Grant 
The Ministry of  Finance and Economy sets a normative target for each municipality and then 
sets the level of  the current year’s grant based on a municipality’s previous year performance. The 
distribution of  the incentive grant is as follows. Municipalities that meet or exceed their target 
receive the full grant. Municipalities that miss their target but improve revenue collection, over the 
2004 baseline, receive whatever percentage of  the grant amount they achieved. Municipalities that 
fall short of  the 2004 baseline receive nothing. All funds that are not distributed go back “into 
the pot” and are reallocated to the municipalities that exceeded their targets. Municipalities that 
achieve their targets do well at the expense of  those that do not. The extra amount is distributed in 
proportion to both the amount by which the municipality exceeded its target and its population. 
 
30
Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Notes
Education and health grants must be spent on education or health. Grants must be spent during 
the fiscal year or returned to the central government. This creates an incentive to spend all grants 
in a given year, which may lead to inefficiencies and does not encourage municipal savings. Own 
source revenues need not be spent during the fiscal year they were collected and can thus be car-
ried over.
Own Revenues
The largest share of  local own revenues is from the property tax. The assessment of  property 
taxes is conducted by municipalities using market-influenced administrative prices calculated ac-
cording to a structure’s square metreage. Prices vary by zone and by type of  structure. Unbuilt 
land and agricultural land are not taxed. Municipal assemblies set tax rates annually. Municipal 
employees collect taxes (with tax bills hand delivered by 31 March) in two instalments payable 
on 30 June and 31 December via the private banking system. Taxes are owed either by the owner 
or—if  unknown—by the occupant (user) of  the property. The first €10,000 of  a structure’s value 
is not taxed. 
The property tax accounted for about a quarter of  municipal revenues in 2005. This was fol-
lowed by two items, each comprising 15% of  municipal revenues: (1) co-payments collected from 
communities (groupings of  residents in rural villages or urban areas) that benefit directly from a 
specific project, such as the paving of  a road; and (2) administrative fees levied by municipalities 
for various documents. No other item in a list of  58 revenue items has a share above 10%. The 
revenue items next in importance are construction fees (7%) and licenses for large shops (5%). 
Thus, the remaining 53 items account for approximately 27% of  municipal own source revenues 
or approximately 5% of  total municipal revenues.
 Conclusion
Decentralization has three main aspects: political, fiscal and personnel. As is often the case 
throughout the world, Kosovo has carried out political decentralization but not financial or per-
sonnel decentralization. Political decentralization has been achieved by creating independent enti-
ties, municipalities, with their own elected autonomous politicians. An important step toward fiscal 
decentralization has been achieved with the setting of  property tax rates by municipal councils. 
Overall, however, autonomy remains limited as municipalities are neither permitted to manage 
their financial assets, nor to freely set local spending priorities. Moreover, since the pay scale is 
set centrally and the number of  employees subject to central government constraints, personnel 
decentralization means simply the power to hire and fire for approved jobs; this is not personnel 
decentralization.
That said, local governments in Kosovo operate under a unique system of  intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. Some of  the Kosovar traditions might influence the future mechanisms of  decentraliza-
tion to be developed: for there is a strong belief  in local government and self-management, sup-
ported by the period of  parallel institutions in the 1990s. Relatively large-size municipalities could 
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serve as a sound basis of  decentralization, as they have in the countries of  former Yugoslavia. The 
preservation of  large-size municipalities in Kosovo would help to establish rationally sized units 
for communal service provision. 
In addition, local community offices and village councils might play an important role in the future 
decentralized system of  governance and service delivery. Community-based organizations (the 
BLs/MZs) with greater legitimacy could take over some local government functions and become 
involved in service provision. 
There is also a long tradition of  local government property and asset management, so future devo-
lution of  assets will improve the efficiency of  public service management as well.
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Fiscal Architecture
Demographic, economic and institutional realties frame the “fiscal sense” of  spending and tax policies.
Demographic, economic, and institutional changes/trends that are largely beyond national (as well 
as regional and municipal) control are constantly occurring. In developing a nation’s fiscal policy, 
rather than ignore these trends, it should be recognized that they define the “fiscal architecture” 
of  the expenditure and revenue pressures facing public sector policymakers and practitioners.1 As 
demographic, economic and institutional forces vary not only nationally but also by subnational 
regions and their geographically smaller jurisdictions (e.g., municipalities), so does the fiscal archi-
tecture of  regional and municipal expenditures and revenue pressures. The increasing globalization 
of  markets for products and services further magnifies the importance of  recognizing these pa-
rameters and the opportunities they provide for (and the limitations they place on) policymakers. 
Understanding how these trends may affect the choice of  potential tax bases and the changing 
spending needs of  client populations will enable policymakers to design (and, as circumstances 
change, redesign) expenditure programs and revenue instruments to stabilize a country’s long-term 
intergovernmental finances—that is, to come up with spending programs and tax systems that 
make “fiscal sense.”
It is easy to identify various elements of  a country’s fiscal architecture, but more difficult to de-
velop an exhaustive list. Fiscal architecture generally comprises: 
•  Demographic characteristics, including population growth, age distribution, health status 
of  the population, household composition, fertility rates, and life expectancy.
•  Economic characteristics, including the importance of  particular sectors (manufacturing 
agriculture, services) and changes in the importance of  these sectors; concentration of  
natural  resources; size and structure of  economic base.
•  Institutions, including not only institutions of  budget and revenue administration, but 
also the many social systems that make budget polices work, such as a system of  postal 
addresses for tax billing and collection; computerization for tracking budget flows; a 
telephone or website  where one can download budgets, regulations, and tax forms and 
instructions, and have questions answered; clarity on property rights and rights of  differ-
ent levels of  government; a range of  tools for holding public officials accountable to their 
citizen-clients; and a judicial system for dispute resolution among citizens and between 
citizens and their governments. There are also cultural matters such as the ease at which 
a census taker may be able to secure a population’s cooperation to generate data that can 
be used systematically to examine a variety of  impacts of  spending and tax policy on 
business and households alike.
1  Over the medium and long term, “local” policies may influence these forces at the margin and thereby provide a public sector 
enabling environment for economic development and improvement in a nation’s human development indicators. For example, see 
briefing note 19  on Local Economic Development.
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Expenditures
The methodology for analyzing the impacts of  fiscal architecture on governments is based on the 
relationship between the (above) components and government revenue and expenditures. Thus, 
the expenditure side of  the budget will largely be driven by “needs” as objectively measured, which 
can be done by estimating a systematic relationship between changes in the population with re-
spect to considerations such as size and composition and the changing relative cost of  production 
of  service delivery (growing public sector relative to private production is often a great concern 
for subnational governments where the delivery of  services is often a labor-intensive process not 
easily amenable to cost containment using technological changes).2
 
Consider, for example, that Kosovo has a particularly young population distribution, with fully a 
third of  the total population of  primary school age (0–14 years), and another 61% in the 15–64 
year cohort (UNFPA 2003, Table 2.1). For policymakers, this means giving short- as well as medi-
um-term expenditure planning to considerations of  not only the operating costs of  activities such 
as public recreation and a teacher core, but also to planning for capital improvements for schools 
(general as well as vocational), and growth-enabling physical infrastructure. Moreover, given such 
a young population profile, policymakers are forewarned to now carefully plan a pension system 
that will be solvent over time. 
This youth dominance does not necessarily mean that services traditionally associated with the 
elderly can be ignored, especially in some municipalities outside of  Prishtina where the population 
may be relatively elderly and in need of  health clinics, hospitals and social services. Similarly, once 
the Status Talks are completed, Kosovo may experience an influx of  new residents (or conversely, 
an emigration). If  there is an in-migration, then, for example, the issue of  housing may become 
increasingly important to the budget committees.
Revenues
A similar logic applies to the “fiscal architecture” that frames the revenue side of  the budget equa-
tion.3 In this case, the challenge is not only to find the right fit between the general nature of  the 
tax base and external reality, but also between the type of  tax and the tax base—to identify the tax 
that best captures the tax base. A broad measure of  taxable income makes sense for an employed 
labor force. Real property taxes make sense as a sustainable revenue source for land and capital 
intensive economies. Agricultural income and land taxes are obviously attractive in farm intensive 
2  The relationship between changes in public expenditures and changes in demographic factors can be expressed as follows: ΔEXPi 
= ΔCPOPi * (PXPSi) + ΔPXPSi * (CPOPi), where EXPi is the total expenditure on the ith spending category, CPOPi is the client 
population of  the ith spending category, and PXPSi is the production expense of  the ith spending category. In this expression, the left 
hand side is the change in expenditure for a particular spending category, EXPi, and the right hand side of  the equation contains the 
components of  the change in expenditures. 
3  An expression for the relationship between changes in public revenues and changes in demographic and economic factors may also 
be expressed as follows: ΔRevi = ΔTXBASEi * (TXRATEi) + ΔTXRATEi * (TXBASEi) where, Revi is the revenue from source i, 
TXBASEi is the base for tax source i, and TXRATEi is the tax rate for source i. This equation assumes a given population to pay the 
tax. Obviously, if  the number of  taxpayers increases or decreases, this will directly affect the level of  collections. For example, if  there 
is a large increase in the labor force participation, we should expect to see an increase in income tax collections. The equation also as-
sumes a given (constant) level of  enforcement effort.
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areas. Business receipts and consumption taxes such as those on retail sales become increasingly 
important for communities that experience a shift to services. Excise taxes and doing-business 
permit fees can work in a sector that is characterized by hard-to-tax small businesses, the self-em-
ployed and underground activities. Natural resource taxes can be potentially productive for some 
countries, but, if  they are to be so, one must be ready for a lot of  clear-thinking on how to set up a 
tax system that takes into account the fiscal interests of  both a “central” government and the local 
areas in which mineral mining occurs (Bahl and Tumennasan 2002 ).4 
The table below briefly illustrates the way of  thinking that fiscal architecture analysis requires. 
Characteristics of  fiscal architecture appear in the first column; examples of  changes in these areas 
appear in the second column; and the implications for expenditure and tax policy follow in the 
next two columns. In reviewing this table, it is important to keep in mind the intergovernmental 
nature of  both the spending and tax sides of  the budget. A fiscally sustainable Kosovo, whether 
province or nation, will require the reinventing of  a new fiscal partnership between central and 
subnational (e.g., local) governments.
4  Kosovo lists 132 types of  extractive natural resources, each of  which is subject to some royalty tax or fee.  
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Table 1. Illustrations of  Local Fiscal Architecture and Likely Implications for Spending 
and Tax Policy
External Reality Trend /Condition Spending Implications Tax Implications
Demographic: 
Age distribu-
tion and family 
composition 
Workforce: disproportion-
ately elderly or young?
Youth: schools, infra-
structure of  growth, 
police; for the 15–64 
cohorts, higher educa-
tion; and as society 
ages, health and hos-
pitals. 
For the “end points” of  
youth and elderly, charges 
on consumption (fees, 
charges). As employment 
grows for the workforce 
age group, taxes on 
income.
Economic: 
Structure of  
output mix 
Home/self-employment 
Regulatory systems 
that enable such work; 
improvements in 
broad-band connec-
tivity.
Informal economy that 
calls for non-tax rev-
enues (license fees) and 
consumption and excise 
taxation; income taxes not 
likely to be feasible. 
Dominated by crop 
agriculture, both large and 
small producers’ mineral 
mining (at present, 55% 
of  the Kosovo population 
is agricultural/rural and 
45% urban). 
(i) Transportation; (ii) 
environmental control; 
(iii) need to develop 
off-site infrastructure 
for access to markets. 
(i) Suggests a focus on 
land value (or some proxy) 
and agricultural income 
tax; agricultural taxes may 
complement rather than 
be integrated with urban 
property taxation (e.g., use 
versus highest and best 
assessment); (ii) environ-
mental damage fees, inter-
governmental sharing of  a 
tax base (e.g., royalties). 
Small business
Technical support (e.g., 
agricultural research 
services).
Market excise tax on 
production and/or sales, 
plus “doing business” fees; 
presumptive taxation. 
Demographic: 
Spatial distribu-
tion of  popula-
tion 
Rural dominance 
Access to educational 
facilities 
Broad-based land taxation 
often politically difficult. 
Per house (communal) tax 
an option.
Urban dominance
Increased demands for 
most infrastructures 
services—look for 
economies of  scale 
and use of  special 
(rather than only gen-
eral purpose) govern-
ments.
At first, real estate (com-
mercial & residential) taxa-
tion feasible. Perhaps, as a 
communal levy, but then 
with progress to modern 
concept of  real estate tax. 
Low-rate business receipt 
taxes and market fees/
taxes are enforceable. 
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Table 1. Illustrations of  Local Fiscal Architecture (continued)
External Reality Trend/Condition Spending Implications Tax Implications
Institutional: 
Progress in 
scope and qual-
ity of  social 
services. 
Increase participation in 
education; distribution of  
clean water (if  not piped 
to residents and business-
es, then, at least, delivered 
to locations convenient to 
users). 
Water supply (central 
and regional) and 
distribution (local). 
Enabling environment 
for economic develop-
ment spending. 
Likely to be a measur-
able willingness to pay for 
service improvements; 
demonstrating the service 
quid pro quo is essential.  
Up-front external finan-
cial, technical, and capac-
ity assistance can play an 
important role.
Institutional: 
State of  public 
records; data. 
Many localities have no 
property records; or they 
are very old (census). 
In some countries, land 
ownership is communal 
and/or nomadic. 
General government.
May require presumptive 
taxation (which must be 
transparent); nomadic fee 
charging possible, but po-
litically difficult; taxpayer 
identification can be a 
hurdle.  
Institutional: 
Communications 
infrastructure.
Transportation modes; 
availability of  postal/mail 
services; IT usage by the 
public sector.
Highways (regional, 
national) and roads 
and streets (local).
Even if  assessment pos-
sible, how to collect, audit 
and appeal if  system is 
poorly developed?
Cultural: Ethnic 
mix; Views on 
basics such as 
a census, land 
tenure, what is a 
“tax.”
In some societies a census 
taker may be either sus-
pect and/or a family will 
not allow all members to 
participate; also concepts 
of  land ownership will 
vary (which, in turn, un-
dermines getting a taxable 
base). 
Policing, general 
government to ensure 
equal access to servic-
es; taxpayer services, 
mechanisms for citizen 
voice and participation 
in budget decisions. 
For census, sampling and 
estimating techniques 
become even more im-
portant. The economic 
vagaries may be easier to 
address; for example, that 
of  tax-related issues as to 
what constitutes “rights in 
land” may be sometimes 
addressed by distinguish-
ing between land rights, 
ownership and use. 
Source: Wallace 2003; Ebel and Taliercio 2006; Vaillancourt 2006. 
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Fiscal Decentralization in Eastern 
Europe: Stages of  Reform
Summarizing the decentralization experience and record of  Kosovo’s neighbors.
The financial reforms associated with decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990 
have reached different stages of  fruition in individual states. They have, however, pursued at a 
varied pace certain core objectives. These have aimed to increase local autonomy by
•  making the assignment of  revenues more transparent and objective and less dependent 
    on political favor;
•  improving local governments’ capacity to plan the development of  services and sustain 
    long-term debt by stabilizing the assignment of  revenues;
•  removing disincentives to revenue generation; and
•  increasing local budget discretion both over the choice of  expenditure and the levy of  
    taxes and/or charges.
Revenue Sharing
Assigned shares of  state taxes remain the predominant revenue for local governments in most 
CEE states. However, the following reforms have been widely made.
Rationalizing the Shared Tax Base
In most states tax sharing is now confined to large shares of  personal income tax (100% in Bul-
garia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine). Assignments of  shares of  corporate profit taxes (CPT) by 
origin have been largely eliminated, although retained in Poland, while sharing a portion of  the 
tax by formula continues in the Czech Republic. (Sharing CPT by origin is technically difficult 
since the point of  collection does not necessarily coincide with the real incidence and the base is 
too volatile to finance a large burden of  recurrent expenditure reliably). The introduction of  VAT 
has eliminated the sales tax revenues formerly assigned to local budgets, particularly in the for-
mer Yugoslav states, although some VAT shares are distributed by formula (e.g., Czech Republic, 
Macedonia, Romania). 
Uniform Assignment Of  Tax Shares
The discretionary and variable assignment of  tax shares which characterized the Socialist matrix 
systems has been abandoned in favor of  shares fixed and distributed by law to specific tiers or sizes 
of  local government. Initially these shares were prescribed by annual state budget laws, but in at 
least eight countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Ukraine) they are now set in permanent legislation to facilitate medium-term budget planning and 
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forecasting of  debt service capacity. 
Sharing by Origin or Formula
Two main patterns of  revenue sharing persist:
•    Assignment by origin accompanied by formula equalization (through horizontal redistri-
bution in Poland and partially in Albania and Ukraine, otherwise by an additional inter-
governmental transfer). Progress has been made in some but not all states in assigning 
PIT shares to the place where the payers reside rather than work.
•    Assignment of  a fixed percentage of  the nationwide yields by formula (usually and pre-
domi -nantly by population, weighted in favor of  larger municipalities to reflect their 
services to sur rounding areas).
Formula equalization usually takes account of  exogenous variations in both expenditure need and 
local revenue capacity, although dissociating revenue potential from actual levels of  collection 
has proved technically demanding and has not been universally achieved. In some states such as 
Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine equalisation only covers expenditures on delegated competences, 
chiefly education, health care and social welfare.
Grants
Where grants (as opposed to revenue shares) remain important local budget sources, the following 
reforms have been in progress:
Reducing Conditionality
It has generally been policy to consolidate a former array of  earmarked grants for recurrent ser-
vices into a single block grant. Although the expenditure demands of  individual services may be 
estimated when calculating the grants, they do not normally determine legally the use to which 
they may be put by local budgets. In some states such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia a spe-
cific grant is still given for the costs of  education (or more particularly teaching salaries) but with 
some flexibility over end use. In some countries local expenditure on social and housing benefits 
is reimbursed by national government according to actual cost.
Indexation
In some, though only a minority of  cases, the aggregate volume of  grants is indexed by law to an 
external factor. In Poland, for example, the general education grant must not fall below 12% of  
the total state budget.
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Calculation by Outputs
The input norms characteristic of  Socialist budgeting are being progressively abandoned. It is now 
regarded as more efficient to estimate aggregate expenditures on local government competences 
and disaggregate these to individual budgets by calculations of  relative spending needs based on 
exogenous variables such as the client population (e.g.. school age for education, children and the 
elderly for health services) and population density.
Hard Budget Constraints 
It is a general principle that assignments both of  grants and tax shares are not subject to variation 
during the budget year (although the actual receipts of  tax shares will depend on yields).
Local Own Revenues
Taxes
Taxes on land and buildings are the most common revenue solely assigned to local government. 
Individual local authorities are usually given discretion to determine assessment coefficients within 
prescribed limits, but freedom to set rates is currently confined to Macedonia, Montenegro, Po-
land, Romania and Slovakia, though more widely recognized as desirable. There is a wide but vary-
ing range of  local taxes on vehicles, small business profits, inheritance, land transfers and gifts.
In Croatia and Montenegro local governments are permitted to impose surcharges (up to 10%) on 
the rates of  personal income tax paid by their residents.
Hungarian local governments have the right to decide which of  five optional taxes to impose lo-
cally. This is rare. The Bulgarian Constitution forbids any body except Parliament to determine a 
tax rate.
Fees and Charges 
Local governments generally have far more discretion to determine rates of  charges and fees for 
specific services and administrative transactions and these are widely exploited, particularly where 
the incidence falls chiefly on businesses rather than voters.
State subsidies to public utility services have been progressively eliminated. This has given rise 
to substantial increases in the rates of  consumer charges, but these have been partially offset by 
targeted subsidies to keep the net cost of  rents and domestic utilities (principally heating) within 
prescribed percentages of  household income (usually around 20%).
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Capital Investment Funding
Grants
Most states have allocated grants for the repair and development of  infrastructure including roads, 
water supplies, sewerage and waste disposal, partially funded in some states by environmental 
penalties. These have been substantially augmented by European Union pre-accession funds in 
candidate countries and structural funds in the new member states. The distribution of  these has 
become subject to normative criteria in some countries such as Bulgaria, Poland and Ukraine, but 
they remain more subject to political discretion than in the case of  recurrent transfers.
Credit
Most local government legislation now permits local authorities to raise loans or issue bonds to 
fund capital investment within prescribed limits. Requirements for national government approval 
have been generally abolished but borrowing power is generally subject to some ratio of  debt or 
debt service to annual revenue.
Budgeting
Budgetary classifications are being widely reformed to disaggregate expenditure by purpose and 
output in place of, or as well as, inputs (wages, energy, transportation). 
In most states, once approved by elected representatives, budgets no longer require external ap-
proval. State administration officials may only intervene in local decisions where they consider 
them illegal and then only by reference to courts. Wider controls pertain to the exercise of  del-
egated functions.
Audit requirements vary and are generally inadequate. In most countries national or regional audit 
chambers inspect local government accounts, but in some cases their remit only extends to the use 
of  state budget transfers and reports are submitted to parliament rather than the local representa-
tive body. In other cases (e.g., Slovakia) local governments are required to appoint external and/or 
internal auditors. Audit is usually confined to the legality of  budget transactions, but in countries 
like Hungary efficiency is also coming under audit review. Both in Czech Republic and Hungary 
groups of  municipalities have compared unit costs of  specific services, while benchmarking initia-
tives are under way in Romania and Slovakia. 
Purchases of  goods and services (e.g., refuse collection or construction) generally require public 
advertisement and competitive tendering. 
These reforms have taken place over a period of  sixteen years since the fall of  the Berlin Wall. 
Their timing has followed no particular sequence, and has been largely occasioned by exogenous 
events such as changes in government, negotiations over European Union accession, territorial 
reform and national tax reform. Certain basic characteristics were defined in the initial legislation 
creating municipal government in the early 90s, but revenue bases remained subject to frequent ad 
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hoc changes for the rest of  the decade. The more permanent definitions of  revenue assignment 
have largely been enacted since the millennium as accession states have “tidied” up their decentral-
ization to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the former Yugoslav states have adjusted to 
the substitution of  VAT for sales taxes.
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Legal Framework and the European 
Charter of  Local Self-Government
Legal framework and the European Charter of  Local Self-Government for local government in Kosovo.
With the collapse of  Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, local self-government has become a key part of  the process of  institution building to 
establish democratic republics. In this context, the European Charter of  Local Self-Government 
(hereinafter, the Charter), adopted in 1985, and entered into force in 1988, has rapidly become 
the common reference for devising a new democratic local self-government system throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia1.  A common reference, the Charter can be applied 
through different systems of  intergovernmental (central-provincial-local) relationships. Govern-
ments may accede to the Charter with various degrees of  acceptance of  its provisions, between 
ratification in full and ratification of  a selection of  paragraphs, as allowed by Article 12. 
Whatever the future status of  Kosovo, the question of  the assessment of  the local self-govern-
ment system of  Kosovo by reference to the Charter is relevant. Until now, Serbia-Montenegro 
has not ratified the Charter, which therefore is not applicable to Kosovo, as it was not applicable 
to Montenegro. But Serbia will have to accede to the Charter if  the country is willing to achieve 
its political integration in European institutions. If  Kosovo were to become an independent state, 
as Montenegro has recently, its authorities will face the challenge of  complying with European 
instruments and standards in order to make possible the integration of  Kosovo in European in-
stitutions. Although Kosovar institutions have repeatedly voiced their commitment to respect the 
Charter, formal ratification will nevertheless be a key step toward Kosovo’s integration with Eu-
rope (two of  the important documents for the future of  local government, the Framework Docu-
ment for the Reform of  Local Self-Government in Kosovo (July 2004) and the Basic Principles 
of  Decentralization (November 2006), expressly affirm that the foundation of  local government 
will be the Charter). 
The Impact of  the Charter on Local Government Reforms in 
CEE Countries
For all countries of  Central and Eastern Europe, membership in the Council of  Europe expresses 
their commitment to the values codified in the Statute of  the Council of  Europe (the treaty es-
tablishing the Council of  Europe) and in the treaties elaborated by the Council of  Europe and 
submitted for signature and ratification to all member states. Two among the Council of  Europe 
treaties have particular importance: the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, including the protocols developed over the past few years and their guar-
antees, and the conventions regarding local self-government, especially the European Charter of  
Local Self-Government. Compliance with this legal framework has been a basic condition for later 
consideration of  an application for EC and EU membership. 
1   Council of  Europe Committee of  Ministers, European Charter of  Local Self  Government, Recommendation No. R (95)19, On 
the Implementation of  the Principle of  Subsidiarity, Adopted by the Committee of  Ministers on 12 October 1995.  
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The Charter is of  particular importance for the process of  institution building. As expressed in 
the preamble, “local authorities are one of  the main foundations of  any democratic regime”; “the 
right of  citizens to participate in the conduct of  public affairs is one of  the democratic principles 
that are shared by all member States of  the Council of  Europe”; and “[it] is at the local level that 
this right can be most directly exercised.” 
Beginning with Hungary, the following countries have ratified the Charter:  1994, Hungary, Poland; 
1995, Bulgaria, Estonia; 1997, Latvia, Macedonia (FYROM), Slovenia; 1998, Croatia, Moldova, 
Romania, Russia, Ukraine; 1999, Lithuania, Czech Republic; 2000, Albania, Slovakia; 2002, Arme-
nia, Azerbaïdjan, Bosnia and Herzegovina; and 2005, Georgia. Serbia and Montenegro signed the 
Charter on 24 June 2005, but it had not been ratified before the independence of  Montenegro 
(June 2006).
The Charter has direct influence as a legal framework of  reference on the new legislation on local 
government in these countries. Assistance is given to governments at the time of  preparing draft 
legislation so that it may refer systematically to the provisions of  the Charter. The Secretariat Gen-
eral of  the Council of  Europe then monitors compliance of  the legislation and of  government 
practice.
The Charter does not provide a model of  local self-government; it is rather a codification of  basic 
principles for a democratic local government system, based on the common but very diverse ex-
perience of  European countries. As a consequence, very diverse systems of  local self-government 
may comply with the Charter. The Charter’s structure is also partly responsible in that it allows 
countries some flexibility in deciding which principles to observe. In accordance with article 12, 
all paragraphs are considered individually as optional and signatories to the Charter decide which 
of  the required 20 provisions to bound themselves by. A core set of  14 paragraphs of  special im-
portance has been distinguished (part I of  the Charter), from which at least half  of  the required 
provisions must be chosen. 
Several countries decided to adhere to the totality of  paragraphs (Hungary, Poland, Russia, 
Ukraine), or with very few exceptions: for example Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia (at least for the 
territories upon which the government has effective jurisdiction), Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia. 
Provisions most frequently left aside are from articles 4, 7 and 9.2 The principle of  subsidiarity (art. 
4.3) has been left aside by Croatia, Georgia, and Slovakia; some paragraphs of  article 9 on financial 
autonomy have been left aside by some countries (Czech Republic: local tax power, equalization, 
consultation of  local authorities on redistributed resources; Slovakia: bound only by the principles 
of  proportionality and sufficiency, local tax power and access to the capital market for financing 
investments); paragraph 7.2 on compensation for the exercise of  the mandate of  elected repre-
sentatives has also been left aside by a number of  countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Georgia, Romania).
This possibility to choose the provisions by which to be bound has certainly facilitated the com-
mitment of  transition countries to the Charter. But in the end, this does not seem to be reflected in 
2   Article 4—Scope of  local self-government; Article 7—Conditions under which responsibilities at the local level are exercised; Article 
9—Financial resources of  local authorities.
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the legislation and in international declarations that, on the contrary, generally reflect a much wider 
adhesion to the principles codified by the Charter. For example, the Memorandum of  Understanding on 
Commitment of  the Ministers Responsible for Local Government of  South-Eastern Europe, signed in Zagreb 
on 26 October 2004, reaffirms the “importance of, and the commitment to, fully implementing the 
principles of  the European Charter of  Local Self-Government.”
Nevertheless, as in the rest of  Europe, the legislation on local self-government of  Central and 
Eastern European countries reflects a broad variety of  conceptions. This is because the principles 
of  the Charter can be translated into a wide array of  institutions and local government systems, 
including: more or less decentralized, with variations between sectors, with one (Bulgaria), two 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) or three (Poland) types of  local self-government, and with 
various arrangements regarding the relationships between central and local government. 
The Paragraphs Most Relevant for the Local Government 
Reform in Kosovo
There are eight articles in the Charter that have special relevance to Kosovo (Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8,       
9, 10 and 11). To summarize the relevant paragraphs: 
Article 2: Constitutional and Legal Foundation for Local Self-Government
Article 2 states that the signatories of  the Charter agree that “the principle of  local self-govern-
ment shall be recognized in domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution.” In-
deed, the fact that since 1990 all constitutions adopted in Central and Eastern Europe have con-
tained provisions on the recognition and the legal protection of  local self-government is probably 
a major impact of  the Charter.
Article 3: The Concept of  Local Self-Government 
The Charter’s concept of  local government is based on two ideas: (i)  local authorities have to man-
age a substantial share of  public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of  the 
local population; and (ii)  a right of  citizens that is exercised through elected councils or directly 
through referendums or other forms of  citizen participation.
This concept presumes a relatively unified local community. However, in Kosovo, a number of  
municipalities suffer ethnic divisions. In such a context, pure majority rule may have to be miti-
gated to safeguard the rights of  minorities, whereas referendums and popular initiatives might 
serve to strengthen ethnic divisions.3
3   Such dangers of  majority voting could be avoided if  a society has a judicial system (e.g., constitution, international conventions, 
courts, community mediation committees) that ensures minority rights and protections as, for example, currently established for a 
multiethnic Kosovo under the Constitutional framework 2001: UNMIK 2001/9; and the Framework for the Reform of  Local Self-
Government in Kosovo, July 2004).
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Article 4: The Scope of  Local Self-Government 
Article 4 is a key article of  the Charter. It provides the basic principles for designing the com-
petence (functional assignment and revenue authority) of  local authorities, and at the same time 
provides the criteria against which to assess the compliance of  this competence with the Charter. 
It must be emphasized that competence is a complex concept that does not have exactly the same 
meaning in all languages, but generally conveys several meanings. This cannot be detailed here, but 
throughout the rest of  this note, the word “responsibility” will be understood as functions, which 
may be of  two types: duties (an obligation) or powers (the function may be exercised or not). How-
ever, the word “power” is also used, depending on the context, as the legal act that may be used to 
exercise a function (Marcou 2006).
Just as the principle of  local self-government has to be recognized by legislation, and where “prac-
ticable,” by the constitution (art. 2), the powers and responsibilities of  local authorities have to 
be prescribed by statute or by the constitution (art. 4, para. 1). The powers and responsibilities of  
regions may also be stated constitutionally as a matter of  guarantee for local authorities that (i) the 
regional sphere of  competence is protected by the law and that (ii) the burden of  their tasks cannot 
be increased by discretionary decisions of  central government. 
The Charter does not advise that specific responsibilities (competencies) of  local authorities be 
prescribed by the constitution, but rather is permissive in that it allows the policymaker to take the 
practical and appropriate stance that this is a matter that is best left to statute as provided by the 
law (art. 4, para. 1) and to practice, as a nation’s fiscal architecture is apt to change (See briefing 
note on “Fiscal Architecture”). 
The Charter also refers to the distinction between own and delegated powers (art. 4, para. 5). 
Normally, responsibilities and powers of  local authorities are own responsibilities and powers, 
as reflected in article 3: they have to discharge “a substantial share of  public affairs under their 
own responsibility….” Delegated powers refer to tasks performed by local authorities under the 
responsibility of  central government, although the Charter prescribes that there shall be allowed 
enough discretion to adapt to local conditions (para. 5). Although not explicitly stated in article 
9, it derives from paragraph 2 of  this article (resources commensurate with the responsibilities 
provided by the law), that delegated powers have to be accompanied by the transfer of  resources 
to cover the expenditure they imply. 
In several countries having succeeded to former Yugoslavia, large municipalities of  the former 
socialist republic have been split up into more numerous and smaller municipalities, whereas the 
administrations working at the level of  the former large municipalities have become local branches 
of  central government administrations (Slovenia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Mace-
donia). This organization is compatible with the Charter only as far as new municipalities were de-
volved enough functions to comply with the concept of  local self-government (a substantial share 
of  public affairs under their own responsibility), and that sufficient administrative and financial 
resources are transferred to them. 
In Kosovo, at present, part of  the municipal administration is shared between the municipality and 
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the administrator appointed by the Special Representative of  the Secretary General (SRSG). In the 
future, the role of  such a central administrator should be reconsidered since the idea of  having 
central government representatives to co-run or supervise local government was rejected during 
the preparatory work of  the Framework Document for the Reform of  Local Self-Government in Kosovo as 
unnecessary and expensive and has not been mentioned at all during the final status negotiations 
by either Kosovo or the Belgrade delegations.
Several paragraphs of  article 4 provide basic principles for the legislation of  the powers and re-
sponsibilities of  local authorities. Of  particular relevance to Kosovo:
•   The general competence clause (para. 2): Local authorities…have full discretion to exercise their 
initiative with regard to any matter which is not excluded from their competence nor assigned to any other 
authority. This is a freedom clause, much more than a competence clause, and it is there-
fore a very important principle.
•     The principle of  subsidiarity (para. 3): Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised …by those 
authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of  responsibility to another authority should weigh 
up the extent and nature of  the task and requirements of  efficiency and economy. Thus, the principle 
of  subsidiarity may justify the allocation of  a task to a local authority, since it is closest to 
citizens, or justify the allocation of  this task to central government, because of  the extent 
or the nature of  the task or for reasons of  efficiency or economy. The use of  the word 
“allocation” means that the decision on this option belongs to the higher authority, e.g., as 
a rule to the central  government. As a result, the principle of  subsidiarity does not simply 
call for devolving more responsibilities to the local level, but rather involves assessing the 
relevance of  the allocation of  tasks among several government levels (see briefing notes 
on Expenditure Assignment). 
•   The principle of  completeness (para. 4): Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full   
    and exclusive. This principle is meant to enable local authorities to exercise powers within
 their own responsibility; it is assumed that, when powers are not full and exclusive, they 
are conditioned by the upper authority, at the detriment of  local self-government. The 
principle of  completeness is also a prerequisite for sound accountability arrangements: 
when too many  authorities are involved in the same tasks, none of  them is really ac-
countable. However, in practice it is very often difficult to adhere to this principle, be-
cause several levels of  government  are involved in all major fields of  responsibility, and, 
even if  powers are “full and exclusive,” it derives from shared responsibilities that each 
government is dependent on the others. The lowest are dependent on the upper for rule-
making and the upper on the lowest for implementation, but usually the configuration is 
much more complex.4 Therefore, the principle of  completeness should mainly serve as 
guidance for legislation and governments, to aim for a clear distribution of  powers and to 
4   The violation of  the principle of  completeness is particularly relevant in Kosovo. UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 (Section 41) rec-
ognized the right of  municipalities to own and manage municipal properties, and Regulation 2002/12 on the Establishment of  the 
Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) placed all Socially and Publicly Owned Properties under the administration of  KTA. This has seriously 
hampered local government from designing and implementing comprehensive local development plans, urban and spatial plans and 
has generally prevented municipalities from exercising full and exclusive powers over water supply and sewage systems formerly owned 
by municipalities, as they are now run by KTA.
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develop procedures for shared responsibilities. 
•     The idea of  paragraph 6 is: local authorities shall be consulted…in the planning and decision-making 
processes for all matters which concern them directly. However, this kind of  consultation should 
also be developed in shared fields of  responsibility and where local authorities have own 
powers.
Article 5: Protection of  Local Authority Boundaries 
This is obviously a burning issue in Kosovo. Article 5 reads: Changes in local authority boundaries shall 
not be made without prior consultation of  the local communities concerned, possibly by means of  a referendum where 
this is permitted by statute. The use of  the plural leaves open the possibility for determining which 
communities are to be consulted within the municipalities concerned. On this matter, the Charter 
pertains to large and small local authorities alike, but in Kosovo this is not only a matter of  size.
At present, municipal territories and boundaries are the responsibility of  the SRSG, in accordance 
with UNMIK regulation 2000/45. This should remain a central government responsibility in the 
future. 
As already stated, the Framework Document for the Reform of  Local Self-Government in Kosovo is contem-
plating options for a territorial reform: the two options being either to split up existing large mu-
nicipalities, or to keep them but with additional responsibilities delegated to sub-municipal units. 
Large municipalities have functional advantages, and sub-municipal units with elected bodies could 
be vested with significant responsibilities to discharge services that need to be close to citizens and 
that they can easily access on a daily basis. In large municipalities comprising several communi-
ties, this will encourage representatives to work together and build step-by-step the conditions for 
mutual trust. Sub-municipal units existed in the former Yugoslavia (mestna zajednica). Splitting up 
municipalities into smaller ones would probably create ethnically homogenous municipalities with 
concentrated minority populations, and make more difficult the institution building of  a “multi-
ethnic Kosovo” (also see briefing notes “Service Provision in a Decentralized Setting” and “Joint 
Service Delivery”). 5
Article 8: Administrative Supervision of  Local Authorities’ Activities
Article 8 states that administrative supervision is inherent to local self-government, but is at the 
same time limited by the proper concept of  local self-government. Thus, local self-government 
takes place in the broader system of  state organization, but is distinct and separate from the 
machinery of  the executive power which is under the authority of  the central government. Lo-
cal government activities are therefore subject to the law and are involved in the implementation 
of  various public policies and functions for which the central government is responsible. This is 
the rationale for administrative supervision. However, at the same time, the competence of  local 
self-government is protected by the law; therefore, supervision is not meant to be control at the 
5   There are serious concerns this principle of  the Charter may be violated by the UN Security Council or other institutions, which 
will decide on the future status of  Kosovo. There is abundant evidence that all parties involved (PISG, UNMIK, UNOSEK, Belgrade, 
Contact Group) will pursue the territorial division without prior consultation because of  the fears that public consultations might prove 
unsuccessful. Therefore, it is interesting to contemplate whether major political and security concerns may and should prevail over the 
Charter’s principles.
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discretion of  upper authorities; local authorities are not subordinated to the central government 
and its agencies.
Accordingly, the norms of  article 8 reflect the following restrictions on supervision. Administra-
tive supervision is: (i)   to be provided by the law and exercised only according to legal procedures; 
(ii)  aimed at compliance with the law; and (iii) to be kept in proportion with the interests it has 
to protect. Administrative supervision can be exercised with regard to expediency, as provided by 
paragraph 2 (2nd sentence), only for the execution of  delegated tasks.
On this basis administrative supervision can be organized in very different ways: by sectoral or 
general authorities of  the central government; or by judicial authorities, through prior or a posteriori 
scrutiny of  legal acts of  local authorities. When supervision is exercised by administrative authori-
ties, supervisory acts have to be subject to judicial review. The intensity of  this supervision should 
be regulated by the principle of  proportionality, as stated by article 8, paragraph 3. But this can be, 
and is, interpreted in very different ways from one country to another, from Eastern to Western 
Europe. However, the general tendency in Western Europe has been to alleviate administrative 
supervision.
One problem results from sectoral supervision, because the same authority may supervise the 
implementation of  delegated tasks and the performance of  own responsibilities, including those 
that are duties (mandatory tasks). In that situation, and due to routines established, there is a strong 
risk that higher authorities operate with an extensive conception of  supervision, and that this ex-
tensive conception will be accepted by the local administrations. This can be observed in a lot of  
countries during the transition period, and in particular in countries from the former Yugoslavia, 
as regards the supervision exercised by the local branches of  ministries maintained at the former 
municipal level. Therefore, the organization of  administrative supervision as a specific function of  
the central government, instead of  being simply an extension of  the competence of  the respective 
ministries, should contribute to avoid abusive interpretations of  supervision and to protect the 
sphere of  local self-government6.
Article 9: Financial Resources of  Local Authorities 
Sound local finance is a basic condition of  local self-government. At the same time, it depends 
heavily on the general economic situation of  the country, on the situation of  public finance as a 
whole and in particular on the tax system. Article 9 summarizes the basic principles for establish-
ing a sound local finance system. The principles are (i)  sufficient resources should be assigned to 
local authorities within national economic policy, and sufficient discretion be given over use of  
these resources within the framework of  their powers (para. 1); (ii)  all financial resources (not only 
assigned resources) have to be commensurate to responsibilities to be discharged (the principal of  
sufficiency, para. 2); (iii) own tax power and power to determine charges (para. 3);7(iv) buoyancy 
6   There is also a risk of  confusion when many sectoral ministries perform administrative supervision of  local governments over same 
or similar issues.
7   At least part of  resources have to derive from these powers; only revenues deriving from own taxes and charges upon which the 
local authority is, at a minimum, empowered to fix the rates, can be considered as own resources; on the contrary, tax shares (from the 
national or the local yield) are not own resources, because they reflect no power of  local authorities on their resources; tax shares are 
only assigned resources (see briefing note on Revenue Assignment).
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and diversity of  resources to ensure that resources of  local budgets will evolve with the costs of  
their tasks (para. 4); and (v)  equalization such that the local finance system has to provide for mea-
sures designed to correct the unequal geographic/jurisdictional distribution of  potential sources 
of  finance (para. 5). 
Additional principles of  article 9 concern capital expenditure. Grants should not be earmarked for 
specific projects, the provision of  grants should not remove the policy discretion of  local authori-
ties in their own jurisdiction (para. 7) and local authorities should have access to the national capital 
market to borrow (para. 8). 
Article 10: Local Authorities’ Right to Associate
The right to associate for local authorities consists of  three separate aspects: (i) cooperating to 
discharge functions; (ii) joining together to promote common interests with respect to other au-
thorities, in particular the central government; (iii)  favoring the exchange of  knowledge and ex-
perience, in particular, through participation in international organizations of  local authorities, 
whereby local authorities have access to different approaches and practices of  local government 
in other countries.
The first aspect above is a way to overcome problems of  economies of  scale and to internalize 
costs and benefits linked to particular services. If  large municipalities are maintained in Kosovo, 
the scope of  this kind of  association will remain limited; however, if  the decision is made to create 
smaller and more numerous municipalities, it will be necessary to provide for adequate forms of  
cooperation. Public law corporations may then offer better conditions in terms of  accountability 
to municipalities, although voluntary cooperation remains an option (see briefing note “Joint Ser-
vice Delivery”).  The second aspect corresponds to the necessity for local authorities to represent 
their own interests before the central government and to participate in local government reforms. 
Additionally, such associations can provide services to their members. The last aspect seems par-
ticularly important in the case of  Kosovo, to give to local councilors and mayors the opportunity 
to consider local self-government and the performance of  local government functions outside of  
the Kosovar context and its conflicts. 
Article 11: Legal Protection of  Local Self-Government 
Article 11 is about the judicial protection of  local self-government rights. Local authorities must 
have a right of  recourse to judicial remedy. The efficiency of  judicial remedies depends very much 
on the capacity of  the judiciary to deal with the settlement of  legal disputes in general. Several 
countries have assigned these types of  disputes—at least when legislation or government regula-
tions are at stake—to a constitutional court. This option represents an opportunity to transfer this 
function to a new kind of  court, which is much less entangled in the difficulties of  a country’s ju-
dicial organization and therefore should be in a better position to protect self-government rights.
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A Strategy for Signing the Charter
At present it is difficult to contemplate a strategy for signing the Charter, since only a state can 
be party to the treaty, and the future of  Kosovo is not settled. A first option could be to pursue 
the ratification of  the Charter by Serbia. Since Serbia has signed the Charter on 24 June 2005, the 
ratification would bind Kosovo in its status as a province. This would probably be the quickest 
solution. There would be advantages in the application of  the Charter to Serbia too. The questions 
arise, however, as to (i) whether this would be binding to an independent Kosovo; and (ii) would 
in the short term open the way for Serbia to force decentralization policies in Kosovo arguing that 
acceptance of  ratification by Serbia may be construed as acceptance of  application of  the Char-
ter in the whole territory of  Serbia including Kosovo. Thus, if  the discussions on the future of  
Kosovo result in the decision to turn Kosovo into a new independent state, it is probable that the 
ratification of  the Charter will take much more time.
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Fiscal Autonomy
The question of  the importance and the fiscal measurement of  the concept of  “local self-government.” 
A well-designed intergovernmental fiscal system is characterized by a high degree of  subnational 
(e.g., local) fiscal autonomy. Indeed, the preamble to the European Charter of  Local Self-Govern-
ment recognizes that local governments require a “wide degree of  autonomy with regard to their 
responsibilities and…the resources required for their fulfillment (Council of  Europe 1985).” The 
Charter further provides guarantees of  autonomy with respect to the four fiscal pillars: expen-
ditures (Article 4, para. 3); revenues (Article 9, para. 3); the use of  intergovernmental transfers 
(Article 9, para. 7); and borrowing and debt (Article 9, para. 8).1
The purpose of  this briefing note is threefold. The first is to provide some perspective on how 
“autonomy” fits within the broader framework of  fiscal decentralization. The second is to review 
what we know about why fiscal autonomy matters—to go beyond the stated objectives of  the 
European Charter and focus on the potential payoffs of  autonomy. Finally, the  third  looks at 
the question of  how to move from goals and objectives to how policymakers should think about 
implementation of  fiscal autonomy. It is one thing for policymakers to promote fiscal autonomy 
as a statement of  principles, and a very different matter to make it work in practice. 
Two Points that Provide Perspective 
At the outset of  a discussion on fiscal autonomy, two general points must be noted. The first 
relates to terminology, while the second is a comment on the difficulties inherent in measuring 
decentralization and the degree of  fiscal autonomy.
The Three Ds
A brief  clarification of  terminology is warranted. Decentralization and subnational fiscal auton-
omy are clearly interrelated concepts, but the term decentralization can  encompass several distinct 
governmental arrangements, each of  which may be present, and each of  which has it place, in a 
country’s public sector system (Bird, Ebel, Wallich 1995): 
•     Deconcentration refers to the placement of  the central government ministry offices in lo-
cal areas (regional offices). Deconcentration with authority refers to arrangements whereby 
regional branches or offices of  the central government are vested with some ability to 
make independent decisions. Deconcentration without authority occurs when these regional 
offices have no independent capacity for decision-making and all deviations from  normal 
practice must be approved by the center. 
1  The European Charter contains other provisions guaranteeing local self-government/autonomy with respect to the principle of  
decentralization (preamble), protection of  local authority boundaries (Article 5), administrative structures (Article 6), and rights of  as-
sociation (Article 10). Each of  these “non-financial” issues is addressed in other briefing notes of  the present volume.
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•  Delegation is a process whereby local governments (not branches of  a central ministry) 
are given responsibility for delivering certain services,  but then are subject to more or 
less detailed supervision by the central government, which also may (and in most cases 
should) provide some or all of  the financing for the services. The design of  intergovern-
mental fiscal transfers and the degree of  central monitoring will determine the balance of  
central and local influence in such delegated areas of  responsibility.
•    Devolution is the most complete form of  decentralization and the variant associated with 
“fiscal autonomy.” Independently established subnational governments (SNGs) are given 
responsibility for the delivery of  a set of  public services along with the authority to 
impose taxes and fees to finance the services. Devolved governments have considerable 
flexibility in selecting the mix and level of  services to provide. Some financial support 
may be provided by the central government (see briefing notes on “Revenue Assign-
ment” and on “Intergovernmental Transfers”). 
Measurement
There are several good reasons why a public sector should be decentralized, each of  which is 
ultimately tied to the theme that a well-decentralized system is key to accomplishing a society’s (na-
tion’s) broader economic goals such as improved economic efficiency, enhanced economic growth, 
and macroeconomic stabilization. 
The challenge is: how does one know that decentralization delivers on these promises? The theory 
makes good sense, but, in fact, the reality of  the claims are very hard to measure because the type 
of  data needed to define a country’s degree of  decentralization (the “decentralization variable”) 
is lacking. At present, the most consistently collected and reliable database is that reported in the 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of  the International Monetary Fund (Kaiser 2004). Although the 
GFS series is extremely useful for carrying out a large variety of  analytical tasks, it is still focused 
on the macroeconomic performance of  a nation as a whole and not its constituent or decentral-
ized parts. Therefore the GFS series does not easily lend itself  to measurement of  the degree of  
fiscal decentralization. Analysts wanting to measure the degree of  fiscal autonomy and devolution 
within a country have to come up with ways to specify the decentralization variable. Fortunately, 
some very good recent work has been done and we are beginning to get some empirical answers 
to the question of  “why fiscal autonomy matters?” (Jensen 2001; Yilmaz, Hegedus and Bell 2003; 
Moloche, Vaillancourt and Yilmaz 2004; Bell 2006).2 
Why Fiscal Autonomy Matters
While acknowledging the difficulty of  measuring decentralization, here is what we know empiri-
cally about the relationship between decentralized fiscal autonomy (devolution, local self-govern-
ment) and the accomplishment of  a nation’s broader economic and fiscal objectives:3
2  The Local Government Initiative/Open Society Institute–Budapest, in cooperation with the Organization For Economic Develop-
ment (Paris), was among the first institutions to initiate this work. See the links to the Fiscal Decentralization Initiative on both the 
LGI/OSI and OECD websites. 
3  This discussion draws on Meloche, Vaillancourt and Yilmaz 2004.
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•    Developed countries are associated with mature systems of  decentralization and varying 
     degrees of  fiscal autonomy (e.g., Akai and Sakata 2003). Conversely, the dismal macro-eco 
nomic  record of  centralized command and control under Communist regimes in Cetral 
and Eastern Europe has been well documented  (Bird and Banta 1999; Dunn and Wetzel 
2002).
•   It is expected that if  decentralization enhances efficiency in the allocation of  public ser-
vices, this should show up as economic growth. There is some evidence that such a 
relationship exists with respect to the revenue side of  the budget. Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (1997) reach this conclusion with respect to change in per capita income. Ebel 
and Yilmaz (2003), by  defining the “decentralization variable” in terms of  both a narrow 
and broad definition of  revenues (the broad definition including unrestricted grants), 
reach a similar conclusion with respect to the growth rate of  real per capita output.4 A 
similar finding with respect to revenue autonomy has been reported in Meloche, Vail-
lancourt and Yilmaz 2004, which concludes that “decentralization of  expenditures com-
ing with centrally controlled revenues seems to be an obstruction to economic growth.” 
However, there is less evidence of  the role of  expenditure decentralization, though in 
recent research on this topic Imi (2005) concludes that in a mixed pool of  developed and 
transition countries decentralization “particularly on  the  expenditure side is instrumental 
to economic growth.”5
• On the matter of  macroeconomic stability, there is evidence that subnational revenue 
autonomy improves the fiscal position of  subnational governments, but that a reliance 
on intergovernmental transfers may worsen that fiscal position (Ebel and Yilmaz 2003).6 
• The findings relating to the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public sector 
size is decidedly mixed, with some studies finding no evidence of  a relationship (Oates 
1985), and others suggesting that the public sector’s expenditure share of  national GDP 
decreases with the increase in subnational tax autonomy (Ebel and Yilmaz 2003). 
There is one overarching caveat and three conclusions that can be drawn from the empirical lit-
erature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization (fiscal autonomy) and the effect on the 
overall economic and fiscal performance of  the public sector. The caveat is that in examining this 
relationship between decentralization and economic welfare, it takes considerable time for decen-
tralization to have an impact—that a change in governance is often not a change of  systems, but 
rather one of  the pre-conditions for that change (Kornai 1992).
The first conclusion to be drawn from the empirical literature is that care must be taken in inter-
preting the available data. Second, the emerging research based on improved data and methodology 
4  However, no attention is given to the important question of  the size of  subnational government relative to total government.
5  There is some econometric evidence of  a negative relationship between decentralization and economic growth (deMello 2000; 
Davoodi and Zou 1998), but the findings of  this path-breaking econometric work have been largely supplanted because use of  GFS 
data led to the misspecification of  the “decentralization variable” (Akai and Sakata 2002; Yilmaz, Hegedus and Bell 2003; Moloche, 
Vaillancourt and Yilmaz 2004).
6  There is evidence to the contrary, which is not reported here because use of  GFS data led to the misspecification of  the “decentral-
ization variable.” For a review of  the issue, see Yilmaz, Hegedus and Bell 2003 and Meloche, Vaillancourt and Yilmaz 2004. 
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allows us to posit a positive relationship between decentralization and the economic performance 
of  nations. Third—and clearly the most important message for Kosovo (and, for that matter, any 
newly decentralizing society) — is that now is the time to establish an intergovernmental data series 
for measuring the degree of  decentralization. Just what this data series might look like is the topic 
of  the discussion below.
What Makes Subnational Government Fiscally 
Autonomous?7
Revenue Autonomy
Revenue autonomy (or revenue decentralization) can be seen as a continuum of  three types of  
revenues: (a) own source revenues; (b) shared revenues (based on derivation basis, but for autono-
mous use); and (c) a variety of  transfers. For the purposes of  this discussion a distinction has been 
drawn between revenue autonomy (tax and “non-tax” revenues such as charges and fees) and in-
tergovernmental transfers (to be addressed in the following section). Adopting this approach, rev-
enues of  SNGs may be divided into categories of  decreasing local autonomy (Table 1). If  SNGs 
have total or significant control over a tax, fee or charge as demonstrated by political control over 
the tax rate (necessary and sufficient) or base, it is a subnational (local) tax. If  the SNG does not, 
at a minimum, have control over the rate of  a tax, then the tax is not local. Thus, for example, that 
the central government may split revenues (tax sharing) with the SNG (where the central tax is 
collected) does not make it a local tax (Blochliger and King 2006). 
7  This discussion draws on the work of  Leif  Jensen (2001) and Working Party 2 of  the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of  the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Seminal Work is Paper No. 7 of  the OECD Tax Policy Studies series, 
Fiscal Design Surveys Across Levels of  Governments (Jensen 2001). 
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Table 1. Classification of  Local Taxes by Degree of  Local Autonomy 
High Revenue 
Autonomy 
No Local Au-
tonomy 
SNG sets tax rate and base.
Highest degree of  own source revenues. 
Most often pertains to fees and charges; 
refer to Tables 3 and 4.
SNG sets tax rate only. 
Necessary and sufficient condition for cat-
egorization as “own revenue” (piggyback-
ing, tax base harmonization/conformity 
permitted). 
SNG sets tax rate, but only within 
centrally permissible ranges. 
A typical practice is to cap the top rate. 
Tax sharing whereby central/local 
revenue split can be only changed with 
consent of  SNG. 
Can result when a local authority collects 
the tax and remits to the center 
Revenue sharing with share deter-
mined unilaterally by central authority. 
100% control by center; this category is a 
source of  much misspecification of  what 
is a central vs. local revenue (GFS includes 
this category as a local tax). 
Central government sets rate and base 
of  “SNG revenue.” 
May accompany political decentralization. 
Source: Adapted from Jensen 2001.
Intergovernmental Grants
Similar to that for taxes and non-tax charges and fees, the framework for classifying grants is struc-
tured according to the degree to which SNGs can control the use of  funds transferred from the 
central government. As discussed in the briefing note Intergovernmental Transfers, grants may be 
either conditional or unconditional, and as with revenues, there is a continuum (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Classification of  Intergovernmental Grants by Degree of  Fiscal Autonomy 
High Au-
tonomy With 
Respect to 
Transfers 
Low or No Lo-
cal Autonomy 
Unconditional Grant (which may be 
formula based or in the form of  rev-
enue sharing) 
Highest degree. Note that whereas revenue 
sharing was given low marks in terms of  “own” 
revenue autonomy, if  that shared portion is 
returned to the SNG where is was collected, 
it takes on the character of  a very flexible 
transfer. 
Conditional Non-Matching
The donor government gives the recipient SNG 
a sum with the stipulation that funds shall be 
used for a specific purpose. Given the fungible 
nature of  this grant, it can offer a degree of  
fiscal autonomy.
Conditional, open-ended matching
Now, flexibility is diminished due to the match-
ing requirement. Though there is still a degree 
of  flexibility due to fungibility, with the match-
ing requirement it is difficult to say that this 
form of  grant gives an SNG much flexibility 
(autonomy). 
Conditional, closed-ended
This is as specific as a grant is likely to become. 
The grant is clearly designed to influence the 
composition of  SNG spending. Such specific 
grants certainly have their merits (e.g., to adjust 
for net externalities), it is just that they do not 
add to the degree of  SNG fiscal autonomy. 
Source: Adapted from Table A-1 from the briefing note “Intergovernmental Transfers”
Expenditures
Just as getting clarity in the sorting out of  (or assignment of) expenditures is probably the most 
difficult intergovernmental design, so too is the expenditure side the most problematic task for 
determining the degree of  subnational fiscal autonomy. As a generalization of  that problem, the 
issue is the degree to which the center “interferes” with and/or “mandates” how local revenues 
shall be spent. The issue is a most important one since local officials will balk at taking on the 
political risk of  raising revenues unless they can demonstrate to citizens some service delivery quid 
pro quo. A policymaker loaded with central restrictions on the spending of  local funds cannot make 
that service-tax cost link.
An additional challenge on the expenditure side is that autonomy may differ across different func-
tional classifications (e.g., health, education, and infrastructure). Also, developing measures of  
autonomy over expenditures is difficult because of  the many ways central government can control 
spending by SNGs. For example, in South Africa and Pakistan, local governments have discretion 
over some expenditure categories, but negotiating wages and work rules with municipal unions 
is centralized at the national level (Bell 2006). A further problem is that the center may prescribe 
administrative arrangements for  subnational governments; for example, in Pakistan the center 
prescribes the provincial and local (district, town) organizational charts. 
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Table 3, which is illustrative, presents a typology for identifying the role of  SNGs in service deliv-
ery as developed by Bell (2006). The various dimensions of  service delivery include policymaking, 
control of  the civil service, standard setting, administration, and monitoring and evaluation. Note 
that to get a clear sense of  the degree of  expenditure autonomy, one would have to develop a Table 
3 matrix on a sector-by-sector basis.8 
8  And then develop—or at least have some good sense of—a weighted index of  the relative importance of  each sector. Thus, for 
example, a local government might have complete control over expenditure decisions relating to a relatively “small” function such as 
maintaining local roadways (e.g., which road to repair and when and how to do it), but very little control over a “ large” sector that 
dominates the budget (e.g., the center sets the teacher and staff  salaries as well as determines who to hire, promote, and/or fire).
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Table 3. An Illustration of  the Elements of  Subnational Fiscal Autonomy with Respect to 
Expenditures
Factor Influ-
encing Degree 
of  Autonomy
Description of  the Factor
Central Control and Low 
Degree of  Fiscal Autonomy
High Degree of  Subnational 
Fiscal Autonomy
Broad Control 
over Policy 
Which government sets the 
main policy guidelines for a 
service (e.g., free primary edu-
cation as a national policy)?
Center either makes or has 
final control over the local 
budget; and/or can over-
ride provisions of  the local 
budget.
Clearly delineated assignment 
of  functions; SNG controls 
its own budget process and 
budget execution institutions 
(accounting systems, treasury 
operations, internal and 
external audit).
Civil Service 
Control over the level of  the 
wage bill and decisions with 
respect to hiring, promotion 
and firing.
Center determines (perhaps 
through negotiation) the level 
and structure of  civil servant 
salaries and the conditions of  
employment.
Local control over civil 
servants who are engaged in 
the delivery of  local public 
goods and services. Includes 
agreements and settlements 
on wages and employment 
conditions.
Standards 
Setting and 
Regulation
Which government sets the 
standards for the composi-
tion of   local public services 
and the regulations that may 
accompany SNG spending 
programs?
(i) Central standardization 
imposed in circumstances 
where there are no clear 
“spillovers.” Which unit of  
government sets the stan-
dards? (e.g., national tests of  
teacher certification may be 
justified for their externalities; 
land use zoning and building 
codes all fail the externalities 
test and are typically local). (ii) 
Lack of  consultation when 
there are external effects.
Local control consistent with 
compliance with the law, 
constitutional principles and 
international standards of  
human rights. 
Administration 
Administration of  service 
delivery on a day-to-day basis.
Mandating of  internal 
administrative organization 
and day-to-day expenditure 
management (e.g., procure-
ment practices). 
Local authorities determine 
their own internal adminis-
trative structures in order to 
adapt them to local needs 
and ensure effective manage-
ment (see European Charter 
1985).
Monitoring 
and Evaluation
Which government monitors 
and evaluates SNG perfor-
mance. 
The center has an appropriate 
and important role in moni-
toring fiscal flows (spending 
and revenues). But monitor-
ing shall not be confused with 
control.
Clarity in revenue and 
expenditure assignments is 
achieved and a responsibil-
ity to report fiscal flows, 
including flows from external 
(foreign) sources, is accepted 
and practiced. 
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Borrowing and Debt
In principle, there is no reason that an SNG should not borrow. Indeed, as long as the SNG is 
subject to a clear set of  rules that establish accountability and lead to a hard budget constraint, 
borrowing to finance capital expenditures promotes efficiency and equity. Because capital (invest-
ment) expenditures provide a flow of  current benefits over time (the life of  the project), it is 
efficient to spread the capital cost recovery process over that same time period. Moreover, using 
“other peoples’ money” provides fiscal space for economic development spending. Equity is sat-
isfied by spreading out the payment of  the capital costs over successive generations that benefit 
from the subsequent year-to-year flow of  services of  the initial investment year. Repayment may 
be based on revenues from the investment itself  (for example if  user charges are imposed on a 
market) or from general taxes. 
For fully advanced countries in which subnational governance and capital markets are well devel-
oped, there is little, if  any, reason for a “higher” level of  government to legally constrain SNG bor-
rowing since the capital markets become the agent for enforcing financial discipline through bond 
rating mechanisms and the understanding that a profligate local government will be allowed to fail. 
However, the typical practice, in developed and developing countries alike, is to establish a rule-
base system that is designed to insure accountability and fiscal discipline. Thus, in some countries 
the central government imposes strict administrative controls (e.g., local authority borrowing is 
subject to approval by the central government in Ireland, Japan, Korea and the United Kingdom). 
Other countries rely on mechanisms for formal cooperation and coordination. For example, in 
Germany, the Financial Planning Council establishes an intergovernmental (central, lander, and 
municipal) debt strategy, whereas in the Netherlands regular meetings are held between the cen-
tral authority and the association of  municipalities. Several countries employ a balanced budget 
requirement monitored by the center (Ireland and Spain). There are also limitation arrangements 
as in Poland whereby subnational governments are subject to specific limits on  debt and debt 
service. And, as in Egypt, many states enact “golden rule” laws or regulations designed to insure 
that borrowing is for long-term investment only. 
Enforcement procedures are coupled with these ex-ante fiscal discipline mechanisms. In Poland the 
Regional Clearing Chamber may require a subnational authority to amend its budget. And, in Bra-
zil, the Fiscal Responsibility Law and its companion legislation allows states and municipalities to 
borrow under the conditions that they maintain debt stocks below specified ceilings and establish 
annual targets for revenues, expenditures, and the balance and changes in the stock of  debt. SNGs 
failing to comply with these rules will face sanctions, including the nullification of  contracts and 
fines. And, for governors and mayors who are chronic rule breakers, there is the threat of  impeach-
ment and imprisonment.
Drawing on Joumard and Kongsrud 2003, Table 4 illustrates the degrees of  subnational fiscal au-
tonomy with respect to the revenue source of  “using other people’s money” to pursue economic 
development objectives (borrowing and debt).
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Table 4. Classification of  Borrowing and Debt Authority by Degree of  Local Autonomy 
High 
Revenue 
Autonomy 
No Local 
Autonomy 
Market Discipline 
(Australia, the states 
of  the United States, 
Canadian provin-
cial and territorial 
governments, Czech 
Republic). 
SNGs borrow on their own account, from internal and external 
country sources alike. This requires that the market assess the 
creditworthiness of  the borrower. There’s a clear understanding 
that subnational borrowing shall not be guaranteed by the central/
state government; however, there may, and should be, a default/
bankruptcy “work-out” procedure codified in the law. 
Cooperative Ap-
proach I (Germany) 
The Landers agree to the “golden rule” of  borrowing for only 
capital investment expenditure. The same is true for municipalities 
but their borrowing is subject to regional approval. Peer pressure 
to comply is introduced by the Financial Planning Council, which 
monitors fiscal flows and may make recommendations for restor-
ing fiscal discipline as required.
Cooperative Ap-
proach II  (Austria)
Municipalities as a group agree to balance their budgets, with the 
possibility of  providing deficits/surplus rights to other govern-
ments. Governments failing to meet their targets are subject to 
fines and sanctions by an intergovernmental commission. The 
fine may be refundable if  fiscal discipline is restored. There is an 
“escape clause” in case of  serious economic downturn. 
Cooperative Ap-
proach III (Nether-
lands)
Subnational governments are free to borrow as long as they run 
balanced budgets. Regular meetings are held between central au-
thorities and the Dutch Association of  Municipalities on financial 
issues. Provinces are responsible for errant municipalities, and 
the center will intervene to bail out in exchange for loss of  SNG 
financial independence.
Fiscal Rules without 
sanctions (Finland 
municipalities)
Law requires SNGs to achieve a balanced budget as well as make 
plans on how to cover any deficit. Borrowing is coordinated by the 
municipalities’ organization. There is no central guarantee.
Fiscal Rule With 
Sanctions (Brazil)
The Fiscal Responsibility Law requires states and municipalities 
to establish agreed upon annual targets for taxing, spending, stock 
of  debt. States are free to borrow as long as they comply with the 
targets. SNGs failing to comply are subject to a number of  finan-
cial sanctions (e.g., nullification of  contracts made). At the extreme 
governors and mayors risk impeachment and imprisonment
Fiscal Rule With 
Central Intervention 
(Norway)
Whereas there are no explicit restrictions on SNG borrowing, if  
an SNG runs a deficit  over two years, the central government 
intervenes with the power to approve borrowing.  
No SNG Autonomy 
(Greece, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, UK)
SNGs must submit their budgets for central approval; borrowing 
is subject to central approval (either all borrowing or borrowing 
within certain limits such as some percent of  current revenues 
and/or debt service).
Source: Adapted from Joumard and Kongsrud 2003.
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Intergovernmental Assignment of  
Expenditure Responsibility 
Addressing the question of  which government shall be responsible for which set of  public services in a 
decentralized system. 
The first and most difficult of  the five fundamental questions facing any intergovernmental society 
is the question of  assigning expenditure responsibilities; that is, which government shall provide 
which set of  public functions? The question’s difficulty stems from a combination of  factors 
ranging from the economic “openness” of  subnational (e.g., local) jurisdictions (unlike a central 
government, subnational units cannot effectively constrain the flow of  good and services or the 
factors of  production across their borders) to the shared or partnership nature of  much public 
expenditure. Indeed, depending on a variety of  circumstances (e.g., the nature of  the production 
process, geographic dispersion of  users, degree of  own revenue autonomy of  local governments, 
language and/or ethnicity of  the population), what is largely a “local” service in one country or 
region may be more centralized in another. Thus, there cannot be said to be one correct answer to 
the “which-government-does-what” question. There are however some principles and guidelines 
that should frame the policy debate. The purpose of  this essay is to systematically lay out these 
principles and guidelines in a manner useful to the policy practitioner. 
In order to accomplish this goal, this note begins with a brief  commentary on two threshold topics 
that are often ignored in the expenditure discussion: (1)  what justifies public expenditures in the 
first place? Or, its converse, why not let the private sector do all the spending? And (2)  what are 
the forms that spending may take? From here the essay moves directly to the two facets of  expen-
diture decentralization: (i)  the nature of  the normative framework that public finance economists 
describe as the “branches” of  the public sector budget; and (ii)  the application of  a set of  objec-
tive principles that allows policymakers, central and local, to get down to the practical business of  
the intergovernmental sorting out of  expenditure (functional) responsibilities. 
Two Threshold Topics  
Public vs. Private
The economically successful society—which uses its scarce economic resources of  people, capi-
tal and land to maximize total economic welfare—must have a mix of  expenditures on privately 
and publicly provided goods and services (Samuelson 1954). Therefore, the first question public 
policymakers, central and local (e.g., provincial, municipal) must address is just what is that mix? 
That is, what makes one type of  spending a private sector function and another a public respon-
sibility? The normative response to this question is based on the concept of  “market failure”—a 
circumstance where the pursuit of  private interest does not lead to an efficient use of  society’s 
resources or to a fair distribution of  those resources (e.g., certain goods that citizens demand but 
cannot be priced; the existence of  net negative or positive externalities; over consumption of  
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common property resources such as air and water; monopoly power). But it is also true that there 
can be “government failure” when collective decisions undermine social welfare (e.g., influence of  
organized “rent seeking” in the form of  restricting competition to the interest of  special benefits; 
limited information on the implementation and/or consequences of  bureaucratic actions; failure 
to recognize how markets will work to circumvent government action; nontransparent and/or 
elite capture of  the electoral process and/or electoral funding). The role of  government has been 
adequately discussed elsewhere and needs no further elaboration  here.91  Suffice it to say that this 
question of  “what is and what is not a proper role for public intervention?” is important for cen-
tral and local policymakers alike and should be the first test of  any public decision to undertake a 
spending activity.
Forms of  Spending
Governments have three mechanisms with which to carry out their expenditure responsibilities: 
(1) “functional” spending made through the budgetary process; (2) regulation of  private activities; 
and (3) tax expenditures. Of  these three responsibilities, this essay focuses on the assignment of  
functions through the typical process of  the functional budget, the cost and accounting financial 
plan that implements a government’s spending choices.102  
Regulations are both complements and substitutes to budgetary spending and typically involve 
mandating private agents to spend on tasks that the government would otherwise carry out. For 
example, business firms are often required to dispose of  their solid waste, with such regulations 
accompanied by fines for noncompliance. Similarly, there can be regulations relating to health 
and sanitation, environmental control, and building and land use practices (for household and 
businesses alike). The use of  such regulation to impose costs on households or firms cannot be 
justified on the basis that it reduces budgetary government spending, or worse, as a technique to 
hide the costs to society of  governmental decisions. Regulation can, however, be appropriate if  
it is designed to “internalize” what are appropriately private sector costs of  production and/or 
privately generated external costs to society as a whole.113  
A third, and often much less transparent, way of  spending is by the use of  tax expenditures. Tax 
expenditures are revenue losses resulting from provisions that grant special tax relief  designed to 
encourage certain kinds of  taxpayer behavior and/or to aid taxpayers in special circumstances. 
They may take one of  several forms; can be hard to measure; and are typically not given the peri-
odic budget review required for good public financial management.124
1  E.g., for further discussion, see Musgrave 1959; Mikesell 2003; Weimer and Vining 2005; Bird and Vaillancourt 2006.
2   The related technical issues of  “off ” vs. “on” budgeting and extra-budgetary accounts is not discussed here. For more on these 
issues, see Wong with Gooptu and Martinez-Vazquez 2002.
3  Whenever one economic actor (a firm or individual) undertakes an action that incurs a (net) added value or cost to another economic 
actor, there is an externality. If  these added values (positive externalities) are not paid for by the recipient or net costs (negative externali-
ties) are not paid for by the first actor, the result is inefficient resource allocation.
4  Gravelle 2005 identifies four variants: (i) exclusions, exemptions, and deductions, which reduce taxable income; (ii) preferential rates, 
which apply lower rates to part or all of  a taxpayer’s income; (iii) credits subtracted from taxes and ordinarily computed; and (iv) defer-
rals of  tax, which result from delayed recognition of  income by allowing deductions in the current year that are properly attributable 
to a future year.
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Normative Framework         
        
Once it has been decided that there is a case for public intervention, the next step—the econom-
ics of  fiscal decentralization—involves two facets (Dafflon 2006). The first facet is to lay out the 
normative framework that identifies the broad functions of  the public sector in an intergovern-
mental (multi-tier) context. There are three such roles or branches of  the public sector budget: 
(i) macroeconomic stabilization; (ii) making adjustments in the overall distribution of  income and 
wealth; and (iii) the allocation function of  commandeering private resources for public use (Mus-
grave 1959). The third facet (to be discussed in the following section) involves establishing criteria, 
according to a set of  principles and objectives, for sorting out which government does what with 
respect to the allocation function. 
To summarize, the three broad roles of  the public sector: 
• Responsibility for stabilization. The maintenance of  high employment and price stabil-
ity should be assigned to the central government.135    This is true for two reasons. First, 
the economically and fiscally open character of  economies in subnational jurisdictions 
prevents subnational governments from effectively addressing macroeconomic concerns 
such as employment and price levels. For example, a successful employment program 
will likely attract job-seeking in-migrants from other jurisdictions, thereby dampening the 
employment effect for local residents.146   Second, the institutional economic reality is that 
one of  the basic tools of  stabilization policy—control over the money supply through 
a monetary authority—rests with a central bank (or, which may be, as in the case of  
Kosovo, a supra-national authority,  i.e. the European Central Bank).157 
• For much the same reason, because subnational economies are “open,” securing equity 
in the distribution of  income and wealth should largely be a central responsibility. A local 
government policy of  “pro-poor” tax and transfer entitlements runs the risk of  attracting 
the poor to the jurisdiction, while at the same time providing an incentive for high and 
middle income families to relocate to another jurisdiction and/or move their capital out 
of  the redistributing district. Indeed, the outcome of  an aggressive local policy to redis-
tribute income and wealth from rich to poor may result in a perverse equality—everyone 
will be poor (Oates 1972). Now, the mobility of  factors such as labor and capital will vary 
according to socio-economic factors. For example, if  the borders of  local jurisdictions 
coincide with those of  traditional ethnic, linguistic, or religious groupings, then redis-
tributive policies carried out locally may be less likely to induce migration. Under these 
circumstances, at least in the short to medium term, subnational local policies may have 
some latitude to redistribute income. But regardless of  the degree of  such mobility (of  
5 This is also becoming the case across nations, thus calling for international coordination of  macro policies.
6 There are two different stabilization issues: (i) whether the aggregate fiscal position (taxes and spending) of  the subnational sector 
influences the overall national economy; and (ii) whether subnational fiscal changes during economic recessions or expansions might 
contribute to (pro-cyclical), or dampen (countercyclical) the recession. For example, a subnational sector would be countercyclical if  
in economic expansions subnational governments would tend to build up reserves thereby dampening effective demand; and, in reces-
sions, tend to spend from reserves, thereby minimizing the dampening effect.
7 Kosovo has adopted the Euro as its medium of  exchange; however, it is not one of  the 12 states that is a formal “participating” 
member of  the Euro Area.
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labor and/or capital), in the longer term what matters most for an effective income- and 
wealth-enhancing policy is for all types of  governments to coordinate an anti-poverty 
strategy. And, in this respect policies that promote education and provide for equal op-
portunities for all in the market place are most likely to be successful. 
This leaves the efficiency argument—i.e., allocation policy—as the raison d’être for a 
subnational role. Allocation focuses on two topics: (i) the manner in which the public 
sector intervenes in how an economy uses (allocates) its scarce resources by collectively 
purchasing not only final goods but also the services of  the factors of  production (labor, 
capital and land), and (ii) the determination of  which type or level of  government shall 
be responsible for which purchases. 
Principles for Assigning Expenditure Responsibility
Once it is decided that a certain set of  goods and services are appropriately public, the key ques-
tion arises: which government shall provide which of  the goods and service? There are five dis-
tinct, but reinforcing, principles (e.g., Oates 1972; Hermann et al. 1997; Dafflon 2006) that serve 
as a guide in assigning expenditures.
• Functions should be assigned to that government whose jurisdiction most closely ap-
proximates the geographical area of  benefits provided by the function. For example, fire 
protection services benefit only the residents of  the community located near the relevant 
facilities; while air or water pollution prevention activities benefit larger regions or even a 
nation (also see the essay on Revenue Assignment).
• Closely related to the question of  “who benefits?” is the principle that takes into account 
the  heterogeneity of  preferences that persons or groups living in different parts of  a 
country may display for different amounts (more or less) of  certain services, a different 
quality of  service (for a given amount), and/or a different approach to delivering public 
services. Under such circumstances, local governments can be the appropriate service 
provider if  the border of  the locality matches that of  the social preference function. 
Thus, around the globe one observes the local public production of  activities such as 
cultural heritage, language, and preservation of  historic structures—even to the point 
where the freedom to provide a different mix of  services becomes a “glue” rather than 
a “solvent” for national cohesion (Bird and Ebel 2006). Where this heterogeneity of  
preference rationale crosses the line from acceptable to unacceptable is when it violates 
protections of  human rights, civil liberties, the right of  people and governments to freely 
associate, and equal access to jobs and justice. 
• Public goods and services should be provided by the government that can best realize 
economies of  scale in production of  the good or service. Economies of  scale refer to the 
unit cost of  production. For any good or service, increasing the amount produced may 
result in increasing, decreasing, or constant unit costs. Other things being the same, the 
type of  government that can deliver a good or service at the lowest possible cost should 
•
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provide that service. Economies of  scale generally accrue when a capital intensive enter-
prise can spread the high cost of  capital over a large number of  customers. For example, 
building a sewage treatment plant that services a larger region may be more cost effective 
than having each local jurisdiction build its own capital intensive treatment plant (See es-
says on Service Delivery and on Joint Service Delivery). 
• If  an activity of  one local government has an important external effect whereby its actions 
create added value (positive externalities) or costs (negative externalities) for individuals 
or businesses located in another jurisdiction, then the responsibilities for providing (or, 
in the case of  negative externalities, limiting or compensating for) these services should 
be coordinated intergovernmentally. Mechanisms for such intergovernmental coopera-
tion range from the establishment of  special purpose (e.g., joint service delivery) district 
governments to institutionalizing regional (and/or central) coordinating bodies. 
• Functions should be assigned to governments that can effectively manage that func-
tion. Specifically, the government should have adequate legal authority and management 
capacity to perform its assigned functions and be willing to pursue intergovernmental 
policies for promoting inter-jurisdictional cooperation. The notion that local government 
may be better able than a regional or central government to determine how a service is to 
be organized or delivered is a key part of  this management principle. This can also help 
insure that best practices can be identified through experimentation and then adopted by 
other jurisdictions.168 
Implementation 
The application of  the principles put forward above does not always yield an unequivocal answer 
to the “right” pattern of  expenditure assignment. Consider, for example, primary education. It is 
not uncommon to see a report on decentralization present a general assignment matrix according 
to whether a function belongs to a central, intermediate (e.g., provincial), or local (e.g., municipal) 
general purpose government, and then assign primary education to the subnational (e.g., local) 
governments. Indeed, this essay provides just that sort of  matrix (Table 1, below). Now, at first 
glance that makes a lot of  sense—local schools for local children. Why should a provincial (or na-
tional?) legislative body have anything to say about schooling in a municipality or village? Well, for 
the most part, the answer is that it should not. But, then, when one takes a closer look, things can 
get more complex. For a start, a nation or province as a whole has a strong interest in a well-edu-
cated population, so now there is a broader-than-local benefit. Indeed, when one applies the five 
principles presented above, it turns out that education can be broken into several sub-functions; 
for example, setting the curricula (a role for a national “core” curriculum supplemented by local 
options); teacher certification (the center or province may wish to set minimum standards); staff  
hiring, firing, and salary determination (local); and textbook selection (a mix).
Similarly, consider public health services. In the case of  vaccinations against diseases such as polio 
8   This criterion of  effective management does not refer to the notion of  an “adequate” fiscal capacity, which, though certainly criti-
cal to the sustainability of  a system of  subnational governments, is a separate matter. See the essays on Revenue Assignment and on 
Intergovernmental Transfers.
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and hepatitis, the benefits and externality arguments converge to make the case for a supra-lo-
cal (indeed, even global) role. However, what about a situation where a municipality has failed to 
maintain its sewer system to the point that it is causing illnesses in some of  its neighborhoods? Bad 
government, for sure; but this is not necessarily a provincial or national responsibility. Now if  the 
consequences of  this health problem spill over to other communities in the form of  negative ex-
ternalities (e.g., contaminating the rivers or groundwater) and the offending local government does 
not act to address these costs, then regional and/or central intervention will be required—perhaps 
even to the point of  some temporary central takeover of  the local Department of  Sanitation.
What does one do where there is no clear “bright line” to assignment of  a function? In the case of  
Europe, there is the generally accepted “overarching” guideline of  Subsidiarity as embodied in the 
Council of  Europe’s European Charter on Local Self  Government, which is a presumption in fa-
vor of  having responsibilities carried out by the authority that is “closest to the citizen” (European 
Charter of  Local Self-Government, Article 4, para. 32). That is, unless there is a clear efficiency 
case to do otherwise, the “higher” (e.g., central) level of  government should have a subsidiary role 
to the “lower” level of  government with respect to expenditure assignment (see the essay on the 
Legal Framework)179. 
 
Illustrations 
The two tables presented below pull together this discussion of  the intergovernmental assign-
ment of  expenditure responsibilities. Though illustrative, both are useful. Table 1, which presents 
the conventional “expenditure assignment” matrix that is found in many country studies, has the 
merit of  providing policymakers with an  framework for initially thinking through  expenditure 
assignment vis-à-vis the guiding principles laid out above. But, as briefly discussed above, it quickly 
becomes clear that, as one takes a closer look at the delivery of  a service as complex as primary 
education, one cannot think in terms of  a single function that calls for a single jurisdictional assign-
ment (and, indeed, some newly decentralizing societies make just this mistake—and at a high cost 
to child education), but rather as a set of  several different functions that come together as comple-
mentary and/or concurrent intergovernmental competencies. Table 2 picks up on this point of  
complexity and, again using the illustration of  primary education, reveals the intergovernmental 
nature of  the service. For purposes of  this illustration, Table 2 provides four groups of  competen-
cies (though other groupings are certainly possible): organization of  instruction (which students 
shall attend which schools, instruction time, and teaching methods); personnel management (the 
critical issues of  civil service arrangements with respect to hiring, firing and credentialing); plan-
ning and structure (consisting of  number and types of  schools, curriculum and content); and 
financing (including matters of  budget process and execution). Table 1 adopts a three-tier model 
of  decentralized governance for three types of  governments: central, regional or provincial, and 
local.1810  Table 2 adds Schools as a fourth type.
9  See the essay on Kosovo for a description of  the responsibilities of  Kosovo municipalities.
10  All governments should consider the option of  setting-up intergovernmental compacts and special purpose governments (see note 
on Joint Service Delivery).
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Final Comment: Beyond Assignment to Accountability
If  fiscal decentralization is to achieve its intended efficiency goals, it must be accompanied by 
policies that will insure transparency in the local budget, decision-making and institutions to fur-
ther insure political accountability—the explicit linking of  legislative decisions to decision-makers. 
The more the responsibility for fiscal decisions is obscured by hidden or complex institutional 
arrangements, the less accountable the system of  public service delivery. With respect to the ex-
penditure assignment decision, there are at least four barriers to accountability: (i) central hiring of  
personnel to perform services that are locally provided and managed (e.g., central hiring of, and 
wage determination for, local school teachers); (ii) unfunded mandates and preemptions of  local 
authority (e.g., central orders to local governments to perform services for which they are not cost-
reimbursed); (iii) lack of  local budgetary certainty (e.g., central withholding of  agreed upon central 
transfers); and (iv) centrally set local expenditure norms (e.g., a mandate whereby the central gov-
ernment details cost and capacity specifications to be used in local service provision). 
Table 1. Illustrative Intergovernmental Assignment of  Functions
Expenditure Function Concept Rationale for Assignment and Comments
Defense, Foreign Af-
fairs, Trade
C Benefit and costs are national in scope
Post and telegraph C Economies of  Scale 
Monetary policy, cur-
rency, banking; fiscal 
policy
C The institutional reality is that the center must control the central bank or 
currency board. Benefits of  monetary stability are national in scope.
Water and air ports C, R, L 
Often special purpose public authorities; and may be sub-central. There are 
numerous examples of  sub-central units managing ports. Clearly, however, 
some national coordination is needed, especially if  ports are few. Customs 
entry is surely national.
Transfer payments to 
persons (Pensions, 
large anti-poverty 
programs)
C Redistribution. In many countries emergency safety net programs are local 
and may reflect local preferences.
Immigration C
Benefits and costs are national in scope and thus this is a typical central 
matter (also have foreign policy implications); but there are exceptions of  
practice: Switzerland Cantons (regional/intermediate governments) and 
UAE Emirates have decision control over immigration. 
Expenditure Function Concept Rationale for Assignment and Comments
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Environment C, L
Economies of  scale suggest that the center would responsible for activities 
such as geological surveys and ensuring clean air and water; but the benefits 
and preferences arguments suggest a regional or even local role for activi-
ties such as irrigation and land reclamation. In the case of  deterioration of  
a local environment due to mining operations—the goal is to internalize 
the costs of  clean-up/control to the mining operations. This may require 
central and local regulation and taxation. 
Land use planning, 
zoning, licensing and 
regulating of  building, 
residential occupancy 
permits; managing mu-
nicipal property , fairs 
and local markets
L Depends on the benefits area; but the principle is that local (e.g., urban) 
planning and zoning is a local affair.
Capital Investment 
Planning 
R, L 
Depends on benefits area; but except for very large infrastructure projects 
having significant economies of  scale and/or national benefits, the capital 
investment decision is usually subnational.
Primary and Secondary 
education, Literacy
C, R, L
A classic case of  the need for intergovernmental partnership due to dif-
fering benefit areas (Literacy is surely a national goal but the operation of  
a school is local—indeed, may even be at the school level). Differences in 
local preferences require local provision.   See Table 2 below. 
Health: Dispensaries 
and local hospitals 
R, L 
Benefits argues municipal (local); but there may be a regional role (econo-
mies of  scale).
Community Fire Pro-
tection
R, L
Primarily local benefits; Police are central; Fire Services are a local respon-
sibility. Unless there is a clear externalities argument (e.g., local police are 
corrupt, the center is not), there is no good justification for any central role 
in community policing  (beyond, perhaps, information sharing).
Community policing C, L 
Applying the benefits rule, there is a case for special policing for provin-
cial or central activities (e.g., inter-municipal and inter-provincial highway 
control), but the benefits rule also argues that community police matters are 
a local issue. Of  course, there should be intergovernmental police coordina-
tion.
Water supply and dis-
tribution
L
Water supply tends to have a regional character (to manage watersheds that 
cross over municipal boundaries); however, the responsibility of  getting wa-
ter to home and businesses has a large local/municipal character (benefits, 
preferences, management).
Parks and recreation C,R, L Primarily local responsibility, but some “heritage” parks may be national. 
Roads Interstate C Internal common market
 Interregional C, R Interregional benefits and costs
 Local roads and 
streets L Includes street lighting 
Table Notes. * All these functions will have a private as well as public sector character. Activities denoted with a double 
asterisk (**) in the table are predominantly private sector functions in many developed federations. ***Center, Regional, 
and sometimes local governments have a regulatory role (e.g., sanitation). The designations are C: Central ;  R a regional 
Table 1. Illustrative Intergovernmental Assignment of  Functions (continued)
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or intermediate tier of  government that is sub-central and yet overlaps municipal/local/village boundaries; L, Local 
(e.g., municipal, special district).  
Table 2.  Further Detail to Illustrate Expenditure Assignment Among Governments: Pri-
mary Education 
Decision 
Category
Function/Compo-
nent
Lead/Joint 
Responsi-
bility for
Principles Ar-
guing for the 
Assignment 
in the Previ-
ous Column 
 Selected Comments 
Organi-
zation  of  
Instruc-
tion 
Which school shall 
children attend? 
L, S (often 
consulta-
tive)
B, H, Mgt
Jordan, Thailand, India, CZ, Hungary, 
Philippines, US, UK 
Instruction time R, L H, Mgt 
Developed countries, typically school or 
local; Unitary developing, often central
Choice of  text-
books and how to 
buy them
S, L, R  H, Mgt, Es
Economies of  Scale (in purchasing) for a 
core curriculum argue provincial (or per-
haps for a small country, even central) role 
in textbook selection and purchasing 
How to group 
students (e.g., 
tracking?)
S B, H, Mgt.
School typical in developing and devel-
oped countries 
Teaching methods S, R H, Mgt, Es 
School typical; India is the intermediate. 
Training is appropriately provincial or 
central well as school and local 
Assessing student 
work 
S ,R C Mgt.
School typical; India intermediate; Jordan 
central; End of  level testing is often cen-
tralized 
Teaching tech-
niques (e.g., F2F 
vs. DL)
S Mgt, H, 
School in developing and developed coun-
tries; India is intermediate; Jordan, Central
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Decision 
Category
Function/Compo-
nent
Lead/Joint 
Responsi-
bility for
Principles Ar-
guing for the 
Assignment 
in the Previ-
ous Column
Selected Comments
Personnel 
Manage-
ment
Hiring /Firing the 
Principal and the 
teaching staff
S. L B, Mgt
A pattern of  what is typical emerges: the 
less developed, the more likely central 
control (Turkey, Malaysia, Jordan, Thailand 
plus France); Developed countries tend 
to be more S & L (US, UK, NL, Sweden, 
Hungary)
Fixing of  teacher 
salary scales
S, L B, Mgt., H
A “golden” devolution rule is for school / 
local control (US, Hungary, Sweden, Chile, 
Finland); yet typically a central matter in 
many developing countries; Intermediate 
in Denmark, India, Argentina, Spain).
Duties of  service 
for teachers & staff
S, L B, Mgt., H A similar pattern as for setting salary scales 
Career planning 
for principal and 
teachers
S, L B, Mgt Some countries give this to the center 
Credentialing of  
teachers 
R, L, S B
Typically central or intermediate in de-
veloping countries. Also central in some 
developed countries (N. Zealand, Hungary, 
Ireland). US is local and intermediate.
Table 2.  Further Detail to Illustrate Expenditure Assignment Among Governments: Pri-
mary Education (continued)
 

Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Notes
Decision 
Category
Function/Compo-
nent
Lead/Joint 
Responsi-
bility for
Principles Ar-
guing for the 
Assignment 
in the Previ-
ous Column
Selected Comments
Plan-
ning and 
Struc-
tures
Creation./closure 
of  a School
L, may 
have over-
laps for R
B, Mgt, Es
 Consultation with S system important; in 
developing countries often a central or in-
termediate function (Turkey, India) though 
also in developed systems (Austria)
Curriculum and 
content 
S,L, some 
core 
courses 
@ R
B
Unitary developing countries, central 
(Turkey, Jordan, Denmark, PRC). School 
in US, CZ, Hungary, NL; Sweden , Spain, 
UK, Chile
Integrating boys 
and girls education
C B
This is about equal (or intentionally un-
equal) access. If  center opts for unequal, 
a case is made for a Provincial or Local 
authority to expand options for equal. 
National Benefits
Setting graduation 
standards L, R B, Mgt.
Though local is some places(US, Thailand, 
UK/Scotland), the typical is P or C
Financing 
Current vs. capital 
budget planning
S,L,R Mgt., B
Capital budget should be S/L; Now the 
grant system is fundamental to the system
Allocation to 
schools of  teaching 
staff
L, R Mgt.
The practice reflects the twin (and inter-
related) issue of  “who pays”. If  the local 
and school systems are tax and transfer 
dependent on the Province, the Province 
will generally control. Until localities   have 
and  then  use the authority to mobilize 
significant own revenues, the province will 
control this “local” decision
Allocation for 
other current 
spending
L, R Mgt. H, B, Ex
Allocation for 
Capital budget 
S, L Mgt. B, H, 
Developed countries typically S, L; devel-
oping typically central or intermediate
Whether to set 
school fees
S, L Mgt, H, 
Must integrate this matter with the broad-
er issue of  the intergovernmental grants
How to pay for 
off-site infrastruc-
ture
L, R Ex., Es
Externalities argue for government 
“above” the school system
Government: C: Central ; R : Regional, Provincial); :L Local (e.g., municipal); S: School.  Principles: Benefits (B), 
Heterogeneous Preferences (H); Existence of  Economies of  Scale (Es), Presence of  Externalities (Ex), Management 
Capacity (Mgt). This  table expands on Gershberg  2006.  
Table 2.  Further Detail to Illustrate Expenditure Assignment Among Governments: Pri-
mary Education (continued)
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Service Provision in a Decentralized 
Setting
A key argument of  a well-designed intergovernmental system goes to the merits of  responsiveness and efficiency in 
local service delivery.
Getting the expenditure assignment question “right” does not guarantee that decentralized ser-
vices will be delivered efficiently and effectively. There are several additional considerations for the 
government (with the assigned responsibility), if  it is to ensure that services are delivered by effec-
tive service mechanisms. This is especially true in Kosovo, where local public services are provided 
by highly controlled, centrally owned and managed service organizations. 
The present forms of  municipal service delivery should be changed as the decentralization pro-
cess further develops, in parallel with the transformation of  international organizations and the 
provisional government.
For designing effective and efficient local services three aspects of  public service provision will be 
discussed here: 
(i)   how the market mechanisms influence the public sector; 
(ii)  what type of  new relationships emerge between various actors in service provision; and 
(iii)  how proper regulatory functions of  the national and local governments should be devel 
oped in a market environment.
Transformation of  the Public Sector
Organizational forms and financing methods of  public services are influenced by the private sec-
tor, leading to changes in governance methods and public management techniques. 
Public Sector Reform: Impact of  the Market
In the field of  public services, modification of  state and public functions can be characterized by 
two major sets of  changes. The first set of  changes is the establishment of  enabling and facilitating 
roles of  the state, both at the national and local level. 
In transition countries, the most critical element of  these changes were the new forms of  own-
ership. Abolition of  state-owned property and decentralization of  public assets established new 
relationships between governments and service organizations. Corporatization of  state assets, 
privatization and transfer of  public property to local governments led to the separation of  service 
providers and producers. Consequently, governments’ political and legal responsibility for public 
service provision does not necessarily require services to be delivered by these public entities. 
Separation of  service producers supported the use of  market-based techniques, like economic 
incentives, performance measurement, greater management flexibility, and customer orientation. 
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Obviously, the social consequences of  introducing market-based techniques require compensation 
and corrections mechanisms. So, the second major change was the development of  state regula-
tory functions. Regulation in a broader sense comprises the legal environment for entering the 
market (e.g., licensing, supervision, audit), and the setting of  service performance standards and 
enforcement of  competition rules. 
New Public Management
Market mechanisms had an impact on governance methods as well. During the past two decades, 
the concept and techniques of  good governance were developed parallel to changes in public ser-
vice delivery in Europe. The objectives of  good governance are to improve accountability, achieve 
better representation, create transparent procedures and make professional decisions. All these 
factors aim to improve the effectiveness of  the public sector through better-informed decision-
makers, and to increase efficiency by facing the real costs of  public services. 
“New Public Management” characterizes the transformation of  the public sector in service de-
livery and governance methods. It aims to diminish the state’s direct influence by making it small-
er (through privatization and decentralization) and by improving its performance. New public 
management is built on entrepreneurial and managerial approaches of  the private sector. Both at 
governments and at public service organizations, it focuses on decision-making (planning, policy 
analysis, evaluation), and management practices (by promoting the “3 Es”: Economy, Effective-
ness, Efficiency; and client and customer orientation).
Client-Contractor Split
Public sector reforms aiming to introduce new public management techniques focus on the four 
main actors of  service provision. The (i) national government’s devolution and privatization poli-
cies set the scene for municipalities and service organizations. The (ii) local governments ensure a 
balance between citizens’ needs and services produced by various organizations. These (iii) service 
organizations operate in a regulatory environment set by general (national) legislation and local 
rules or compacts. Evidently, (iv) citizens as clients are able to influence the other three actors 
through elections, participation and other direct forms of  client power (paying user charges, rais-
ing complaints, using customer protection mechanisms). 
Development of  these institutions and establishment of  procedures is a long-term process. Within 
this framework, perhaps the most critical condition for initiating changes in local public service 
delivery is the separation of  the two service functions: 
(i) provision or ultimate responsibility for a public function, and
(ii) production or the actual delivery of  goods and services. By making this shift the roles of  the 
key actor, the service provider, become clearer: the service provider works as a client and as a 
regulator. In this scheme financing of  service provision is a regulatory means. The contractor, as 
the actual producer of  the service, is primarily linked to the client, but obviously to the customers 
as well (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Separation of  Roles and Functions in Public Service Provision
1. Service provider
Client, regulator
2. Sources of           3. Service
funding            producer
Grant, subsidy         Contractor
4. Customer
Mandatory or optional use
User charge, tax or free of  charge
The client-contractor split is based on the legislation, the available organizational forms and the 
financial incentives set for the contractors. Service producers might be budgetary organizations, 
entities under company law or other organizations (e.g., NGOs). Efficient service provision very 
much depends on the selection process of  these partners (whether it is competitive or not; how 
targets are formulated), contract specification, monitoring and enforcement practices. 
Customers of  public services are voters, influencing municipal (client’s) decisions and they have 
direct impact on service producers. If  they are obliged to use the selected contractor’s services, 
then they can affect the service organization through financing (user charges, taxes) and complaint 
mechanisms. 
Source of  funding is usually a mixture of  public (national, local budgets) and private finances. Vari-
ous grant schemes, subsidies, and national and local user-charge policies aim to balance incentives 
for efficient operation of  service producers and to ensure equitable services and access to a mini-
mum level of  public services. Private financing can also be involved in public service provision, as 
there is usually excess capital available on the market. However, the various public-private partner-
ship mechanisms require a developed legal environment (e.g. on concessions, public procurement), 
and managerial and regulatory capacity of  governments.
This separation of  roles and functions supports policymakers by making clearer the motivations 
behind the various actors. Moreover, it helps to understand the conflicting roles of  local govern-
ments as owners of  service organizations, primary sources of  funding and entities representing 
customers. The separation of  roles might also help to better target various regulatory techniques 
and to separate economic and social objectives in service provision.
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Developing the Regulatory Framework for Effective Service 
Provision
Components of  Regulation
Most municipal public services are regulated in four major areas: 
(i)   institutional and organizational forms; 
(ii)  service performance, content, strategies; 
(iii) finances; and 
(iv) management, in a broad sense, including tendering and contracting, users’ involvement, 
and customer protection.
Institutional and Organizational Forms (i):
(a)  local government institutions, in the forms of  budgetary or contributory organizations; 
(b) “municipal enterprises,” mixed forms of  public sector entities with characteristics of  
businesses, and 
(c)  business entities under company or not-for-profit organization law. These three groups 
of  service organizations operate under different taxation (VAT, profit tax) and account-
ing rules (e.g., depreciation rates). 
For providing local public services, they should go through a licensing process. Permissions are is-
sued if  the service organizations meet technical standards, environmental protection requirements, 
employment rules and other pieces of  sectoral regulation. 
Organizational forms can be more diverse when there is a similar demand for services that are 
easy to monitor (e.g., road maintenance), or when the need for services varies but both users 
and governments are able to control service performance (e.g., special public education courses, 
some communal services). A homogenous institutional setting is typical when options for service 
monitoring are limited (e.g., primary public education) or public control of  service performance 
is highly technical.
Service Performance, Content, Strategies (ii): One of  the most critical elements of  regulation on mu-
nicipal services is to guarantee minimum services set by national standards and to balance them 
with local autonomy. Control over service performance and equal access to public services can be 
ensured primarily in two ways: influencing inputs, or setting output and outcome requirements. 
Input based regulations are traditionally used in the public sector, through which, inter alia,  staff-
ing levels, operational and management costs, curricula, and available technologies are set. When 
outputs can be measured (e.g. pupils trained, water produced, heat supplied, customers served), 
or results as outcomes are identifiable (e.g. level of  poverty or unemployment, safe public trans-
portation), then regulation will be more indirect. It allows greater flexibility in management and 
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consequently leads to better services. These performance objectives are also influenced by sectoral 
plans and strategies.
Finances (iii): Finances indirectly influence public services through transfer schemes for current 
expenditures, capital investment funds, price setting rules and financial management regulations. 
This area of  regulation is typically dominated by the general rules of  intergovernmental finances. 
Managment (iv): The operational and managerial framework in a broad sense covers all the issues of  
personnel (employment, salary, and training), competition and contracting rules, customer involve-
ment in decisions, conflict of  interest, and consumer protection. These rules gradually evolve with 
public sector reform and decentralization. They are critical elements of  regulation because they 
specify the competencies in detail and define local autonomy in managing services. 
Stages of  Developing Regulation on Public Services
These four major areas of  regulation on public services are usually developed over a long period 
of  time. They are the most complicated and time-consuming to change, as they are deeply embed-
ded in the organizational and institutional setting of  a country. The experience of  transition coun-
tries has showed that, after the first constitutional changes are made and basic local government 
and public finance laws are passed, it could then take another three to five years until the support-
ing regulatory framework becomes effective. Under unfavorable political conditions it might take 
even  longer (e.g., in Slovakia) or the positive trends could even reverse (e.g., in Bulgaria from the 
mid-1990s).
However, major discrepancies in developing the regulatory environment might endanger the trans-
formation and could create a regulatory “vacuum.” Unlike in established market economies, re-
structuring and privatization of  public services in transition countries often takes place in an 
incomplete regulatory environment. This delay in establishing new regulations for example in local 
utility services might increase the chances of  creating monopolies. 
In the field of  communal and urban services, some generally accepted international principles 
shape regulatory reforms. First of  all, regulation should ensure open access to networks. It should 
be followed by “unbundling,” that is, separation of  various components of  service delivery (e.g., 
generation, transmission, and distribution in the energy sector) and their allocation to different 
organizations. This will also prevent cross-financing of  loss making activities from profitable ones, 
consequently decisions on privatization and subsidies will be more transparent and rational. Priva-
tization of  utility services should prohibit “creaming off ”; that is, when only the most lucrative 
parts of  the services are put out for tender and the least efficient ones remain in the public realm. 
The most important lesson to be learned from the transformation of  urban services in transition 
countries is that the regulatory environment should be developed before or in parallel with the 
privatization of  communal or urban services.
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Table 1. Stages of  Transformation in Public Utility and Communal Services in Transition 
Countries
Public Utilities (natural monopolies)
Communal Services (mixed 
goods and services)
First Stage 
RESTRUCTURING
“communalization”
“corporatization”
• Modest breakup of  state-owned 
  monopolies (devolution of  assets)
• Modest unbundling 
• Establishment of  independent 
   regulatory authority
• Rationalization 
• Establishment of  com-
petitive environment
Second stage
PRIVATIZATION
with REGULATION
• Privatization of  competitive assets
  (de-monopolization)
• Development of  regulatory function
• Market liberalization
• De-monopolization
• Management of  public 
shares
• Privatization 
Source: Péteri and Horváth 2004.
Within the European Union the classic principles of  regulation are put into the framework of  
“services of  general public interest.” This principle would evaluate the economic performance of  
service producers in a broader framework, incorporating other aspects, like affordability and equal 
access to services. It gives greater power to local governments in appointing service organizations 
and could limit the use of  market and competition in public services.
Examples of  Public Education and Water Services
Tables 2 and 3 below summarize the main characteristics of  basic local government services (pub-
lic education and water management) along three dimensions of  regulation: 
(i)   assignment of  major regulatory functions by levels of  government; 
(ii)  transparency and customer orientation in service management; and 
(iii) accountability and customer protection.
In the area of  public education almost all countries foresee certain roles for local governments in 
the management of  education services, with the exception of  Spain. In almost all the countries 
analyzed, except for Denmark (which is highly decentralized), the state enacts rules and legisla-
tion in areas such as curricula, personnel status and training, standards for quality monitoring and 
private provision of  education services. 
Local governments are responsible for the functioning of  schools and maintenance of  school 
infrastructure. In the case of  Lithuania local governments are in charge of  financial planning, even 
though the state holds control over municipal tax revenue. In the case of  Denmark the system is 
financed mostly by municipal own resources. In Spain funds are allocated both by the state and the 
regional administration.
Water services are mostly provided by locally owned enterprises (in the Spanish case also by re-
 

Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Notes
gionally owned enterprises). The state controls legislation and implementation of  water-resources 
management and planning; regulation on the modes and instruments for private participation in 
the provision of  water-related services; and financial resources of  local administration. 
In the countries analyzed public-private partnerships for service provision is not a very extensive 
practice, but contracting out is used in Poland. In the case of  Lithuania the practice of  leasing 
public assets is widespread. Local governments are usually responsible for capital investments. 
This increases their dependence on economic resources from the central budget, since user charge 
revenues are not sufficient for funding large capital schemes.
Lessons for Kosovo
1. Future devolution of  public functions should be accompanied with the transformation 
of  regulatory mechanisms at national level. The central regulatory schemes should target 
service performance and quality, ensure diversity of  service organization and manage-
ment practices, guarantee sector-neutral transfers and matching funds for capital invest-
ments, regulate price-setting mechanisms and separate social compensation schemes 
from user charges.
2. Municipal public service provision is a joint responsibility of  national and local govern-
ments. Funding schemes should guarantee a minimum level of  services and allow local 
autonomy in developing local policies. Indirect forms of  national-level supervision focus-
ing on service outputs should be developed.
3. Devolution of  state property is a basic condition for establishing autonomous local gov-
ernments. Municipalities responsible for service provision have to be in a controlling 
position over the local service organizations.
4. Large regional service organizations should be kept in the area of  public utilities, but 
those local governments which are served by these companies should have an increased 
influence over the service producers. 
5. Diversity in forms of  service organizations should be legislated by allowing the use of  
non-profit organizations in human service delivery and opening up the market for private 
investors in utility and urban services.
6. Legal framework of  private sector involvement should be developed through competi-
tion rules, licensing, consumer protection and funding regulations.
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Table 2. Intergovernmental Relations and Education in Comparative Perspective1
Intergovernmental Relations and 
Regulatory Instruments
Transparency of  the System
Accountability and 
Consumer Protection
Poland 
Mixed structure. The state enacts 
laws and regulations in the follow-
ing areas: finances, curricula and 
personnel status and training. 
Management of  schools and qual-
ity control is decentralized at the 
local level. 
Education is funded by national 
transfers, managed at local level. 
Local authorities can complement 
national budget grants with their 
own resources.
State has a strong hold on ed-
ucation policy, through fiscal 
and regulatory instruments. 
Concentration of  most deci-
sion capacities in state hands 
reduces uncertainty. 
Parents have input in 
the management of  
schools. Parents associa-
tions hold school mana-
gerial structures and 
teachers accountable. 
Consumers have limited 
input and control over 
the legislative process, 
which usually takes 
place at the national 
level. 
Lithuania
Mixed structure, but municipali-
ties hold financial and managerial 
control of  the education system. 
Municipalities are in charge of  
school management (including 
personnel) and financial planning.
The state retains major normative 
and management capacities in the 
following areas: personnel train-
ing, student curriculum, publish-
ing of  textbooks, regulation of  
private schools and municipal tax 
revenue.
Clear division of  functions 
among tiers of  government. 
State retains general norma-
tive capacities, as well as co-
ordination capacities in areas 
of  general interest, such as 
student curriculum, training 
of  academic personnel and 
regulation of  private schools. 
Municipalities are mostly 
visible in the implementa-
tion phase (i.e. school and 
personnel management) and 
in financial planning. 
Parents have input in 
the management of  
schools, holding school 
managerial structures 
and teachers account-
able. Parents have 
less input and control 
capacities on decisions 
concerning the structure 
of  the curriculum. 
Denmark
Highly decentralized structure. 
Municipalities hold general nor-
mative, managerial and financial 
capacities within the educa-
tion system. Schools are owned 
and managed by municipali-
ties; schools and municipalities 
determine curriculum. The state 
administration establishes general 
policy outcome standards. It has 
financial capacities to compensate 
for territorial economic inequali-
ties. 
The system is highly transpar-
ent because most decisions 
are taken by local authorities 
together with school manage-
ment boards and parents. De-
centralization is understood 
as getting decisions closer to 
citizens rather than inter-in-
stitutional relations.  
Parents have a strong 
input in the manage-
ment of  schools and 
also in decisions affect-
ing the functioning of  
the education system. 
Since most decisions are 
taken jointly by schools 
and local institutions, 
parents associations 
have access to the deci-
sion-making process.
1  Summary tables were prepared by Carlos Hernandez Ferreiro.
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Table 2. Intergovernmental Relations and Education in Comparative Perspective 
(continued)
Intergovernmental Relations 
and Regulatory Instruments
Transparency of  the 
System
Accountability and  
Consumer Protection
Spain
Education system has recently 
been fully decentralized at 
the regional level. Municipali-
ties are not considered to be 
administrations in the educa-
tion system. The state and the 
regional administration share 
financial responsibilities. State 
retains general normative and 
coordination capacities in the 
following areas: curriculum, 
training, regulation of  private 
education and quality stan-
dards. Regional administration 
is in charge of  management 
and have normative and 
implementation capacities in 
all areas. 
Recent decentralization of  
education system at the 
regional level has intro-
duced certain levels of  
uncertainty. 
The limits of  the capacities 
of  each tier of  govern-
ment are not always clear. 
Especially important for 
financial issues.
Parents have strong input 
in the functioning of  the 
system. At the school level, 
parents associations have in-
put in decisions concerning 
school functioning, as well 
as in the control of  teach-
ers’ activities. At the national 
level, parents associations 
have gained visibility in the 
context of  recent debates on 
the new National Education 
Law. Yet, it is not clear to 
what extent parents are able 
to control the normative 
process at the regional level. 
Slovenia
Centralized education system. 
State controls almost all eco-
nomic and normative resourc-
es. Participation of  municipali-
ties is limited to maintenance 
of  school infrastructure and 
control over school manage-
ment.
The system is transpar-
ent to the extent to which 
almost all decisions in the 
provision of  education are 
taken at the same tier of  
government.  
Parents associations partici-
pate in school life and can 
control school activities. 
Parents associations have 
had traditionally very little 
participation in the legisla-
tive process at the national 
level.
Bosnia 
and 
Herze-
govina
Education system is highly 
fractionalized along ethnic 
boundaries. System is differ-
ent for both entities. In the 
Federal Republic of  Bosnia 
education is controlled by 
cantons. Lack of  a coordi-
nated education policy beyond 
ethnic boundaries. In the 
Republic of  Srpska, system is 
highly centralized in the hands 
of  the central administration. 
In the Federal Republic of  
Bosnia education system is 
opaque. Fractionalization 
along ethnic boundaries 
leads to lack of  coordi-
nation instruments and 
over complexity of  the 
educational structures. In 
Serbo-Bosniak cantons de 
facto two separated educa-
tion systems coexist. In the 
Republic of  Srpska, cen-
tralization leads to clearer 
lines of  command. 
Parents have very limited in-
put in the education system.
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Table 3. Intergovernmental Relations and Water Management in Comparative 
Perspective
Intergovernmental Relations 
and Regulatory Instruments
Transparency of  the System
Accountability and 
Consumer Protec-
tion
Poland
Decentralized water system. Lo-
cal governments provide water 
supply and sewage through 
budgetary enterprises and com-
panies. They have powers in fi-
nancing capital investments. The 
state has a general normative 
capacity on water management 
issues and planning (together 
with counties) the use of  water 
resources. The state establishes 
the conditions for public-pri-
vate partnerships, permits and 
licenses. Special state agencies 
are in charge of  regulating river 
basins and the use of  water 
resources.
Variety of  actors involved: bud-
getary institutions, enterprises 
and companies, a few examples 
of  public-private partnerships. 
State-owned enterprises have 
very little share in service provi-
sion. 
Politicization of  managerial 
structures in public companies. 
Decision-making structure is 
not very transparent.
Price-setting rules do not ensure 
an adequate level of  resources 
to cover for capital investments. 
There is lack of  coordination 
between provision of  water-re-
lated services and management 
of  water resources.
Accountability is 
limited by the lack 
of  transparency in 
decision-making, 
this is particularly 
true for decisions 
concerning prices 
and consumer 
rights.
Lithuania
Local governments provide wa-
ter supply and sewage services 
through local public companies. 
They can lease public assets, 
under state regulatory control. 
Municipalities are in charge of  
capital investments. 
The state retains normative 
capacity in the area of  water re-
sources management. The state 
regulates public-private partner-
ships and licenses. 
Governance of  water supply is 
not transparent.
Leasing to private investors is 
a widespread practice. State’s 
legislation on leasing favors 
redundancy of  management 
structures and lack of  clarity. 
Decision-making structures and 
service provision structures are 
not clear. 
There are no clear 
mechanisms for 
accountability 
and consumer pro-
tection. Leasing 
practices in a 
legal environment 
that does not 
favor flexibility in 
the governance 
structures of  water 
supply results in a 
highly opaque and 
expensive system. 
Customers face 
high prices and 
redundant mana-
gerial structures 
that make it more 
difficult to estab-
lish accountability 
mechanisms.
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Intergovernmental Relations 
and Regulatory Instruments
Transparency of  the System
Accountability and 
Consumer Protec-
tion
Denmark
Local governments are in charge 
of  the provision of  water and 
sewage services. Local authori-
ties employ municipally owned 
enterprises and public works. All 
relevant decisions concerning 
service provision are allocated 
at the local level. The state has 
normative capacities concerning 
management of  water resources 
and planning, particularly, in the 
area of  environmental protec-
tion.
The system is highly transpar-
ent. Governance is concentrated 
in a single tier of  government. 
Decision-making rules and 
processes are particularly clear 
when it comes to incorporating 
European or national environ-
mental protection standards that 
have an impact on the price of  
the service.  
The system is 
highly accountable 
and transparent. 
Decision-making 
capacities are al-
located at the local 
level, thus citizens 
can have an input 
on the decision- 
making process. 
This is particularly 
important in the 
context of  price 
setting.
Spain
Municipal governments are 
responsible for water provision 
including capital investments. 
Regional governments have 
normative competency in the 
management of  water resources 
within their territory. 
The state has legislative capaci-
ties in the areas of  management 
of  water resources, planning, 
and the regulation of  conditions 
for public-private partnerships 
in service provision. 
Water supply and sewage in 
urban areas is carried out either 
by municipally or regionally 
owned enterprises. Most deci-
sions concerning water-related 
services are taken at a single 
governmental level. The planned 
incorporation of  private actors 
could introduce new elements 
of  complexity in the delivery of  
public services. 
Accountable 
system of  public 
provision of  
water-related 
services. Devel-
oped system of  
consumer associa-
tions and adequate 
administrative 
procedures ensure 
protection against 
arbitrary admin-
istrative acts. The 
introduction of  
private actors can 
result in a drastic 
reduction of  the 
effectiveness of  
accountability 
mechanisms.    
Table 3. Intergovernmental Relations and Water Management in Comparative Perspective 
(continued)
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Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Two legal systems of  water 
management co-exist in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Both the 
Federal Republic of  Bosnia 
and the Srpska Republic passed 
legislation on water manage-
ment. There are prospects for a 
new Water Law (sponsored by 
the EU) in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, binding for both entities. 
The new law tries to implement 
a river basin approach to water 
resource management and pro-
tection as well as rationalize the 
system of  water provision.
– –
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Joint Service Delivery
The right of  association among governments provides opportunities for improved delivery of  local public goods 
through cooperation.
Kosovo: The Starting Point
Kosovo has relatively large-sized municipalities in the countryside with populations above fifty 
thousand. These local governments comprise different discrete geographical units (towns and 
villages) and, under the present local government system, basic human services such as education 
are organized along these municipal units. Urban services are provided by a smaller number of  
water and municipal solid waste companies for groups of  local governments on a regional basis. 
These communal companies are governed by management boards, where the majority of  board 
members represents the central authority (Kosovo Trust Agency, PISG). 
Despite the large municipal entities and the centralized delivery of  public utility services, with 
further decentralization a need will arise for cooperation among municipalities. Large, multi-ethnic 
municipalities may be fragmented for political reasons—as was claimed during the Vienna status 
talks. The example of  Macedonia demonstrated a similar trend, as local governments first broke 
up and later were amalgamated again into larger units on a new basis. 
Future devolution of  public functions will raise the need for cooperation in public service provi-
sion (administrative services, local public utilities, human services) and in strategic planning. Of  
the latter, even the present large-sized municipalities will be required to cooperate in designing 
regional and urban development strategies and promoting local economic development.
Why Cooperation?
General-purpose local governments might enter special cooperation agreements for primarily eco-
nomic reasons. There is fiscal pressure for efficient provision of  municipal services, which are typi-
cally organized by political-administrative entities; however the boundaries of  local governments 
are not always drawn to allow for efficient public service management. Public services provided 
by central towns might spill over to neighboring municipalities, who benefit from these services 
without contributing to their funding (common examples are education and health care services). 
The other typical case involves small municipalities who aim to achieve economies of  scale in the 
provision of  local services (for example when catchment areas of  utility services are different from 
the administrative borders).
The rational size for efficient municipal service provision varies by type of  public service. In the 
case of  capital-intensive public services, like water or solid waste management, unit costs of  ser-
vices decline with the increase of  facility size. This is not necessarily the case with human services, 
like education, or with administrative services. According to international examples, the unit cost 
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curve of  these services is typically u-shaped, which means that unit costs of  service entities start 
to increase again as the entity exceeds an optimum size, primarily due to the more complicated 
management system and the need for coordination mechanisms. 
In a democratic and decentralized local government system, financial and managerial decisions 
should be harmonized with political decision-making mechanisms. That is, political entities should 
be adjusted to the boundaries of  municipal service units. This allows the internalization of  costs 
and revenues related to municipal services. Political decision-making can be harmonized with fi-
nancial and managerial decision-making in basically two ways: (i) by creating large general-purpose 
local governments or (ii) through horizontal cooperation among municipal units. Amalgamation, 
exemplified by reforms in Skandinavia, creates permanent administrative and political structures, 
to which service delivery mechanisms are adjusted. Cooperation, on the other hand, follows the 
bottom-up approach, when politically autonomous municipalities establish flexible forms of  ser-
vice provision. 
Models of  Municipal Cooperation in Europe
As the forms of  joint service provision follow the constitutional, political, administrative and man-
agement traditions of  a country, different approaches towards municipal cooperation exist. Three 
basic alternatives for municipal cooperation, briefly discussed below, serve as potential models for 
reforms in Kosovo. Examples of  other transition countries (e.g., Hungary and Poland) have shown 
that lessons from these models might be combined in a selective way and can be adjusted to local 
conditions. 
1. The contract-based model of  cooperation follows the new public management concept, developed 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in Scandinavia. Various types of  local services can be provided 
within this form of  cooperation: public education, water, solid waste management or administra-
tive services. Based on private sector rules and practices, different forms and levels of  government 
cooperate by establishing agreements on service performance, funding rules and forms of  man-
agement decisions. 
The legal forms of  cooperation are adjusted to the nature of  services provided (e.g., by council, 
committee, foundation, company). Sometimes the contracted services initiate cooperation and 
define the forms it assumes among municipalities. Local governments—and not individual citi-
zens—develop these contract-based forms of  cooperation. Therefore this type of  cooperation 
differs from the American “special districts,” which may be run by elected governing boards, who 
have taxing power or levy charges, and are accountable directly to service users. 
2. The German model of  government cooperation (“Zweckverbände”) has many variations in the re-
gions of  the federation. Compared to the Anglo-Saxon contract-based model, this form of  associ-
ation establishes administrative-legal relations between various municipalities or even governments 
at different levels. This form of  municipal cooperation is based on the adaptation of  private sector 
management practices in the area of  public administration and public service management. 
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The purpose of  municipal cooperation is similar to the contract-based models: its objective is to 
harmonize political, administrative and service units of  governments with the economic area (or 
fiscal base) of  the local government. The municipalities establishing the associations are equals and 
are not subordinated to the association, despite the fact that the association provides the linkages 
to upper-level state administration. The associations usually provide regional services (e.g., water 
management, secondary education, fire protection). They are funded by shared taxes that are set 
by the association. The municipal property of  common services is transferred to the association. 
There is a permanent consultation between municipal leaders and the head of  the association.  
3. Administrative cooperation, developed in France, takes various legal forms (syndicates and authori-
ties, communautés). Local governments of  different types and sizes establish these forms of  coop-
eration under public law, thus preserving the legal autonomy of  all members. The syndicates are 
voluntary single- or multi-purpose organizations. A local government might join several syndicates. 
All syndicate members enjoy equal rights. The syndicates are funded through the shared revenues 
and contributions of  local governments. 
The public authorities are organized for management of  specific local government functions (e.g., 
fire protection, urban planning, environmental protection, housing, public transportation). Local 
governments are obliged to participate in these metropolitan or regional authorities; however, the 
rules and procedures of  cooperation are set by the members of  the public authority. Specific local 
tax revenues are assigned to these forms of  cooperation, which are administered by the unified 
national tax authority. 
For cooperation with the private sector, local governments might establish mixed public compa-
nies, which operate under private law, but are entirely controlled by the founding municipal bodies, 
who should be majority shareholders. 
Critical Issues of  Cooperation
These international examples demonstrate that, regardless of  their size and scope, elected local 
governments are able to establish various forms of  cooperation. The models presented here also 
show that organizational forms and management practices very much depend on the legal envi-
ronment and traditions. But all types of  cooperation are aimed at creating rational units of  public 
service management for efficient use of  public resources. 
As effective and efficient service provision is the basic goal of  decentralization also in Kosovo, 
the following points should be taken into consideration when designing regulation on joint service 
provision.
(i) Legal and administrative rules of  cooperation: 
• Establishment of  joint service organizations and participation in cooperation is voluntary 
(optional) or mandatory for their members.
• Forms of  representation should ensure legitimacy and effective decision-making. 
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• Boundaries of  municipal cooperation should allow flexibility for creating administrative 
units adjusted to service catchment areas.
(ii) Institutional setting and forms of  administration: 
• Forms of  decision-making should be designed to address inequalities between entities. 
The interests of  small municipalities should be protected through consensus building.
• Separate administration of  municipal cooperation is needed in order to improve its man-
agement capacity.
• Joint service organizations should be subject to municipal supervision and reviewed in 
local government audits.
(iii) Financial incentives for cooperation:
• Intergovernmental fiscal relations should create incentives for cooperation; for example, 
more grants should be allocated by objective criteria (e.g. school age population), instead 
of  by institutional capacity (e.g., number of  pupils enrolled).
• Balancing revenues shared by member municipalities with own source revenue-raising 
authority of  the municipal cooperation.
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Revenue Assignment, Mobilization and 
Administration
Guidelines and criteria for determining which set of  revenue tools shall be assigned centrally vs. locally; and once 
the local assignment is made, the nature of  the policy tradeoffs among tax choices and the challenge of  policy 
implementation.
Debate on revenue policy seldom makes clear the basis for sorting out the authority to assign types 
of  revenues among governments. Several factors may be at work to discourage explicit statements, 
including lack of  data on the economic effects of  public revenue, uncertainty on who will bear the 
tax burden, and the complexity of  the interplay of  a multiplicity of  taxes. That said, there are prin-
ciples, guidelines, and criteria for “getting right” intergovernmental assignment, mobilization and 
administration of  revenues. The assignment issue is addressed below in the form of  three ques-
tions: Why local taxation matters? What normative guidelines frame the “assignment” decision? 
And, what set of  criteria can be applied to weigh the policy tradeoffs of  “which” provincial or 
local tax? Once these questions are addressed, a discussion follows on the “next steps” of  revenue 
mobilization and administration. 
Why Local Tax Policy Matters 
For a country to become a member of  the European Union, it must agree to most, but not all, of  
the eighteen articles of  the European Charter of  Local Self-Government (see “Legal Framework,” 
this volume). A key article is Article 9 that addresses the financial resources of  local authorities: 
inter alia (i) “Local authorities shall be entitled…to adequate resources of  their own, of  which they 
may dispose freely within the framework of  their powers”; and (ii) “...financial resources shall be 
commensurate with the responsibilities provided for by the constitution and the law.” That prin-
ciples of  granting local governments “own revenue” taxing powers are fundamental to a system 
of  local self-government apply to any decentralizing country, not just to Europeans (OECD 2002; 
Ebel and Taliercio 2005).
This question of  “why” local taxes matter goes to the point that far from being a purely local 
matter, a well-designed intergovernmental system is key to a nation’s broader reform goals. This 
follows from what is labeled the “decentralization theorem,” that the set of  governments closest 
to citizens can adjust budgets to local preferences in a manner that best leads to the delivery of  a 
set of  public services that reflect community preferences (Oates 1972). 
The focus is now on improving efficiency in the use of  a society’s resources of  people, land, and 
capital. With respect to private goods and services, the market-price system accomplishes that 
goal. But, when the private market fails in this objective (pure public goods, externalities, and mo-
nopoly), there is a case for the collective (public sector) commandeering of  resources to supply the 
activity. Once the public sector intervenes, the efficiency logic is in favor of  some form of  fiscal 
decentralization. The argument is that, because of  spatial considerations, local governments are 
best situated to become the conduit for setting up a system of  budgets that best match the benefits 
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and costs of  local goods and services. In technical jargon, this is the “benefit model” (or “match-
ing principle”) of  public finance. To satisfy those conditions, subnational (local) governments 
must be allowed to exercise own source taxation and be in a financial position to do so. That is the 
essence of  decentralization. And, this is why subnational local tax policy design matters.1
What Normative Guidelines Frame the “Assignment” 
Decision?
The question now becomes, “which taxes should be assigned for local use?” There are two guiding 
principles: benefits received and tax base immobility (Table 1). 
Benefits received. To achieve the economic efficiency gains promised by fiscal decentralization it is 
desirable that those who benefit from local government expenditure should also pay for it. In its 
most strict interpretation, this argument dictates a reliance on “non-tax” revenues—user charges 
and fees—that one pays for the receipt of  specific service benefits such as for direct use of  a facility or 
consumption of  a service; license fees paid for the privilege of  an activity; and betterment levies to pay 
for local infrastructure. Where it is impractical to impose specific fees or levy user charges, local 
services should then be financed by the taxes levied on local residents (and, here, a “resident” 
may be an individual, household and/or a business) to the extent there can still be demonstrated 
a logical link between taxes paid and the benefits of  services rendered. Such generalized benefit taxes 
include broad based taxation of  the business enterprise on income or receipts as well as the subna-
tional use of  a personal income tax if  it can be determined that the benefits of  local government 
spending are related to one’s improvement in production (income earned) and/or the ability to 
consume (income spent). “Local taxes” in this sense are those over which local authorities have 
some control; for example, they can set the rate or determine the tax base in addition to receiving 
the revenue. Note that such taxes need not be administered locally, and thus in some countries 
the revenue administration of  local taxes may be carried out by another government (e.g., in many 
countries the central or provincial government is responsible for assessment and collection of  the 
municipal property tax).
Tax base immobility. One must be candid to acknowledge that the search for local revenues also has 
a fiscal expediency character. Accordingly, the guideline that a “good” tax to assign locally is one 
that attaches to a relatively immobile tax base (e.g., real estate) often complements the benefits 
principle. The concept is straightforward: because, by their nature, they cannot (as easily as can a 
central authority) control the flow of  economic factors (labor, capital) and goods across their bor-
ders, subnational governments run the danger of  over-taxing a highly mobile factor (e.g., capital, 
some types of  sales, where income is reported) and thereby lose some of  its tax base to a lower-
taxing neighbor jurisdiction. 
Given these two guiding principles, which types of  revenues are likely to be more suitable for cen-
tral/provincial rather than local use? There are several. For example, as Table 1 suggests, in order 
to minimize potential tax distortions, make manageable revenue administration and promote tax-
1  To get a bit more technical: An efficient solution maximizes social welfare subject to a given flow of  land, labor, and capital resources. 
The rule for achieving an efficient allocation of  resources is to supply a service until at the margin—for the last “unit” of  the service 
supplied, the welfare benefit to society just matches its cost. Note that this efficiency requirement does not require that local govern-
ments tax at levels high enough to pay for the entire cost of  local public goods and services.
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payer compliance, a high degree of  national uniformity seems desirable with respect to the taxes 
on corporate net income and value added. A well-administered corporate net income tax requires 
a complex set of  income sourcing and tax base apportionment rules, especially for multinational 
firms. When as in Kosovo a value added tax is imposed as a tax on the “destination” of  where a 
product or service is consumed (as all European Union value added taxes are), one must deal with 
issues such as the implementation of  the border-control rules that accompany VAT administra-
tion.2 
Other tax designs best left “off  the local tax table” include those intended to add a significant de-
gree of  vertical equity in the overall national tax system; e.g., a progressive income tax. The danger 
here is that if  a local government were to seriously pursue a policy to redistribute after-tax income 
from rich to poor, over time the rich may move out of  that jurisdiction with the result that every-
one in the “progressive” locality will be poor. This is by no means an argument against local use of  
a tax on personal income (or, some variant, such as wages); rather, the point is that using the tax 
system to redistribute income (or wealth) is something a central government should take on so as 
to minimize the unintended consequence of  inducing people to change residential locations.
The taxation of  natural resources presents a special case. Since natural resources (e.g., nickel, cop-
per) are completely location-specific, they satisfy the tax base immobility guideline. However, other 
considerations argue for national taxation. There are three. First, natural resources revenues are 
notoriously volatile, thereby making it just the wrong revenue to rely upon for local government 
that must have tax certainty to pay for the “necessary” local public goods such as water distribu-
tion, heath clinics, and preschool and primary education. Second, because the local government 
cannot take on debt to the extent that the center can, a locality is not in a position to deficit finance 
once there is a downturn in global prices of  the natural resources and revenues plummet. Third, 
the equity argument against local taxation of  natural resources is a powerful one. Since natural 
resources are typically unevenly distributed across regions, assigning natural resources to local 
governments would generate subnational differences in fiscal capacities among jurisdictions. The 
two cases for some special local taxation of  natural resources arise to cover the costs of  (i) local en-
vironmental degradation and (ii) off-site local infrastructure costs incurred as a result of  a mining 
operation. However, these two circumstances do not change the fundamental national character 
of  a tax on natural resources. 
2  In large countries and federations, some “intermediate” governments such as provinces, oblasts, and states do have the administrative 
capacity to utilize such taxes (Bird 1999). 
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What Are the Criteria for Selecting One Local Tax Option 
Over Another?
The next policy questions that arise are (i) among the set of  conventional taxes, which make “local 
revenue sense?” and, of  that set, (ii) how does one judge which ones are better than others? Here, 
there are two responses. The answer to the first question is to identify the jurisdiction’s “fiscal (tax) 
architecture” (see note on Fiscal Architecture). The second response is that given the revenue op-
tions consistent with the fiscal architecture, there then can be applied normative criteria for select-
ing one revenue source over another. Table 1 below presents six generally agreed-on criteria that 
are accompanied by a checklist of  which revenue sources satisfy the objectives laid out. Two points 
are apparent. First, in selecting or modifying one tax or set of  taxes, it is inevitable that trade-offs 
must be made among the criteria. No one revenue tool meets all the objectives of  a “good” tax, 
and some taxes may satisfy one criterion and violate another. Second, for a subnational revenue 
system to work well, it is desirable to use a mix of  taxes. All revenue sources have inherent struc-
tural inequalities, and if  any one revenue source is used too intensively those defects can become 
intolerable. That calls for using a mix of  taxes (for a given yield, lower rates), as well as for fostering 
broad-based sources of  taxation.
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Table 1. Criteria for Making Subnational Tax Choices
Criteria/Objective Comment 
Taxes that Satisfy the 
Objective 
…And Those that 
Fail
Accountability: Local 
policymakers respon-
sive to citizen prefer-
ences. Those taxed 
have political redress.
Local officials determine 
“own” tax rates; tax burdens 
borne locally; transparency. 
Local Personal 
Income Taxes (may 
conform to higher 
level tax base with 
rate set locally). 
User Charges
General Business 
taxes
Visitor (tourist)
Natural resource 
taxes (petroleum, 
minerals) 
Revenue Productiv-
ity: Taxes that help 
promote the EU 
Charter (Art. 9) call 
for financial resources 
commensurate with 
spending responsibili-
ties. 
As a system, recognizes a 
balance between bases re-
sponsive to changes in eco-
nomic conditions, growth 
(elasticity or buoyancy) and 
stability (certainty).
Ad valorem prop-
erty tax (distinguish 
between land and 
improvements) & or 
Area-base property 
tax
Personal Income Tax  
General Broad Based 
Business Tax (e.g., 
gross receipts/turn-
over)  
Single stage sales 
taxes 
Some market excise 
taxes
Corporate profits, 
natural resources 
(both highly volatile) 
Many user charges
Tax Price: To extent 
possible taxes should 
function as a payment 
for the flow of  ser-
vices that accrue to the 
taxpayer/citizen.
Taxes set to perform a quid 
pro quo function and may be 
tailored to local and regional 
variations and benefit areas. 
Service spillovers (whether 
positive or negative) may 
call for special purpose 
districts and/or inter-local 
cooperation and revenue 
harmonization.
User fees and  charg-
es;   Visitor taxes 
Moderate tax rates on 
business enterprises 
(generalized benefits; 
e.g., gross receipts) 
Non-resident based 
income tax (assumes 
non-residents are 
subject to alternative 
taxes for services 
received: e.g., user 
charges, sales taxes, 
visitor taxes, general 
business tax)
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Criteria/Objective Comment
Taxes that Satisfy the 
Objective
…And Those that 
Fail
Non-Distortion: taxes 
should not uninten-
tionally interfere with 
private decisions of  
consumers, factor 
suppliers and produc-
ers; they should be 
“neutral.”
Variability in tax rates pos-
sible; Immobile tax bases 
work well here as do taxes 
on commodities that exhibit 
a relatively high inelasticity 
of  demand. Providing for 
taxpayer certainty in making 
tax rate and base policy is 
desirable. 
Taxes on immoveable 
property 
Land value tax plus 
charges
User Charges
Resident based Per-
sonal Income
Sumptuary Taxes
Taxation of  “bads”
Poll and communal 
taxes
Non-resident based 
income tax
Gross receipts taxes
Severance Taxes (if  
high rate) 
Tax Equity: Tax bur-
den should be reason-
able and fair 
Vertical equity (differential 
treatment unequal as usu-
ally measured by income or 
wealth—“gressivity”); Hori-
zontal (equal treatment of  
those in equal circumstances 
as measured by income, 
consumption, or wealth). 
Progressive Resident 
Personal Income 
Taxes
Ad valorem property 
taxes 
Some local sales 
taxes; excises
Poll and communal 
taxes 
Area-based property 
taxes
Gross receipts taxes 
Simplicity: administra-
tion & compliance.
Citizens should be able to 
understand and control the 
system; cash flow preferable 
to accruals; standardized tax 
bases.
Piggyback Personal 
income
Single stage sales and 
excise (market tax) 
Wage taxes
Turnover/receipts 
taxes
Some user charges 
Market taxes
Multi-rate taxes
Potentially broad 
based taxes narrowed 
by exemptions, 
deductions & tax 
preferences
Property tax 
Source: Ebel and Taliercio 2005.
Table 1. Criteria for Making Subnational Tax Choices (continued)
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From Revenue Assignment to Revenue Mobilization and 
Administration
Getting revenue assignment “right” is a most important first step—but it is only the first step. The 
next task is to move from concept to implementation; that is, from intergovernmental assignment 
to revenue mobilization and administration.
Revenue Mobilization
In the aggregate Kosovo’s public finances fit within the range of  the region’s ratio of  government 
spending to GDP. Kosovo’s ratio of  39.5% is the same as the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Mace-
donia, about the same as Bulgaria (37.1%), above that of  Romania (33.1%) and Albania (25.3%), 
and below Bosnia and Herzegovina (50.3%) and Croatia (47.2%) (World Bank 2006)3. This spend-
ing is being paid for largely by domestic tax and non-tax revenues (estimated at 28.1% and 4.1% 
of  GDP in 2004, respectively), and interest income and other fees. 
What is of  concern is that a close look at the composition of  the revenue stream reveals: not only 
are nearly 70% of  total Kosovo own revenues generated by taxes on international transactions (a 
typical number for the region is in the 3–5% range), but also the contribution of  municipal rev-
enues to total government revenue (4%) is quite small (placing Kosovo at the low end of  the 5% 
to 22% range for the region).4 This central/provincial reliance on border taxes is unsustainable in 
an era of  globalization and reduction of  trading barriers; so the “center”—particularly if  Kosovo 
is to achieve independence as a nation—must focus both on making a heavier reliance on the more 
conventional national revenue sources (refer back to Table 1) and on providing the fiscal space for 
local governments to carry a larger share of  the total cost of  paying for public services (which, in 
turn, requires a serious effort at expenditure and revenue decentralization).
In this context, the present Kosovo municipal revenue system needs attention—and will even 
more so if, as is contemplated by the Provisional Institutions of  Self-Government in Kosovo 
(PISG), a second tier of  subnational (local) government is introduced. Of  € 26.5 million of  esti-
mated “own” revenues in Fiscal Year 2005, about three fourths is derived from a set of  narrowly 
based fees and licenses and the other fourth from the broader based property tax on houses.5 The 
policy questions that arise are whether this is the right mix of  narrow and broad based tax reliance, 
or are there other revenue sources that can be mobilized in a manner that can both (i) further the 
goals of  resource efficiency (refer back to the introduction of  this note) and (ii) take some of  the 
pressure off  the central government to use its revenues to support municipal services through the 
grant system. 
In order to embark on a program of  intergovernmental revenue (tax) reform for the new Kosovo, 
3  The data are for 2002; however, the estimated ratio for Kosovo in 2004 is also 39.5% (World Bank 2006, data are 
preliminary).
4  But these regional comparison numbers must be used with great care and caution as they are taken from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), which, though the only available consistent source of  
such country revenue comparisons, is recognized (by the IMF as well) as being a data overstatement. For a discussion, 
see Ebel and Yilmaz 2003. The numbers reported here are from World Bank 2004.
5   For which a low compliance rate is reported (UNDP May 2006).  
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there is what one can call a “way of  thinking” about how to organize the reform dialogue and 
reform process: 
determine revenue assignment and normative framework → tax principles→ 
fiscal (tax) architecture →
country starting point → analysis of  the “own” source revenue options (including a local willing-
ness to pay for public services) → implementation and administration6
Revenue Administration
As noted, the above tax policy sequence is a way of  thinking logically about how to go about 
the job of  improving local resource mobilization—which is to say, the sequence is not a rigid 
sequence. So, as the process begins, it is not too early to be simultaneously thinking about the 
question of  which government, central or subnational (e.g., municipal) should administer the sub-
national revenue system. 
There is no consensus on the principles of  devolved administration. Local governments need not, 
in theory, have direct control over all tax administration functions as long as local governments are 
in control of  how those functions are administered. There is an argument that collection authority 
should be devolved to the government with the lowest collection and enforcement costs; how-
ever, that recommendation ignores the intergovernmental perspective that overall administrative 
and compliance costs for the entire national and subnational system should be considered when 
designing the level of  administrative devolution (Mikesell 2002). Revisiting the definition of  own 
source revenues, one could make the case at the extreme that, because there are functions of  tax 
administration that effectively control marginal revenues, control over some aspects of  tax admin-
istration must be part of  the definition of  an own source revenue.
Suffice it to say that there are several options that would guarantee local autonomy while improv-
ing efficiency. Four traditional models for tax administration in decentralized policies may be iden-
tified:  (a) central government tax administration with sharing of  revenues; (b) central government 
tax administration with assignment of  taxing powers to different levels of  government; (c) multi-
level administration with revenue sharing; and (d) self-administration by each level of  government 
(Vehorn and Ahmad 1997). For all four approaches, there are two cross-cutting dimensions of  
administration: contracting out to the private sector (also known as “tax farming”) and the extent 
to which national and subnational authorities cooperate through intergovernmental agreements 
such as tax compacts, exchange of  information, cooperative taxpayer assistance, and collaborative 
training (Duncan and McLure Jr. 2005).
6  And there often is a citizen “willingness to pay.” See Gulyani 2005 and UNDP May 2006 (p.46–47) discussion of  the property tax. 
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Intergovernmental Transfers
Payments made from one type of  government to another in order to address fiscal imbalances that are inherent in a 
system of  fiscal decentralization. 
Once Kosovar policymakers sort out expenditure roles and responsibilities for the different types 
of  government and the revenue authority to be assigned to each, all but the richest subnational 
governments will almost surely experience a fiscal imbalance. The imbalance occurs as the Euro 
sum of  a “well-designed” expenditure assignment exceeds the “own” source revenues that can be 
generated within the system of  revenue assignment. Such imbalances are not the result of  poor 
management by local officials (though that can certainly contribute to the problem), but rather 
the reality is that there is no a priori reason to expect a Euro equality between expenditure and 
revenue assignments, which are driven by very different factors of  demographic, economic, and 
institutional trends. 
Two types of  fiscal imbalances will occur (Bird and Tarasov 2002). The first is a vertical imbalance 
between expenditures and revenues among different types of  government. As a practical matter, 
in almost every case,1 this vertical imbalance reflects the fiscal reality that central governments have 
control of  the nation’s most productive tax bases and are therefore in a position to capture most 
of  a country’s tax capacity, while a country’s “allocation branch” expenditure responsibilities fall 
largely on local governments (see briefing note on Expenditure Assignment).2 The second type of  
imbalance is a horizontal imbalance which occurs when the differences in expenditure needs and 
revenue-generating ability vary across similar types of  subnational governments, as some jurisdic-
tions are more tax-base rich and/or less need impacted than others. 
Thus is the case made for intergovernmental transfers in the form of  fiscal flows between types 
of  governments. In practice, these flows almost always move from “higher” to “lower” tiers of  
government. 
As with any fiscal policy, intergovernmental transfer systems differ in quality of  their design. If  
designed poorly, the system will not only fail to address imbalances, but will create additional prob-
lems. One such problem is what economists refer to as a “soft budget constraint,” whereby central 
and subnational governments engage in negotiating ad hoc “gap-filling” spending at the end of  a 
fiscal year—a practice that overtime will cause subnational governments to become permanently 
transfer-dependent and will undercut the political and fiscal accountability link between policy-
makers and the citizenry. However, if  done well, a transfer system can not only enhance the overall 
efficiency of  the public sector and ensure that even the poorest of  local jurisdictions are able to 
finance a minimum standard of  services, but can also serve as “fiscal glue” for national cohesion 
through intergovernmental partnership. 
 
1  In some petroleum producing nations, it is the provincial government that may garner much of  the tax wealth (Davis, Ossowski, 
and Fedelino 2003) . 
2  This discussion is presented largely in terms of  the relationship between the central government and its subnational (e.g., provincial, 
municipal) units. However, the same principles apply to the provincial-municipal fiscal relationship. 
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Objectives of  Intergovernmental Transfers
The term transfers refers to a number of  different kinds of  public financing instruments: grants, 
shared revenues, subsidies and subventions are but a few (Bahl 1999; UNDP 2006). Well-designed 
transfers typically have three basic objectives:
•  providing incentives for efficient spending and utilization of  the municipal revenue base;
•  guaranteeing sufficient funds for managing local functions; and/or 
•  supporting regional equalization of  communities.
The above objectives and their intended impact on local expenditures and revenues are summa-
rized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Objectives, Methods and Incentives of  Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers
 
Interplay with the Expenditure and the Revenue sides of  the Local Budget 
Expenditure Revenue 
1. Providing incentives to localities
(i) Promote efficiency in local service 
provision; (ii) stimulate local spending on 
public goods having positive externali-
ties.
Promote (or at least not discour-
age) own source revenue-raising 
“tax effort.” 
2. Guarantee a minimum level of  
services (for different types of  local 
governments) 
(i) Transfers that are conditional on 
promoting certain types of  spending 
(e.g., pro-poor, growth enabling); (ii) 
ensure citizen access to basic services 
(e.g., education, housing, safety net); (iii) 
recognizing objective differences in unit 
costs of  producing a public service (e.g., 
geographic isolation).
Grants for equalizing differences 
in local revenue-raising potential.
3. Horizontal equalization 
Grants designed to recognize both the (objectively measured) variations in 
expenditure needs (e.g., for a given quality of  public service as measured by 
“workload” factors such as number of  children of  school age, poverty levels) 
and unequal distribution of  revenue bases. 
Factors Influencing the Structure and Amounts of  Transfer 
Decisions on the level and distribution of  grants are political; however it is also true that the orga-
nization of  an intergovernmental system has an influence on these decisions (a feature that serves 
to once again illustrate the partnership character and fiscal interplay of  a well-designed system 
of  fiscal decentralized governance). There are three such structural factors that will influence the 
structure and level of  transfers. 
The first factor is the type of  functions assigned to general purpose local governments. The broader 
the set of  functions of  a generalized benefit nature, the more likely considerations such as the 
cost of  ensuring a citizen access to an agreed upon (most likely donor-government determined) 
minimum level of  services will arise. However, if  a locality has a narrower set of  functions that 
happen to be in the form of  a flow of  specific benefits (e.g., utility services), for which costs can 
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be largely recovered through direct user charges, then the need for broad-based grant finance may 
be reduced. 
The size of  local government may also influence the amount of  a transfer. Thus, in post-socialist 
Central and Eastern Europe, a problem that arose in some countries (e.g., Hungary) was what 
became known as the “fragmentation” problem of  too many small governments (e.g., in the early 
1990s, Hungary, a country of  10 million, created 3,148 municipalities with an average population 
of  2,600 residents, whereas Poland, a country of  39 million, created 2,948 or 20 percent fewer 
municipalities, with an average population of  16,000).3 In Hungary’s case, the problem is that some 
governments are simply too small to efficiently provide all the public services that have been (theo-
retically) assigned to them. In contrast, the larger Polish municipalities are better able to capture 
larger portions of  the local tax base. Fragmentation may place government closer to the people, 
but it also complicates intergovernmental relations, particularly with respect to intergovernmental 
transfers (see the related briefing note on Large City Administration).
 
A third factor (closely related to the fragmentation problem) is the number of  subnational government 
tiers and their relationship. With the elimination of  (or at least the power-stripping of) intermedi-
ate governments in favor of  a system characterized by a large number of  general purpose local 
governments, it can be very difficult for the central authority to maintain direct bilateral relation-
ships with the many units. Not only is this inefficient, but it can also lead to unintended political 
outcomes, as extensive fragmentation may reduce the political voice of  local governments as a 
whole. There are solutions, however. One is to reform and/or reestablish the intermediate tier and 
empower that tier to become the conduit for national-to-municipal grants (e.g., the Romanian judet 
and the Pakistani province).4 Another model is the municipal federation in the Nordic countries 
whereby localities organize on a voluntary basis to provide certain local services such as transpor-
tation for commuters, planning and education. A third solution is joint service delivery/special 
government (see briefing notes on Service Delivery). Each of  these arrangements has the potential 
to make more efficient both the spending and revenue-generating sides of  the subnational budget, 
thereby reducing the need for transfer reliance.
The Two Steps in Grant Design
Given the above set of  considerations, the focus of  the remainder of  this essay is on the design 
of  intergovernmental grants. There are two steps to the designing of  grants. First, the amount of  
the grant must be determined; that is, the total amount to be transferred amongst the subnational 
governments must be determined. This is referred to as determining the “distributable pool.” The 
second step is that of  determining how the pool shall then be distributed between the different 
subnational governments.
3  The reason for this fragmentation was quite understandable as Hungarians (as well as most early post-socialist countries) associ-
ated the intermediate tier with the former control economy, and so there was a political imperative to eliminate it (Bird, Ebel, Wallich 
2005).
4   The related topic of  the institutional systems for managing grant systems (e.g., grants commissions) is not discussed here. See Yilmaz 
and Bindebir 2003 and Martinez-Vazquez and Searle 2006.
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Determining the Distributable Pool
There are three ways to determine the total amount to be transferred: (1) as a fixed share of  national 
government revenues; (2) as part of  the annual budget decision; (3) as a proportion of  approved 
specific local expenditures to be reimbursed. A stable transfer system promotes good planning and 
efficient service delivery effort, which further encourages recipient governments to follow good 
budgeting practices and face hard budget constraints (Ahmad 1997, Yilmaz and Bindebir 2003). 
Establishing a fixed percentage of  total national revenues to be transferred is the best way of  pro-
viding some degree of  stability and transparency. However, some governments prefer to decide 
the total amount in the distributable pool in accordance with budgetary priorities as part of  the 
annual budget decision. With this system, the central government exercises a significant amount 
of  control over subnational governments and determination of  the pool becomes an ad hoc exer-
cise. Furthermore, in the event of  a national recession or decrease in central revenues, subnational 
governments will face big revenue cuts.
There are various methods for determining the distributable pool where reimbursement of  certain 
expenditure items (cost reimbursement) is opted for. This third type of  transfer system is always 
closed-ended5 because the central government decides what kind of  expenditure items are eligible 
for reimbursement. Consequently, in such cost reimbursement type of  transfer schemes, the deci-
sions tend to be ad hoc (Table A-2).   
                  
Distribution of  the Pool among Subnational Governments
There are three basic models for allocating the total amount of  transfers from national to local 
government budgets. These methods generate different types of  incentives for local governments 
(see Table 2):
• Gap-filling model: the grant for a municipality is equal to the difference between estimated 
level of  expenditure and the planned local revenues, thus (E-R=G
,
). The resulting 
incentive is for continued transfer dependence and reduced accountability of  local 
officials for their spending and taxing decisions. 
• Local government respects hard budget constraint: whereby government spending is equal to 
the sum of  own source revenues and grants made available for the locality, (R+G=E). 
Here the incentive could be for increased revenue effort and/or spending discipline 
(depending in part on donor-determined size of  the grant). Of  course localities may 
lobby separately and/or collectively with respect to the size of  the distributable pool 
(grant level).
• Fiscal capacity based methods: a formula-based grant is made to each recipient government 
based on a calculated estimate of  the difference between the summed amount of  a 
(nationally) standardized set of  expenditure functions and the recipient governments 
ability to mobilize own source revenues from a (nationally) standardized set of  revenue 
bases. (E
estimated needs
-R
potential 
=G
calculated,
).6  
5  A closed-ended grant places a limit on the total amount of  grant funds. In contrast, an open-ended grant provides grant funds (entitle-
ments) as long as certain conditions for distribution are met by the recipient government. See Table A-1. 
6  Measuring fiscal capacity requires constructing an estimate for revenues and expenditures that each subnational unit would have 
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Table 2. Alternative Methods of  Grant Allocation
Types of  transfers Expenditure Revenue Transfers
1. Gap-Filling 
Individual decision on 
appropriations (EI
estimate
)
Individual revenue 
assessment (RI
planned
)
Individual 
bargaining
(EI
estimate
-RI
planned
)
2. General Grant 
influences the tightness 
of  the Budget 
Constraint
Local decision on expenditure 
levels
(E=R+G)
Local authority to generate 
revenue (R)
General grant (G) 
determined by the 
donor government; 
distinct from gap-
filling since the 
donor controls the 
transfer amount 
at the outset and 
(presumably) does 
not negotiate local 
deficit situations. 
3. Fiscal Capacity 
Accepted expenditure levels 
based on objective (policy 
neutral) measures of  “needs” 
(E
estimated
)
Potential revenue at 
standardized revenue bases 
subject to nationally average 
tax rates and revenue charges. 
(R
required
)
Calculated grant
(G
calculated
=E
estiamted 
needs-Rpotential)
The gap-filling model is the most centralizing form of  grant allocation, where both municipal bud-
get expenditure for particular services and total local government revenue, including own source 
revenue, are estimated for each local government. Transfers are then calculated as the difference 
between these individual levels of  municipal expenditure and total anticipated revenue. This meth-
od, which characterized the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements under Communism, led to the 
“soft budget constraint” system of  unaccountable (to citizens) transfer-dependent local govern-
ments—an outcome that some argue was one of  the most serious of  Communism’s fiscal flaws 
(Kornai 1986). Under gap-filling arrangements, there is little or no incentive to raise own source 
revenues, because transfers are automatically decreased by the amount of  any surplus above the 
planned own revenue appropriations. As of  today, most of  the post-socialist CEE countries have 
tried to abandon gap-filling although others have attempted instead to refine the approach by stan-
dardizing the expenditure side of  the formula (e.g., Bulgaria, Slovenia). 
The second model, used for calculating general grants, provides greater autonomy in deciding mu-
nicipal expenditure and creates incentives for own source revenue-raising. Under this model the 
national budget grants are calculated by formulae and carry with them a high degree of  userfiscal 
flexibility and autonomy (see Table A-1). Methods used for distributing general grants include 
population size, and number of  users of  municipal services (e.g., students, elderly in health care 
facilities, welfare assistance).7 This approach is widely used in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
recorded had it followed tax and expenditure policies that prevail across the nation. This estimate is to be designed independent of  its 
current tax and expenditure policies (Yilmaz and Bindebir 2003).
7  Note that benchmarks such as students, elderly in health facilities, and number of  hospital beds give numbers that reflect a govern-
ment’s policy decisions and, thus, are not “policy neutral.” In contrast, alternative “workload” measures such as the number of  children 
of  school age, number of  elderly in the population, and poverty tend to be more policy neutral and therefore serve as “objective” 
measures of  spending need. 
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Poland, with the complexity of  the allocation formulae marking the difference between the sys-
tems in the three countries. 
Finally, the most “policy neutral” model for grant allocation is built on the difference between ex-
penditure needs and own source revenue capacity. This method calculates local expenditure through 
formulae, and at the same time, takes into account standardized estimates of  potential revenues 
that a subnational government could mobilize if  it applied average national tax rates (and revenue 
charges) to its available revenue bases. Consequently, methods of  transfer serve equalization pur-
poses (municipalities with low revenue potential and/or higher expenditure needs receive higher 
grants) without destroying local incentives for own source revenue efforts (local governments get 
no compensation for uncollected revenue below the average level, and the surplus in own revenue 
does not automatically decrease the transfers). In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) only Hun-
gary and Poland have tried to standardize the revenue side of  the grant allocation formula. There 
has been little work to set up standardized measures for both revenues and expenditures (but it is 
certainly possible, see Table A-3). 
Final Comment: Need for Reliable Information 
The complex grant allocation formulae require proper statistical and fiscal information; otherwise 
there would be no way to ensure objectivity in grant allocation. Detailed data is needed for measur-
ing outputs and the capacity of  service organizations in a timely manner. This information is not 
always available at the early stages of  annual budgeting, in which case fiscal planning is necessarily 
based on estimates and projections.
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Appendix
Table A-1.  Taxonomy of  Intergovernmental Grants  
Conditional, Open-
Ended, Matching
Conditional, 
Closed-Ended Non-Matching Unconditional
Description
For every Euro the 
subnational government 
(SNG)  receives, the 
recipient must spend some 
own funds in order to 
receive the grant. With an 
“open-ended” grant there 
is no cap on amount of  
funds. Thus, the cost of  the 
grant depends on recipient 
behavior.
Conditional grant 
but with a ceiling on 
the cost.
The center 
transfers a fixed 
sum of  money 
with the only 
stipulation that 
it be spent on a 
specified activity. 
There is no 
percentage share 
requirement 
(“match”) 
placed on the 
SNG.
Provided for 
equalization purposes 
or basic functional areas 
(e.g., the decision to 
give governorates some 
flexibility in investment 
fund spending). 
Purpose of  
Grant
Encourage spending 
on production of  
good or service having 
positive social and/
or interjurisdictional 
externalities.
Same as open-ended.
Restriction 
on its use 
differentiates 
it from 
unconditional 
grant.
Increases overall 
capacity to spend. 
May have specific 
equalization goal 
(horizontal imbalance) 
and/or be a way 
to correct vertical 
imbalance.
Illustration
There is no cut off  (or 
cap) on the amount of  
funds received as long as 
the SNG meets the need 
conditions for receiving 
the transfer. Thus, this 
type of  grant becomes 
an “entitlement.” Grants 
for housing for the poor, 
access to education, and 
the safety net are often 
structured in this manner. 
Most categorical 
grants 
(environmental 
management, 
housing, substance 
abuse treatment) 
have some limit on 
donor cost (close- 
ended).
Community 
development, 
job training, 
transportation, 
capital/
operating 
assistance.
An equalization grant 
is designed to address 
horizontal imbalance 
of  recipient. Sector 
“block” grants have a 
designated purpose, 
broadly defined.
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Conditional, Open-
Ended, Matching
Conditional, 
Closed-Ended Non-Matching Unconditional
Effect on
Governmental
Spending
The center determines the 
amount of  spending.
Effect on Spending 
is shared by donor 
and recipient (but 
this all ends when 
cap is reached). 
The cap (total Euro 
limit to be spent) 
is a way the center 
can control its own 
budget. That is, at 
some point the SNG 
is no longer entitled 
to the grant.
Donor gives 
recipient a 
fixed amount 
of  a grant with 
stipulation on 
its use. If  the 
community 
wanted to 
consume less 
of  the public 
good then the 
grant condition 
affects behavior. 
Otherwise this 
looks like an 
unconditional 
grant.
The donor will cap the 
amount of  the grant. As 
long as the community 
wants to consume at 
least an amount of  
the public good equal 
to the amount of  the 
grant, then the fact that 
the grant is conditional 
or unconditional is 
irrelevant.
Fungibility
Fungibility means that 
money can be used for 
more than a designated 
purpose; or it “frees up” 
other funds that would 
be used for a restricted 
purpose for other uses, 
including tax reduction.
Yes Yes Yes
Degree 
of  Fiscal 
Autonomy 
Moderate Low 
High—similar 
in effect to an 
unrestricted 
grant.
High
Source: Robert Ebel and Adrian Ionescu, Central European University, Masters of  Public Policy Course (2005). 
Table A-1.  Taxonomy of  Intergovernmental Grants  (continued)
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Table A-2. Determination of  the Distributable Pool in Selected Countries
Country
Sources of  
Funds for Trans-
fers
Description
Turkey
Fixed share of  
national rev-
enues 
6 percent of  
national tax rev-
enues
Central government provides additional support for certain projects in the form 
of  cost reimbursement from different funds; such as Local Authorities Fund, 
Municipalities Fund, Traffic Services Development Fund, Tourism Development 
Fund.
Jordan
Fixed share of  
national rev-
enues 
6 percent of  fuel 
tax
The “fuel tax” refers to a pool of  shared taxes set aside to help finance local gov-
ernments. Revenue in the pool is drawn from an earmarked portion of  customs 
duties, vehicle licenses, excise taxes on fuel products, and traffic violation fines.
Colom-
bia
Fixed share of  
national rev-
enues 
24.5 percent of  
national revenues 
to departmental 
governments 
(second tier); 22 
percent of  na-
tional revenues to 
municipal govern-
ments (third tier).
There are three components of  the transfer system: the situado fiscal (SF), the par-
ticipaciones municipals (PM) and the sistema nacional de cofinanciacion (SNC). 
The SF consists of  24.5 percent of  national current revenues; it is transferred to 
departments to finance education and health expenditures. The PM consists of  a 
percentage of  national current revenues, increasing annually to a scheduled maxi-
mum of  22 percent; it is transferred to municipalities for “social investments.” The 
SNC finances specified subnational projects on a matching basis.
Japan
Fixed share of  
national rev-
enues
LAT: Fixed 
percentages of  5 
taxes
The main source of  transfer pool is local allocation tax (LAT)—an unconditional 
transfer system that is a tax-sharing arrangement. LAT is distributed according 
to a uniform formula based on basic financial need and basic financial capacity 
of  subnational governments. It is paid annually to subnational governments and 
varies across them inversely with their local fiscal capacity. LAT is not a traditional 
transfer but a shared-tax system that is similar to surtax on the national income 
tax base. Approximately 60 percent of  prefectural and 40 percent of  municipal tax 
revenues are from the LAT.
Belgium
Fixed share of  
national rev-
enues 
•  The full proceeds of  radio-television fee collected by the federal government;
•  A share of  personal income tax (apportioned according to a historic break 
down of  the amounts and indexed according to the GNP);
•  A share of  VAT
Spain
Fixed share of  
national rev-
enues
The major unconditional transfer source is the central government’s general rev-
enues and PIT collected in each subnational government jurisdiction. 
United 
States
Annual Budget/
Cost Reimburse-
ment
There are more than 600 different federal transfer programs to state and local 
governments, most of  which are conditional transfers. The largest portion of  the 
amounts of  federal transfers is used to fund healthcare programs administered by 
the states. 
Source: Serdar Yilmaz and Serap Bindebir 2003. 
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Table A-3. Equalization and Intergovernmental Transfers, Selected Countries
Indonesian transfers are designed to empower district governments: The equalization grant pool, the 
dana alokasi unum (DAU), is a fixed percent (25%) of  central resources (in practice, budgeted rather than actual 
resources) after tax sharing with the regions. The central government distributes the pool on a formula that 
takes into account both revenue capacity and expenditure needs. Revenue capacity is estimated as standardized 
own revenues plus tax sharing receipts plus 75% of  share of  natural resource receipts. Expenditure needs reflect 
population, poverty rate, land area, and a construction cost index. Recognizing that the district is the primary 
unit of  decentralized service delivery, 90% of  the grant goes to districts, and 10% to provinces. The grant 
finances 70% of  total district spending and 50% of  provincial expenditure. There is also a new earmarked grant 
system (DAK, accounts for only 3% of  total grants) that builds in some equalization. Regions with low fiscal 
capacity pay only 10% in matching funds whereby those with high fiscal capacity pay up to a 50% match.
China is ever so slowly experimenting with a “robin hood” system of  using a transfer system to channel 
funds from its relatively rich, largely Eastern and costal provinces to its poor Western region. The 
Peoples Republic relies largely on earmarked grants, which account for 95% of  all grants, two-thirds of  which 
consist of  revenue sharing on a derivation basis (similar to Egypt). Thus there is no equalizing element. A small 
equalization grant does exist (3% of  total grants). The pool is determined annually during budget preparation 
(thus ad hoc, uncertain); however it is formula based, derived from regression analysis of  a “standard budget” 
and relies on variables such as provincial GDP, student-teacher ratios, number of  civil servants and population 
density. 
The Philippines provides an example of  a multi-SNG distribution of  the transfer pool. Under the 
Local Government Code (LGU), local governments receive a fixed share of  central tax revenues through the 
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). The pool is equal to 40% of  average internal tax collections three years prior. 
The IRA pool is first divided among types of  SNGs: provinces (23%), cities (23%), municipalities (34%), and 
barangays (20%). The distribution formula allocates based on pollution (50%); land area (25%), and sharing 
across provinces.
Hungary, like many regimes of  the Soviet sphere, has systematically moved from revenue sharing 
to equalization grants. The typical Soviet sphere socialist country of  Central and Eastern Europe was not 
dissimilar to current-day Egypt in that it financed local administration through a combination of  tax sharing on 
a derivation basis and an intergovernmental formula grant designed to fund the expenditure capacity (not needs) 
requirements of  centrally set, socialist, service delivery “normatives.” At first (1991) 100% of  the centrally levied 
and administered personal income tax was returned to municipalities on a derivation basis. Over the decade 
Hungary systematically reduced that percent from 100% to 50% to 35% to, presently, 5%. And, in doing so, 
also systematically moved these central funds into an intergovernmental grant pool to be distributed according 
to needs. The result: from derivation to equalization.
Canada equalizes on the basis of  potential revenue capacity of  its provinces. The goal of  the Canadian 
system is to equalize tax bases. To accomplish this, the central government calculates a per capita provincial 
standard tax rate and applies that to the potential tax base of  each province (the standard rate is the average 
per capita tax base of  five middle income provinces). The central government then calculates the revenues that 
would result from applying the (implicit) “average” tax rate to each province. The center then calculates two 
numbers: the amount of  tax revenues that a province would generate if  it received own revenues equal to the 
average per capita tax collection of  the five provinces, and the potential yield it can generate by applying the 
five-provincial average tax rate to its actual base (a “representative” yield). The amount of  the transfer is then 
based on the difference of  the two numbers. Note that because for a poor province the lower number is based 
on potential revenue, the transfer is neutral with respect to actual tax effort. That is, a poor province is not 
penalized if  it makes an actual  per capita “tax effort” greater than its “representative” potential tax effort. The 
Canadian transfer pool is funded from general tax revenues. 
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Australia is designed to measure relative “fiscal capacity”—the relationship between equalized tax 
revenues and representative (equalized) spending needs. The distributive pool is broadly defined for 
central taxes (personal income, corporate net income, value added, and excises). Then, formula is a three-step 
calculation: First, the revenue capacity of  each state is calculated in a manner similar to Canada’s method. This 
give a measure of  the ability of  each state to generate so many Aus. dollar revenues from a “representative” 
tax base multiplied by statewide average tax rate (“representative tax rate”). A similar “representative’ method 
is applied to estimate expenditure needs on a state-by-state basis. Expenditure needs are calculated on the basis 
of  separate sets of  indicators for each of  41 expenditure categories assigned to subnational governments (e.g., 
medical services are based on population adjusted for age and sex, health on infant mortality). Each of  these 
indicators is assigned a weight, which is then used to aggregate the relative expenditure needs of  each state. The 
indictor of  expenditure needs less the indicator of  revenue raising capacity determines the relative expenditure 
gap of  each jurisdiction. 
Source: Amin and Ebel 2006; Dillinger 2005, Yilmaz and Bindebir 2003; Bird and Tarasov 2002.
Table A-3. Equalization and Intergovernmental Transfers, Selected Countries 
(continued)
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Local Borrowing and Municiptal Debt
Using “other peoples’ money” to finance capital expenditures for development.
There are several recurrent policy issues within the context of  designing an intergovernmental 
fiscal system. One such issue for newly decentralizing countries is whether a subnational govern-
ment (e.g., province, municipality) should be allowed to take on debt. A typical argument against 
borrowing is that the subnational unit does not have the institutional and administrative “capacity” 
to manage debt. This argument presents often a paternalist attitude towards local governments 
(with a doubtful assumption that capacity of  central level bureaucracy in transition countries is 
usually higher than in case of  local administrations) and in practice it is often used as an excuse 
to block fiscal decentralization. It should be noticed however, that the issue of  local capacity to 
manage debt policy may become more salient in countries with territorially fragmented systems, 
in which there are plentiful very small subnational units (see essay on Territorial Organization). A 
second argument, and one that had particular merit for some countries in the early days (the 1990s) 
when countries were making the transition from heavy socialist centralization to decentralization, 
was that the “transition” country had inherited a precarious macroeconomic situation (Bird, Ebel, 
Wallich 1995).
But for a country to develop, a good case can be made for permitting subnational governments 
to borrow as long as the “golden rule” of  debt finance is followed: that subnational governments 
borrow only for financing capital (investment) expenditures such as those for infrastructure im-
provements, which provide a flow of  benefits over time.1 When this rule is followed, borrowing 
then not only becomes a viable alternative to other sources of  financing (e.g., so-called pay-as-you-
go schemes, whereby only current revenues are used to pay for capital investments), but, in fact, 
becomes a tool for the achievement of  the goals of  fiscal equity and efficiency. Indeed, borrow-
ing—using “other peoples’ money”—provides fiscal space for economic development planning. 
Thus, one observes that in developed economies of  the world, local governments have developed 
a range of  borrowing strategies and tools—strategies and tools, it must be noted, that are often 
accompanied by some rules-based mechanisms for fiscal discipline (see briefing note “Subnational 
Fiscal Autonomy”). 
The Arguments for Borrowing
The main arguments for using borrowed money for capital projects may be summarized as fol-
lows:
• Efficiency. Because capital (investment) expenditures provide a flow of  current benefits 
over time (the life of  the project), it is efficient to spread the capital cost recovery process 
over that same time period. 
• Equity. Equity or fiscal “fairness” is enhanced by spreading out the payment of  the capital 
1  The one exception to this rule is the use of  short-term loans to address temporary cash-flow problems; but such loans should be 
repaid during the same budget year
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costs over successive generations that benefit from the subsequent year-to-year flow of  
services.
• Timing. Borrowing allows for faster implementation of  projects and benefits deriving 
from investments can be enjoyed earlier. Indeed, in some cases earlier completion of  a 
project may generate additional revenues or reduce current expenditures (e.g., new, more 
efficient lighting or heating systems). Moreover, faster implementation often reduces the 
total cost of  an investment project.
• Practicality. Borrowing often enables use of  external grants that require pre-financing. 
• Politics. Recognizing the merits of  these first four arguments, it is to be noted that the 
ability of  local governments to borrow is one of  the tenets of  the European Charter of  
Local Self-Government, which in article 9, calls for the right to borrow by subnational 
entities in order to finance investment projects. 
Clearly, borrowing does not increase the pool of  financial resources (“servicing the debt” by a 
schedule of  repayment of  principal and interest is required); rather what it does is change the 
timing of  the financial resources. It also raises the question of  borrowing limits, which help to 
(i) assure that debt does not exceed a level which cannot be repaid and (ii) minimize the risk of  
not being able to service a debt, a circumstance that if  widespread could lead to macro-economic 
instability (see further discussion below). However, as European practice suggests, subnational 
debt usually constitutes only a very small fraction of  the total public debt, and its macroeconomic 
consequences are negligible (Swianiewicz 2004). Indeed, there is an emerging body of  evidence 
that suggests that a well-designed system of  fiscal decentralization enhances macro-stability and 
growth (see briefing note “Subnational Fiscal Autonomy”).
Forms of  Borrowing
Borrowing by subnational governments takes several forms, with the practices of  various coun-
tries representing different models (King 1984). The focus of  this essay is on long-term borrow-
ing, i.e. going beyond the current budget year.
• Intergovernmental loans. In some countries, especially those in Eastern Europe, there 
is an arrangement where an upper tier government’s budgets may provide loans for lower 
tier governments. Many analyses suggest that this form is rarely effective in promoting 
optimal use of  borrowed funds. Within this arrangement decisions relating to loans are 
often made on the basis of  political rather than economic criteria, and the administration 
is not prepared to assess the risk and feasibility of  financed projects. In some countries 
intergovernmental loans are used to support local governments with excessive indebted-
ness (that have problems servicing their debt). Such a solution may produce a “moral 
hazard” problem, encouraging both lenders and financial institutions to underestimate 
the risk related to borrowing. 
 
13
Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Notes
• Special credit lines or special funds offering preferential loans. It is quite common 
to offer special credit lines to local governments; for example, for investments that sup-
port environmental protection. Due to the ability to secure lower interest rates, such 
loans are often cheaper than commercial loans. In some countries there are special envi-
ronmental protection funds that subsidize loans by drawing on own revenues from fees 
and fines imposed for polluting the environment. And, in several European countries 
there has been a trend to establish special financial institutions that focus predominantly 
or exclusively on financing local government investments. Establishment of  communal 
banks is one available option. However, the experience in many cases has been that these 
institutions, which lend predominately to local governments, often do not support opti-
mal credit decisions; and, thus,  the recent trend in several West European countries has 
been to withdraw from such special programs and rely instead on the commercial credit 
market. On the other hand, the experience of  some East European counties has been 
that special environment funds have played a clearly positive role in promoting desired 
investments as well as serving as a tool for teaching local governments the basic rules 
related to behavior on the capital market (Swianiewicz 2004). 
• Commercial bank credit. Credit from commercial banks is probably the most popular way 
of  subnational borrowing in Europe. In many countries banks are very keen to lend money to 
subnational governments, since they judge the risk of  the lending to be very low. Indeed, there is 
often competition among different banks that offer products and services to local governments.
• Municipal bonds. Borrowing from the private capital markets—the “municipal bond market”—
is common practice in some non-European countries, such as the United States, Canada and 
Australia.2 It is also promoted through some technical assistance programs, such as those funded 
by United States Agency for International Development and the World Bank. The practice is 
now becoming more frequent in Europe, although due to constant costs related to the issue, they 
tend to be largely utilized by regions and big cities rather than by small local governments. For 
large issues, the cost of  the loan may be lower in the case of  bonds than for commercial credit. 
When bonds are issued in Europe the vast majority of  issues are purchased by a small number of  
investors such as banks. pension and investment funds; the role of  individual private investors is 
very limited.
• Leasing, BOT. The above items describe “conventional” forms of  borrowing. There are also 
alternative forms such as leasing or some forms of  Public-Private Partnership—which are, in 
fact, a form of  borrowing (e.g., the essence of  the Build-Operate-Transfer, BOT,  mechanism is 
borrowing).
• Guarantees issued by local governments (e.g. for credit received by local companies). 
Although guarantees are not a debt incurred by local government, they may become part of  a 
local government’s financial obligation. In some countries (e.g. Poland) guarantees are reported 
together with other types of  municipal debt, and they count against legal limits on debt size.
2  The term “municipal bond market” is broadly used to describe subnational borrowing by not only local (e.g., municipal) govern-
ments, but also by other local governments and provinces.  
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Quite another form of  local debt is related to arrears in payment. Contrary to the forms of  borrow-
ing discussed above, which are often required and serve to support local development, arrears are 
a clear sign that the local financial system is in poor health. Although it is a fundamentally different 
type of  debt from those previously discussed, in some transition countries it plays an important 
role in many local governments. 
Regulatory Framework
An efficiently functioning capital market requires a regulatory framework. For a number of  reasons, 
market mechanisms cannot provide sufficient regulation in this respect. Therefore it is necessary 
to provide clear rules and controlling/monitoring mechanisms. In nearly all European countries, 
the borrowing power of  local governments is limited by various rules-based regulations (Joumard 
and Kongsrud 2003). 
First of  all, in most (but not all) countries local governments are allowed to borrow only to cover 
investment spending, but must not borrow to cover a gap in their operating budgets. There are two 
modes of  local borrowing regulations in European countries:
• ex ante borrowing controls, including individual borrowing limits and permissions; 
• ex post control of  the level of  indebtedness and control of  the current budget, which 
needs to include resources for servicing debt on capital projects.
Although there is no EU law directly related to levels of  local debt, Maastricht treaty criteria indi-
rectly limit local borrowing by requiring total public debt to be kept below 60% of  GDP. 
Countries usually apply limits on debt at the level of  individual subnational governments. There 
used to be some countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia) that did not apply limits on individual mu-
nicipalities, but the practical experience of  less than prudent local policies forced them to eventu-
ally introduce some limits. The most frequent limitation is on the level of  debt service, usually 
expressed as a percentage of  the annual budget revenues. Sometimes there is also a limit on to-
tal indebtedness. In general, limits on local government borrowing can be set in three different 
ways:
a) annual debt service as a percentage of  local government revenues; 
b) ratio of  total annual new borrowing as a percentage of  annual revenues; and
c) stock of  debt.
Sometimes these limits are criticized for being inflexible and not reflecting the real financial stand-
ing of  a local government. Thus, for some local governments it can be very difficult to repay a 
debt that is a small fraction of  their annual budget, while for others too strict a limit on borrowing 
may act as an unnecessary barrier to the expansion of  their development program. An alternative 
approach is to relate an allowed level of  debt to the actual and projected level of  operating surplus 
(difference between current revenues and amount spent on current operation of  local govern-
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ment), but such a regulation does not provide macroeconomic security of  the debt level. 
Another important issue is regulation of  local governments who have problems servicing their 
debt. In some countries (Hungary, Switzerland), there are laws and regulations to address local 
financial emergencies (e.g., threats of  or actual default, bankruptcy) that are designed to secure 
the ongoing delivery of  basic local public services to local communities as well as to  discourage 
irresponsible behavior on the local borrowing market. 
Implementation of  borrowing regulations requires an effective monitoring system, i.e. report-
ing requirements and a system of  collecting and presenting relevant information (Dafflon 2002). 
Monitoring is often a problematic issue in the transition countries of  Eastern Europe. In con-
structing such a monitoring system, borrowing by communal entities (such as companies that are 
separate legal entities, but owned by local governments) needs to be accounted for.
Policies to Support Development of  Local Borrowing 
Central governments may support development of the local borrowing market not only through           
building a regulatory framework and providing  special credit arrangements, but also—and much 
more importantly so—by carrying out their own policies that enable local governments deemed 
to be creditworthy to have access to debt funds.3 The following are examples of  policies that may 
support local borrowing:
1. Stabilization and diversity of  the banking system as a necessary precondition for 
development of  the local borrowing market.
2. Training programs for bank and local government officials. Effective local borrowing 
policies require sophisticated skills that are not everywhere available, especially (but not 
only) in smaller local governments.
3. Transparency of  the financial reporting system. Such a system supports control by 
local communities (and their elected representatives), but also enables better access to 
information by potential lenders (banks, private investors).
4. Promoting a clear separation of  the current and capital budgets of  local governments. 
This enables imposition of  the “golden rule of  the balanced budget” and allows for 
borrowing for capital projects only. 
5. Stability of  the local government system. Multi-year financial planning, a precondition 
for taking on long-term debt, is possible only within a stable local financial system. It 
is also important that local governments have a considerable amount of  control over 
their budget revenues, so in this way development of  local borrowing is interrelated with 
other aspects of  fiscal decentralization. 
6. Developing regulations on borrowing that are predictable and stable. 
3  That bond issuing requires knowledge of  procedures that are often quite complex and thereby require a high degree of  technical 
expertise; small local governments may have limited administrative capacity to work through the process. Thus, such tools become an 
important vehicle to allow small jurisdictions to have access to debt finance.
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__________________
In sum, the ability of  subnational (e.g., local) governments to borrow and to take on and manage 
debt is a key tool for local as well as national economic development. But,  to make it work, there 
must be an intergovernmental partnership—partnership whereby not only does the central au-
thority understand it is in the national interest to enable (and regulate, and monitor) local borrow-
ing, but also one in which local governments take on the responsibility to become creditworthy.   
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Property Devolution and Local
 Government Asset Management
Local governments should have ownership of  assets related to devolved public functions, and they develop effective 
methods of  municipal  property management.
In many countries, local governments own a vast array of  assets including public housing pro-
jects, water and sewerage distribution systems, roads, office buildings, and numerous infrastructure 
facilities. Management of  public infrastructure assets, however, may be fragmented with various 
categories of  assets falling within a different jurisdiction, or bureaucracy. As a result, it is essential 
that all governments, no matter what their stage of  development, properly devolve public assets 
by implementing more effective legislation on commercial entities; provide clear rules and options 
for local governments with respect to the management of  public assets; and develop more effec-
tive zoning and urban planning systems to enable local governments to prudently manage public 
assets. 
The future of  publicly and socially owned assets is critical for the future decentralization and 
modernization of  public services in Kosovo. According to the present regulations all municipal 
assets are owned nationally and they are managed by the Kosovo Trust Agency. However, there 
is a tradition of  local asset management and autonomy in working with locally owned communal 
enterprises. 
This briefing note provides the essential ingredients necessary for effective management of  local 
public assets by : (i) reviewing what steps are essential to the successful devolution of  public assets; 
(ii) providing a framework as to why local government asset management is important; and (iii) 
presenting a brief  description of  the fixed asset cycle
Property Devolution
Public sector reforms in transition countries have revolved around three interrelated issues: (i) 
political decentralization; (ii) reassignment of  public functions and their funding; and (iii) transfer 
of  state-owned assets. Devolution of  public property is justified, because real local governments 
need a sound economic base and the transferred assets, accompanying assigned services, are man-
aged more efficiently. 
The counterarguments against substantial devolution of  public assets usually emphasize that it 
will: (i) lead to the loss of  national property; (ii) increase differences among local governments; and 
(iii) lead to inefficient property management practices. 
These political debates can be resolved if  the transfer of  ownership is properly managed. The 
most critical issues related to property devolution are as follows:
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•  how the scope of  devolved assets is defined;
•  what are the methods of  property transfer; and 
•  how the accompanying legal rules and regulations are developed. 
A principle behind property devolution is the functional approach, according to which all the assets 
connected to assigned local government functions should be transferred to local governments. 
Property devolution might also be implemented at different speeds,  according to the rules of  
decentralization in specific service areas. CEE transition countries, in their experience with wide-
scale devolution of  state assets, encountered three related problems that had to be solved during 
the property transfer:
a.   Whether former owners had the right of  compensation for the loss of  their private assets with 
nationalization. 
b.    What reference date was to be used to establish the starting day of  public ownership?  
c.     Transferred assets were severely deteriorated (e.g., social housing stock). Many of  the new 
owners were obliged to accept these liabilities.
The actual transfer of  property in CEE countries followed the physical location of  the assets. 
Typically, the following groups of  property were devolved: land and public spaces, natural water-
flows, service organizations and urban infrastructure, social housing stock, financial and intangible 
assets. Transfer of  state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was determined mainly by the privatization 
practices. Often small services, manufacturing companies and some shares of  incorporated SOEs 
became municipal assets.
Local government ownership of  assets must be legislated. Table 1 below presents in tabular form 
the experiences of  local governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Real municipal ownership 
may be limited by assigning only the “right to administer” (e.g., Slovakia in the early 1990s) or by 
separating non-negotiable core property (roads, city parks) from those which can be alienated (e.g., 
Hungary). The actual transfer of  property was implemented in two ways: (i) by virtue of  law or (ii) 
through property transfer committees/commissions. 
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There are several conditions for establishing an efficient and transparent system of  local asset 
management. However, the most critical conditions for creating an enabling environment for ef-
ficient local management of  new asset portfolios are the following:
a. Legislation on commercial entities within the public and private sector (a Company Act) should 
clarify the basic rules of  operation for businesses. 
b. The privatization process should make it clear from the very beginning what options are avail-
able to local governments, as new owners of  former state-owned companies. 
c. As local governments become owners of  urban land and begin operating in a market environ-
ment, land use (zoning) regulations and the urban planning system should be adjusted to these 
new conditions. 
d. Fiscal regulations need to be adjusted to the new environment; local governments should enjoy 
high autonomy in setting user charges and levying property-related local taxes.
Why Is Local Government Asset Management Important?
In many instances, management of  public infrastructure assets is fragmented with various catego-
ries of  assets falling within a different jurisdiction, or bureaucracy. In almost all countries, differ-
ent classes of  assets are managed according to their own rules, often adhering to traditional asset 
management practices rather than developing an approach that defines the most appropriate asset 
management practice.
The need for better management of  locally owned public assets has been highlighted on a global 
scale by the widespread decentralization initiatives that have devolved huge asset portfolios from 
central to local governments. Many regional or local governments appear to be unprepared to deal 
with the multiple issues related to being the owners and managers of  public assets.
New Public Management2
Reforms in local government asset management belong to the various public policies associated 
with “New Public Management.” In brief, new public management seeks to:
•  Improve public sector performance supported by performance monitoring and incentives;
•  Separate policymaking and service delivery functions;
•  Decentralize or devolve service responsibilities from higher to lower levels of  
   government;
•  Provide for greater managerial flexibility in financial management; and,
•  Enhance or provide for greater accountability and transparency in local government 
    operations.
Much of  the impetus for new public management reforms stems from the recognition of  the 
substantial amounts of  wealth tied to local government fixed and property assets and the potential 
2  This section is largely derived from Kaganova and McKellar 2006. 
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income or cost-savings to be obtained by changing asset management practices. 
The reform of  accounting practices includes the shift to accrual-based accounts. Budget con-
straints, while prompting cost-cutting measures, have also accelerated approaches to manage local 
government assets better and initiated the search to raise additional revenues from such assets. In 
many countries, the budget constraint may result from the fact that local authorities have very lim-
ited flexibility to raise local tax rates or to impose new local taxes. The primary options for raising 
revenues involve charging for the use of  public assets or selling assets. A deliberate downloading 
of  programs and services from higher level governments, as part of  decentralization initiatives 
has taken place in numerous countries, often without adequate sources of  funds to pay for the 
devolved programs. 
Accounting Reforms Accelerate Improvements in 
Asset Management3
The reform of  accounting practices in the government sector has strongly influenced local gov-
ernment asset management practices. The move toward accrual accounting and generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) has made inroads with respect to local governments managing their 
financial assets more appropriately. These accounting changes can have dramatic impacts on the 
way that fixed and other local government property assets are accounted for, and the kind of  in-
formation flows that are needed to comply with newly adopted accounting standards. From a local 
public finance point of  view, local governments in many other parts of  the world have tradition-
ally operated via annual budget requests and annual appropriations assigned on the basis of  these 
budget requests. This approach typically eliminates the need for any type of  balance sheet since 
all transactions are annual cash transactions with carry-over provisions. Capital assets are written 
off  in the year completed. The value of  these assets is not accounted for in public ledgers. This 
implies that local government assets are, in an accounting sense, considered to be nonproductive 
or a free good. 
Accrual accounting has prompted controversial changes in public sector asset management. In ac-
crual accounting for government, financial statements should report all assets, liabilities, revenues, 
expenses, gains and losses. For capital assets, accrual accounting shows asset values and related 
debt. This implies that governments should identify and record all their assets, attach a value to 
each asset, and then re-evaluate these assets later.
Accrual accounting also matches a revenue stream to offset the annual charge associated with 
amortizing capital cost. For example, if  a fixed asset is amortized over twenty years as an expense, 
a corresponding revenue stream is shown on the other side of  the ledger. This revenue stream is 
derived from a capital charge. This may either be an imputed charge or an actual payment and is 
introduced as the primary means to force users to recognize the true cost of  using and consuming 
the asset. 
3  For more on government accounting, see Gauthier 2001. 
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A problem arises with depreciation. Some charge(s) can be assessed on the expense side for depre-
ciation, usually as a percentage of  the capital cost. Without a corresponding entry on the revenue 
side to match this liability, the balance sheet rapidly accumulates an amount of  deferred mainte-
nance. This deferred maintenance, if  allowed to persist, has a significant impact on the net worth 
of  the total portfolio.
Fragmented Management of  Public Assets
When many government agencies, departments, government-owned companies, or special purpose 
entities may become involved in managing, financing, and using an asset class, the management of  
these public assets may become fragmented. A lack of  government-wide strategies, policies, and 
rules dealing with asset management practices may exacerbate the management fragmentation of  
public assets. It is essential that uniform policies, procedures and rules be introduced with respect 
to the management of  public sector assets.
Until very recently, information about fixed assets and other real property has generally been an 
issue with respect to local governments. In addition, reliable financial information regarding lo-
cal government assets is also often missing. Bookkeeping values are often so outdated as to be 
meaningless. 
The Fixed Asset Cycle
The fixed asset cycle is the accounting cycle relating to the ownership of  an asset (see Chart 1). 
This cycle is composed of  the budgeting, procurement, acquisition, recording, accounting, report-
ing and disposal of  an asset. Each of  these steps has its own specific functions and traits, but each 
of  these traits interrelates with one or more of  the other items. In addition, each stage of  an asset’s 
life has different accounting, reporting, and management responsibilities. These stages run from 
the initial acquisition of  the asset to the ultimate disposition of  the asset.
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The asset management cycle can be briefly described as follows:
• Acquisition. Acquisition is defined as the obtaining of  the fixed asset by the local 
government. This acquisition can be done as, but is not restricted to, a cash purchase, 
receipt of  donation, construction, lease purchase, or eminent domain.
• Acceptance. The process of  receiving the fixed asset for use by the local 
government.
• Fixed Asset Recording. Recording is the act of  entering a newly acquired asset on 
the fixed asset subsystem.
Depreciation
The usefulness of  most assets, other than land, declines over time and some type of  write-down 
or write-off  cost is needed to indicate that the usefulness of  an asset has declined. Depreciation is 
the term most often used to indicate that intangible assets have declined in service potential. The 
cost of  fixed assets will be allocated to the periods benefited through depreciation. 
The method of  depreciation chosen must result in the systematic and rational allocation of  the 
cost of  the asset (less its residual value) over the asset’s expected useful life. Most communities 
use the straight-line method of  depreciation, which presumes that the same economic value is 
obtained from the use of  the asset in each period. 
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Residual value
Residual value is often not material and in practice is frequently based on a predetermined per-
centage of  the initial acquisition value. If  the historical cost is used, residual value is defined as 
the expected worth of  the asset, in present currency (i.e., without any consideration of  the impact 
of  future inflation), at the end of  its useful life. Residual value should, however, be net of  any 
expected costs of  disposition. In the case of  water utilities, residual values are very difficult to de-
termine since most fixed assets are unique and are rarely sold in the market. Since it is rarely used 
in practice, not using a residual value is a viable approach since it all too often generates unreliable 
estimates.
Disposition of  Fixed Assets
Regardless of  the time of  disposal, depreciation expenses for fixed assets should be taken up to 
the date of  disposition and all amounts related to the retired asset should be removed from the ac-
counts. Ideally, the book value of  the specific asset should be equal to its disposal value. However, 
this is generally not the case, and a resulting gain or loss occurs. Gains or losses on the retirement 
of  assets should be shown in the income statements along with other non-operating revenues/ex-
penses that arise from ordinary business activities. 
Conclusion
This paper focused on the search for common rules, and institutional and accounting arrange-
ments to improve the efficiency and public usefulness of  government-owned (fixed) assets and 
real property. Government assets are crucial to financing government operations. These assets in 
some instances can be used to collateralize borrowing and are essential to effective public service 
delivery. 
Public asset accountability involves the overall stewardship of  assets. The importance of  public 
sector assets implies that it is essential to inventory, catalog, and account for these assets in a sys-
tematic manner. Installing (accrual) fixed asset recording accounting systems is a crucial initial step 
to establishing effective mechanisms to measure results that will drive asset creation or divestiture 
decision-making. Local governments must be able to hold asset managers accountable for the 
assets in their custody and be assured that these assets are serving their intended purposes and 
achieving targeted results. 
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Budgeting: Methods, Process and
 Execution
Putting together the political document that specifies the expenditure program. 
A budget serves as both a financial plan and, if  so designed, a statement of  the purpose and 
performance of  public spending.1 When budget allocation methods are designed in accordance 
with the legal and constitutional framework of  the country there is an intentional and sometimes 
seemingly arbitrary decision to set the level of  public services. In this case, the budget serves as 
the synthesis of  all laws in force, and of  all policies, strategies and other short-term plans. The 
challenge is to find a format that transmits the above content, while at the same time serves as the 
basis of  accountability and the ability to be held accountable. Being able to put together a budget 
and to get it “right” on both its operating and capital (investment) components is a key indicator 
of  a municipality’s capacity to govern. 
Budgeting Process and Methods 
Budgeting Procedures
Budgeting is a four-stage process, with special roles and actors.
1. Executive formulates the budget proposal.
2. Legislature debates and approves it.
3. Executive implements the budget.
4. After implementation, executive reports on its activities, and a supreme audit institutio
    conducts an audit, evaluates and certifies its quality. 
A budgeting system comprises all the activities, procedures, and incentives for each of  the four 
stages. However, the substantives of  the budgeting system are different in each stage, depending 
on the budgeting approach that is followed. 
1  This essay focuses on the expenditure side of  the expenditure and revenue “budget equation.”
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Which Type of  Budgeting Approach Better Serves Citizens’ Needs? 
Traditional (Input Based) Methodology 
Until recently, the traditional approach to budgeting was marked by two main characteristics: 
Annuality: The budget period was usually a single year. Although longer-term projections of  pub-
lic expenditure were prepared, the planning of  public expenditure focused only on the upcoming 
financial year.
Incremental: Under incremental budgeting, new budget is prepared by beginning with previous 
year’s numbers (expenditures plus or minus some percentage). 
The traditional approach is often criticized for the second characteristic of  its incremental nature. 
Because the current budget reflects the priorities and inputs of  the previous year (or, if  this is 
always the way the process works, years), it fails to take into account the changing needs and col-
lective preferences of  the community. Moreover, if  the revenue-driven budget constraint changes 
(as it almost certainly will from year to year), the result can be a very ad hoc “across the board” 
increase or decrease in spending—an increase or decrease that may have very little relevance to, 
and therefore distort, the next several years (the “out years”) of  budgets. 
These are valid criticisms. But, in defense of  incremental budgeting, it has the merit of  allowing 
one to contend with an often very difficult and complex process. This is particularly true for the 
newly decentralizing system such as Kosovo will likely soon address. Incrementalism also allows 
one, at least in the short run, to avoid setting off  political battles over spending priorities (although 
some may rightly not consider this a “merit”). 
Recognizing these merits, the theme of  this briefing note is to combine the best of  the traditional 
approach with a process that incorporates both the tests of  service delivery performance and that 
of  responsiveness to changing fiscal architecture and citizen preferences. 
Measurement and Performance Budgeting
The objective of  “budget reforms” is typically to institutionalize a government’s ability to be aware 
of, and to adjust to, service delivery performance (OECD 2002a, 2002b). Such performance budgeting 
thus shifts attention from control ex ante on budgetary inputs to accountability ex post on the basis 
of  results (IMF 2001). With performance budgeting, decision-makers try to choose outputs that 
will lead to desired policy outcomes; that is, they seek improved performance. With the traditional 
approach to budgeting, appropriations focus largely on inputs and decision-makers have little in-
centive to strive for better performance.2 
In a performance-based system, there is a need to monitor the quantity and quality of  outputs, and 
to measure the result (or outcomes) of  delivering these outputs. Data and reporting requirements 
2  There may be some non-input related drivers of  spending, such as a law requiring a certain percent of  the budget be earmarked for 
a program (e.g., an earmark for provincial-to-local transfers or other “mandatory” spending).
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are needed to enable monitoring (Allen and Tommasi 2001). There is a sequence to budget reform 
(see Box 1). 
Strategic Planning
Improvement of  the efficiency and effectiveness of  governance involves another essential man-
agement tool: strategic planning. Strategic planning is also an effective tool to support the alloca-
tion exercise of  budgeting. 
In parliamentary democracies, the election programs of  political parties can sometimes be regard-
ed as some sort of  a comprehensive strategic concept, which serve in the election period to 
guide the development of  strategies (much may depend on the representative nature of  the election 
process—see note “Achieving Decentralized Accountability”). 
When formulating strategies, with the analysis of  external and internal information, it is 
necessary to first identify the position of  the public service or organization. By considering 
this position, the status intended to be reached at the end of  the planning period should be 
designed. 
Box 1. Sequence and Principles of  Budget Reform
1. Foster an environment that supports and demands performance before introduction
    of  performance or outcome budgeting.
2. Control inputs before seeking to control outputs.
3. Account for cash before accounting for accruals.
4. Establish external control before introducing internal controls.
5. Establish internal controls before introducing managerial accountability.
6. Operate a reliable accounting system before installing an integrated financial 
    management system.
7. Budget for work to be done before budgeting for results to be achieved.
8. Enforce formal contracts in the market sector before introducing performance 
    contracts in the public sector.
9. Have effective financial auditing before moving to performance auditing.
10. Adopt and implement predictable budgets before insisting that managers efficiently 
      use the resources entrusted to them.
Source: Schick 1999.
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The Main Objectives of  a Budgeting System 
It is generally accepted that all budgeting systems need to achieve the following three basic objec-
tives: 
(i) To maintain aggregate fiscal discipline. 
 Fiscal discipline pertains to effective control of  the budget totals, by setting ceilings on 
expenditure that are binding both at the aggregate level and on individual spending enti-
ties. Control of  the totals is the first purpose of  every budgeting system. There would 
be no need for budgeting if  the totals were permitted to float upward to satisfy all de-
mands.
(ii) To allocate resources in accord with government priorities. 
 Allocative efficiency is the capacity to establish priorities within the budget, to distribute 
resources based on the government’s priorities and program effectiveness and to shift 
resources from old priorities to new ones. 
(iii) To promote the efficient delivery of  services. 
 Technical or operational efficiency in the use of  budgeted resources refers to the capacity 
to implement programs and deliver services at the lowest cost.
Table 1. below shows how these principles are enforceable in the two basic budgeting approaches:
Table 1. Traditional vs. Performance-Oriented Budgeting
Main Objectives Traditional, Input-based System
Performance-Oriented 
System
To maintain aggregate fiscal 
discipline. 
Only outlays may be decreased, there is 
no opportunity to adjust service levels. 
In the absence of  information decision-
makers are not able to classify demands 
and they increase the public debt.
Based on the draft 
justification of  
appropriations, decision-
makers are better able to 
decide which service or 
program would provide 
better public outcomes, and 
can discontinue the less 
important ones. 
With the added information, 
it is easier to determine 
whether to provide a 
particular service and 
increase public debt, or cut 
the service and save future 
money.
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Main Objectives Traditional, Input-based System
Performance-Oriented 
System
To allocate resources in accordance 
with government priorities. 
Allocation mechanism linked to the 
operational or capital investment 
expenditures level. The government 
objectives are to increase or decrease 
them, without any special requirements.
Based on the information 
on service delivery, strategic 
objectives and priorities, 
some programs receive 
additional resources, while 
others are discontinued or 
reduced in scope. 
To promote the efficient delivery of  
services. 
As efficiency is not measured, improving 
it is only rhetoric.
If  appropriations are 
linked to performance 
requirements, to obtain 
public money is the main 
incentive. 
The Role of  Accountability and Fiscal Transparency
The current wave of  civil society advocacy is underpinned by a global public management revolu-
tion that promotes greater public participation in governance and highlights the need for greater 
transparency and accountability in public management.
Accountability refers to the way in which government exercises responsibility in making known how 
it intends to make decisions or take action, the actual decisions made and action taken, as well as 
the result or outcome of  such decisions and action. 
The concept of  accountability as applied to budgeting has three dimensions:
Effectiveness—to use money prudently.
Responsiveness—to achieve the promised payoff  in efficiency gains of  a decentralized system 
of  governance, as embodied in the principle of  “subsidiarity” of  the European Charter 
of  Local Self-Government (see the briefing note on Legal Framework).
Performance—to accomplish something.
Transparency refers to the low cost availability of  information on all government decisions and 
activities. As a government responsibility, transparency requires government, to make information 
accessible to, the general public in a manner that is easily understood (see “Achieving Decentral-
ized Accountability” in this volume). 
As also noted in the briefing note “Achieving Decentralized Accountability,” transparency under-
pins accountability. Fiscal and financial information—made fully available on a regular, timely and 
low cost of  accessibility basis—is an important ingredient of  an informed executive, legislature, 
and public. Competent legislative staff  and independent public media are essential to processing 
Table1. Traditional vs. Performance-Oriented Budgeting (continued)
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and disseminating this information. Thus, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Chartered Institute of  Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) emphasize the importance of  
clear fiscal roles and responsibilities and transparency (IMF 2005; CIPFA 2004). 
Classification, Fiscal Information and Accounting 
Classifying expenditures is important for formulating policy and measuring the allocation of  re-
sources among sectors. An expenditure classification system provides a normative framework for 
decisions on policy and accountability.
According to the different needs of  policy formulation, reporting, and budget management, public 
expenditures are generally classified according to the following categories:
a)  Function, for historical and policy analysis.
b)  Organization, for accountability and administering the budget.
c)  Fund, for administering the budget.
d)  Economic categories, for statistical reporting and aggregate fiscal control.
e)  Line-item (or object), for compliance controls and internal management.
f)  Program, for policy formulation and performance accountability.
From the above list, the functional classification requires some explanation (IMF 2001). It classi-
fies government activities according to their purposes (e.g. education, social security, and housing) 
and is independent of  the government organizational structure. Moreover, a stable functional 
classification is required to produce historical surveys and analyses of  government spending and 
to compare data from different sectors and different fiscal years.
The accounting system should apply the features of  the expenditure classification system. Each 
transaction entering the accounting system should be coded according to the above six classifica-
tion types.
The Importance of  Auditing in a Budgeting System 
International standards define two main types of  audit (see also the briefing note “Achieving De-
centralized Accountability”). The external audit makes an important contribution to the stewardship 
of  public resources and corporate governance of  public services. Furthermore, it is necessary 
for the segregation of  state powers, wherein decision-makers are accountable to citizens and the 
administrators of  the executive are accountable to decision-makers. For this reason, governments 
need an independent external audit body that can evaluate financial records, that is independent 
from the executive level, and that reports to decision-makers. 
The internal audit has different roles and priorities from the external audit, but there is a lot of  
overlap in what both types of  auditors do, and why they do it. The main role of  the internal audit 
is to support management in improving its activity and control system.  External auditors look at 
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internal control systems to determine whether they prevent or decrease the risk of  errors, while 
internal auditors seek to make ongoing improvements in these systems.
Mastering the Transformation of  Kosovo’s 
Budgeting System
The pace and direction of  reform should be defined according to each country’s context and 
priorities. Nonetheless, there are some basic principles that should be incorporated into every 
budgeting system.
The following section contains lessons learned by Eastern European countries in the reform of  
their own budgeting systems, which may be of  value to those leading reforms in Kosovo.
Consider Moving Towards a Performance-Oriented Budgeting 
Approach
Broadly, the concept of  a performance-oriented system is designed to result in public organiza-
tions that are better aligned with the government’s objectives and to improve the development of  
civil servants and the public service culture. 
The need for performance measurement and reporting for the diverse variety of  state and munici-
pal programs is a continuing challenge. Citizens, elected officials, and managers are often frustrated 
by the lack of  information that would enable them to assess whether public services are operating 
effectively and efficiently, and how to improve unsatisfactory performance. 
As Kosovo considers whether or not to apply some features of  performance budgeting, it is worth 
bearing in mind that performance budgeting can enrich policy debates and help identify and priori-
tize desired outcomes, especially when embedded in a broader strategy of  managing for results. 
Improve Technical Support for Budgeting Procedure and Budget 
Implementation
Having a proper expenditure classification and coding system is the most important requirement 
of  any reform. 
When reforming an expenditure classification system, changes in the organization of  the account-
ing systems should focus on what is required to identify all transactions properly. If  budget prepa-
ration and execution is fully computerized, it is easy enough to code each item. 
For budget preparation, a unified and computerized coding system of  budget classification catego-
ries at all levels of  governance are required if  cross-referencing is to be possible. Cross-referencing 
amongst the different dimensions provided by budget classification categories is a very useful tool 
for analyzing the budget, which helps to understand what room there is for changes. In the ab-
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sence of  a proper IT system, this type of  cross-referencing of  budget dimensions is limited, which 
will act as a constraint on reforms.
It is clear that Kosovo will undergo numerous policy changes and a permanent transition. In the 
absence of  the information provided by different budget classification categories and cross-refer-
encing of  budget dimensions, policy changes are unlikely to be systemic or lasting. In the case of  
Kosovo, the functional classification would play an important role, as far as only this classification 
makes it possible to follow, measure and compare budget expenditures apart from organizational 
structure. 
Switch from Annual Planning to Strategic Approach
Strategic planning looks ahead toward goals to be accomplished, while performance measurement 
looks back to see what was achieved. When used together they form a continuous process. In 
essence, strategic planning defines the performance to be measured, while performance measure-
ment provides the feedback loop that keeps the target in focus.
The concept-flow behind strategic planning and performance measurement is the same for all 
levels of  governance, only the actors and the level of  details are different: 
•  Develop a strategic framework that identifies key results (outcomes)—strategic planning.
•  Devise measures that explain achievement in a succinct, measurable way.3 
•  Agree on “expected results,” “planned performance expectations” or targets.4 
•  Identify and effectively report targets that are achieved.
•  Identify and effectively report the contributions to public outcomes (effect). 
•  Use the above information to inform management decision-making.
Use the Budget as a Transparency and Accountability 
Mechanism
The preparation of  the budget is a multi-phase procedure, in which expenditure requirements and 
the needs of  public services gradually approximate existing revenue constraints. The last phase of  
the budgeting process is the presentation of  the budget to politicians for a final decision. When 
reviewing the draft budget, politicians should understand:
• How the budget links to strategic objectives?
• What is the cost of  maintaining the existing level of  services?
• What are the service implications of  reducing costs?
• What are the service implications of  growth proposals and what are their costs?
3 The EU term is Operational Programs.        
4   The EU term is Program Complement Document      
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The functions of  the budget are diverse. The budget
• mediates the planned policies;
• obtains the support of  politicians for planned policies, as it is a plan for execution;
• divides the policies into budget programs; that is, it gets decision-makers approval 
for the execution of  planned “individual” projects or programs;
• serves as a guide for execution and as the basis of  follow-up reports;
• determines the subjects on which decision-makers retain the right of  approval and 
thus limits the scope of  actions of  the executive level.
When the budget document—supported by the appropriate procedure—answers the above ques-
tions and discharges the above listed functions, it serves to inform citizens and politicians about 
the core budget decisions, so it is likely to be transparent and provide accountability.
Use the Budget as an Effective Resource (Re-)Allocation Tool
Two broad approaches exist for allocating resources and drafting a budget:
The top-down approach allocates resources to sectors, sub-systems, and main objectives, as con-
strained by revenue levels worked out by the Ministry of  Finance. The Ministry of  Finance has 
information about the whole scale of  resources and takes into consideration government-level 
priorities.
The bottom-up approach allocates resources according to the detailed needs and requirements of  
service delivery units—which calculate their own revenue needs. In practice, a mixture of  both 
approaches is always used, but currently there is too much emphasis on bottom-up bidding and 
too little on top-down strategy. The budgeting process tends to begin with bottom-up bids which 
often prove to be a waste of  time, as a top-down analysis would clarify the need for cutbacks. 
More emphasis on using a top-down strategy to allocate resources between sectors (main public 
service lines) with a view to resource constraints would be progress. The top-down approach 
needs to be accompanied by performance standards and targets.
Link Budget Appropriations and Performance
An ideal budget document would paint a clear picture of  what resources are being used and what 
is being achieved by expending them. (See Gomez 2006 for the key types of  budget documents 
that not only support budget preparation, but also its implementation).
The central and local budget documents should contain most or all of  the following information:
• Medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal projections.
• A statement of  budget policies and fiscal policy objectives.
• Revenue and expenditure estimates, measured in gross terms even when appropriations 
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are calculated on a net basis. These estimates should cover all revenues and expenditures, 
including special funds and accounts, if  any.
• Authorizations for forward commitments, if  any.
• Financing from external sources, grants and loans.
• A statement of  contingent liabilities resulting from state guarantees of  third party debts 
and an estimate of  payments likely to be required under those guarantees during the bud-
get year.
• A statement of  major identifiable fiscal risks. 
• A statement of  tax expenditures. 
• Narrative statements explaining the sectoral activities to be funded, their objectives and 
expected results.
The last element of  the list establishes the base for accountability in the public sector and is the ele-
ment that marks the main difference between a traditional and a performance-oriented system. 
The crucial issue is how to link performance and the allocation of  resources. The narrative state-
ments in a traditional budgeting system are expressed only in general terms; namely, to meet de-
mands to the extent possible. In the performance-oriented system the link between appropriations 
and output is transparent, and resources are made available only for declared outputs against which 
the government can be held accountable.
Consider Involving Citizens in Planning and Budgeting Processes
Budget advocacy is opening up a traditionally elitist political exercise that in the past has led to 
social inequity. As such, the model of  civic engagement generates strong public interest and, in the 
process, pressures governance to be more transparent about the way it allocates people’s money. 
However, before working to build better relations with citizens, decision-makers must understand 
that citizen input should not be the sole decision-making criterion; rather it should be a supple-
ment to technical analyses of  the issues.
Never Ignore the Cultural Context
There is no inherent relationship between a particular budget approach or institutional arrange-
ment, and budget outcomes. The relevance and effectiveness of  budget management systems de-
pend on the country context. Hence, any instrument for public expenditure management originat-
ing from another country must be carefully analyzed in the light of  the local context and rejected, 
adopted, or adapted as needed. If  budget reforms are designed without considering key local 
traditional rules and behaviors, they are likely to fail. 
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Establish the Framework of  Sound Financial Management
The internal control system is the whole framework of  controls, both financial and managerial, 
established by the management in order to carry on the business of  public bodies in an orderly 
and efficient manner, ensure adherence to management policies, safeguard assets, and secure the 
completeness and accuracy of  the records.  Strong internal controls prevent poor decisions and 
make it easier for top managers to delegate decisions. A government with weak internal controls 
is prone to fraud or corruption.
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Achieving Decentralized 
Accountability
Establishing relationships whereby governments that are responsible for providing local goods and services are 
politically and fiscally answerable to their citizens, who, in turn, are ultimately responsible for the consequences of  
tax and spending decisions.
Introduction: Governance, Accountability and Development 
The case for decentralization is fundamentally an argument about improving the process of  gov-
ernance that matches collective (e.g., public) decision-making with respect to subnational (e.g., lo-
cal) tax and spending decisions to local preferences. As the previous briefing notes make clear, the 
“best” solution is one of  an intergovernmental partnership that builds on the platform of  fiscally 
strong local, provincial, and central governments. To make this all work there must be accountability; 
that is, mechanisms (formal systems, institutions, laws, regulations, as well as the informal day-to-
day practice of  government) must be put in place such that two things occur: political leaders and 
bureaucrats become answerable to the citizenry for their actions and the citizenry takes on and 
accepts responsibility for the collective actions that governments make on their behalf. 
Such “good local (intergovernmental) governance” rests upon three pillars: transparency, predict-
ability and participation. Transparency implies that there is low-cost accessibility to relevant infor-
mation. Predictability results primarily from laws and regulations that are clear, known in advance, 
and that are enforced in an even-handed, uniform, and certain manner. And, citizen participation is 
needed to supply reliable information and to provide for a way of  monitoring public sector per-
formance (Schavio-Campo 1999).
Accountability Links and Mechanisms
In an intergovernmental system accountability takes the form of  a triad. Accountability may be 
bottom-up whereby local government is answerable to citizens; horizontal, whereby government is 
answerable to certain public agencies institutionalized to monitor government performance; and 
vertical, with answerability to certain central governmental instrumentalities that monitor the sys-
tem as a whole. 
Bottom-up accountability includes citizens acting through the electoral process and indirectly through 
civil society organizations (e.g., honest brokering “think tanks” such as Forum 2015, KFOS and 
Riinvest; civic organizations such as neighborhood organizations; citizen “watch-dog” NGOs; 
and an independent media). Horizontal and vertical accountability involve a range of  public and 
quasi-public entities entrusted to minimize government abuses and promote reform (e.g., munici-
pal associations, electoral commissions, local government councils, courts, ombudsman or public 
complaints agencies, and various auditing agencies) (see Figure 1). 
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For newly (or even poorly developed) decentralizing systems of  governance, the quest to build ver-
tical and horizontal accountability can be hindered by a variety of  factors, including poor salaries, 
weak morale, weak oversight institutions, poorly drafted laws, and/or the absence of  effective local 
public sector management practices (Allen and Tommasi 2001). An  important barrier to achiev-
ing bottom-up accountability will occur if  elections are unrepresentative, gerrymandered and/or 
dominated by political elites, and/or if  the electorate has few other ways to register its views on 
the quality of  governance (Mair and Katz 1997; Mungui-Ppidi 2003). This is especially true under 
systems that operate with a closed-list proportional system that allows central party functionaries 
and/or public officials to dominate local councils and impede citizen access to the electoral pro-
cess (a problem that some argue is one Kosovo must address).  
To help establish as well as strengthen the accountability triad, there must also be a set of  mecha-
nisms (systems, strategies, institutions), formal and informal, that become a “way of  doing” gov-
ernment. These mechanisms can be divided into four categories and are illustrated in Table 1: 
information; consultation and oversight; community participation and the independent media. 
The challenge in implementing these mechanisms for public sector accountability lies in creating 
an enabling political context where such mechanisms can be introduced and be sustained.
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Table 1. Mechanisms for Advancing Public Sector Accountability1
Accountability 
Mechanisms Task Method
Information Provision of  Informa-tion
Mandatory provision of  information by the 
government (e.g., public hearings, annual 
reports, brochures, newsletters); citizen-led 
sources such as service delivery “scorecard” 
surveys.
Financial Disclosure
Timely accounting and budget information 
(e.g., quarterly reports followed by audited 
financial reports).
Financial Management 
Systems
Use of  financial management information 
systems (which, for example, can provide 
citizens on-line access to key indicators of  
performance).
Competitive Procure-
ment 
Local government procurement processes 
must be transparent, open, and, for larger proj-
ects, competitive.
Consultation/
Oversight
Notice and Comment 
on Rule-making
Requirement that draft normative acts be pub-
lished in public forums prior to their enact-
ment.
Public hearings
Public hearings may be required by law when-
ever laws and implementing rules and regula-
tions are developed.
Administrative Procedure 
Systems
Administrative procedures should require that 
citizens receive notice prior to any change in 
legislation or other action.
Advisory Committees
Permanent or ad hoc bodies that provide input 
to government in various policy areas (e.g., a 
broadly representative Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations).
Active Partici-
pation Right to Petition
The public has the right to propose the adop-
tion, amendment or repeal of  a normative act.
Consensus/Negotiated 
Rulemaking
Councils that consult with groups (e.g., interest 
groups or civic organizations) must reach con-
sensus with respect to policy initiatives.
Media—Right 
to Know
Non-governmentally 
controlled media (print 
and electronic, including 
access to the Internet)
Require government to inform the indepen-
dent press of  its activities, from procurement 
practices to budget reports (Reinikka and 
Svensson 2004). 
1  This table draws on Malcolm Russell-Einhorn 2004.  
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Policy Considerations 
Improving public sector accountability requires an approach that recognizes the diverse factors 
underlying the persistence of  weak governance. Creating interventions that improve local gov-
ernment accountability generally requires a tailor-made strategy that takes into consideration the 
particular contours of  the problem in different circumstances, local, provincial and/or national. 
Actions to improve governance, public financial management and accountability need to be taken 
on numerous fronts, of  which five are identified below. 
The Local-Central Government Relationship
A first issue to arise is that of  the appropriate role of  central government in promoting and ensur-
ing the vertical accountability of  local governments. This can be a tricky matter since the very way 
the issue is phrased as the “role of  the central government” not only presumes a hierarchy among 
governments, but also that the central authority has the capacity to be intergovernmental and the 
integrity to be in a position to appropriately monitor “its” subnational governments. Assuming 
that there is a well-functioning central authority—again, an overly confident assumption in some 
countries—if  the foundations of  vertical accountability are to be established than sufficient fiscal 
autonomy must be guaranteed to the local level of  government. There are three dimensions to the 
issue: (1) local governments must be effectively empowered to carry out services in accordance 
with their assignment of  powers and functions; (2) sufficient local resources must be ensured to 
carry out the assigned expenditure tasks; and (3) local governments must have sufficient discretion 
over these resources within the framework of  their powers (see briefing notes “Fiscal Autonomy” 
and “Legal Framework and the European Charter of  Local Self-Government”).
The three dimensions can lead to the creation of  some tension between the various levels of  gov-
ernment—a tension, that one should note can be either  “healthy” or  destructive to an intergov-
ernmental system. To illustrate, while recognizing that a central government has the important role 
of  monitoring local performance and collecting intergovernmental (including provincial and local) 
data—and that it is incumbent on the subnational governments to cooperate on this matter—if  
the center seizes upon this monitoring as a justification for interfering with what is a subnational/
local competency, then the tension represents a destructive rather than positive or “healthy” sign 
of  robust intergovernmental relations.2 Such interference typically arises when the parliament de-
volves expenditure assignments to local governments, but then at the same time attaches various 
conditions and/or unfunded mandates that do not fit local citizen preferences and constrain local 
decision-making. It can also occur when a ministry or other central instrumentality undertakes 
various administrative and regulatory actions.
Now, two things can happen: one positive, one negative. The negative outcome, which is repeated 
in many newly decentralizing countries, is that the give-and-take ends up in the creation of  a soft 
budget constraint “deal” where the center ends up bailing out or paying for the mandate or con-
dition. Such a practice leads not only to a loss of  local autonomy and accountability, but, if  the 
practice is widespread, macroeconomic instability for the nation as a whole. 
2  If  there is a local “financial emergency” such as a financial default or bankruptcy, there can, and should, be legislation on how this 
situation is to be addressed. See Jókay, Szepesi and Szmetana 2004.
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But, too, there can be very positive outcomes from a “healthy” intergovernmental tension—and, 
thus, to continue with the illustration, the local jurisdiction can learn the lesson that acquiring local 
fiscal autonomy means getting serious about matters such as own source revenue mobilization and 
local control over decisions regarding the mix of  local public goods. But getting “local control” 
can be difficult without political support; and the support that can come from the local citizenry. 
How does the local government obtain the “grassroots” political support it needs to make this 
work? By institutionalizing systems of  accountability: transparency, predictability and participation 
so that the citizens have a stake in local autonomy (for a case study of  Kosovo’s regional neighbor, 
Hungary, see Pallai 2003).
Consultation and Participation…and Corruption 
Local governments can also present an uncertain terrain for good governance and effective ac-
countability efforts, particularly where they are established in an environment characterized by  low 
levels of  political and social organization, a poorly developed legal framework, and centrally con-
trolled (e.g., non-elected) municipal councils. Under these circumstances, the concern arises—and 
it is legitimate—that “good governance” will give way to elite capture and corruption. There is, 
however, growing evidence about the positive impact of  consultative and participatory mecha-
nisms in improving local service delivery (Fisman and Gatti 1998, World Bank 2001) For example, 
in their empirical work designed to identify major drivers of  corruption in order to isolate the role 
of  centralized decision-making, Grugru and Shah (2002) find that lack of  service orientation in 
the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), a colonial 
past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision-making are major causes of  local cor-
ruption. From this they conclude that, when well-designed, accountable decentralization enhances 
public sector performance and reduces corruption. Suffice it to note here that in order to advance 
this anti-corruption outcome, multiple mechanisms of  organizational and institutional capacity 
building may need to take root in order for local government accountability to prove effective 
(Blair 2000; Kobonbaev 2006). 
Evaluating Accountability
Within this context of  decentralized governance, there are three useful criteria for evaluating ac-
countability mechanisms vis-à-vis local circumstances (Russell-Einhorn 2004): 
• degree of  visibility: governments whose policies are put in question in a very public forum 
find it more difficult to obfuscate their intentions; 
• simplicity: high costs of  obtaining information undermine the goal for a decentralized 
government to be “close to the people”; and 
• direct access: recognizing that developing government accountability is a long-term process, 
success depends on the citizen’s ability to influence policy relatively quickly.
Even when all three criteria are met by a government, the development of  homegrown grass-
roots movements (NGOs, interest groups, civic initiatives) remains essential to the effectiveness 
of  accountability mechanisms. And here, one may note that the dominance of  “supply side” in-
ternational NGOs and donor-driven citizen participation projects often has very little impact on 
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citizens’ ability to influence policy decisions. Rather, the payoff  comes in working on the “demand 
side” by increasing local public awareness and institutionalization of  the available transparency 
mechanisms.
 
Institutional Controls 
Inadequate accountability mechanisms within the local civil service can be minimized with ap-
propriate institutional controls. The most effective controls generally reside inside institutions. 
This implies that there is honest and effective supervision, auditing oversight and control, and an 
awareness and internalization of  the standards of  ethical behavior. Thus, for example, some mu-
nicipalities have created ethics commissions and/or offices of  the Ombudsman. To be effective, 
these offices must be independent from the political establishment, have ample personnel and 
financial resources, and have high standards. In some cases, ethics commissions must also have 
the power to enforce penalties and be able to make reports without political clearances from an 
interested government or government body. And, clearly, a free press increases the impact of  this 
process—and to development as a whole (World Bank 2002; Islam 2006). 
Transparency of  Rules, Regulations, Laws and Processes
The lack of  transparency in rules, laws, and processes in many countries lessens local government 
accountability. Rules dealing with government procurement processes, financial management and 
accounting are often confusing. Even if  an individual exercises some initiative and tries to under-
stand the rules, the documents specifying these rules may not be publicly available. Furthermore, 
many organizational rules may be changed without public announcements to that effect. Indeed, 
in some instances, regulations and laws are written so that only trained lawyers or financial experts 
can understand their true impact. This problem may be compounded by the lack of  an indepen-
dent and competent judicial process that can interpret the law and a supreme (high) court that is 
trusted to give a final judgment if  such is required. 
The Audit Function
Management controls are the policies and procedures put in place by the managers of  an (govern-
ment) entity to ensure its proper and effective operation, and key among these are the audit func-
tions. Developing an effective system of  controls requires, first, a careful assessment of  the risks 
confronting the organization. Policies and procedures can then be selected to control those risks 
effectively and at reasonable cost. No system of  controls can provide an absolute guarantee against 
the occurrence of  fraud, abuse, inefficiency, and human error. However, a well-designed system of  
controls can give reasonable assurance that significant irregularities can be detected. 
There are two types of  audit procedures:
Internal audit is part of  an organization’s management control structure. The internal audit office 
audits lower-level units on behalf  of  management. Among its most important functions, internal 
audits test the management controls and assist senior management in assessing risks and in de-
veloping more cost-effective controls. Here, it is important to emphasize that effective internal 
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auditing critically depends on independence of  auditors from undue interference by senior local 
government officials. There is abundant anecdotal evidence that in many Kosovar municipalities, 
where auditors are appointed or their job performance is conducted by chief  of  personnel or 
CEOs in municipalities, internal auditing has become an insignificant process. 
External audit of  government operations is typically performed by a supreme audit institution 
(SAI) or an independent external auditing firm. External auditors typically perform compliance/
regulatory audits, financial assurance audits, and value-for-money (efficiency) audits.
To be effective, external audit staff  must have the professional skills required for the audits being 
performed. The external audit function can only be effective when a method for communicating 
audit results to law enforcement agencies (e.g., anti-corruption agencies, the courts) is combined 
with an approach for encouraging appropriate corrective action. In Kosovo, the General Auditor 
reports the findings of  financial controls to the UN office of  the head Special Representative of  
the Secretary General, but, then, is not required to refer the serious violations of  the financial 
management or procurement laws to the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency for further investiga-
tion. There is also no direct referral mechanism between the General Auditor and law enforcement 
authorities or the Office of  the Public Prosecutor of  Kosovo. As a result, many alleged bribery 
and corruption cases are simply labeled as “financial mismanagement” because the cases are not 
referred by the external auditor to law enforcement bodies. The creation of  a system to ensure that 
offenses involving violation of  official duty for financial rewards do not go unpunished, requires 
that information about alleged corruption offenses can be received from any citizen or organiza-
tion and that a specialized financial auditing is conducted. The reports can then be referred to 
prosecutors for review of  whether further action (e.g., criminal indictment) is appropriate.   
___________
Good governance and effective local government accountability play a critical role in determining 
whether fiscal decentralization will deliver on the promise of  improved service delivery and hon-
est government. To accomplish this objective, a newly decentralizing Kosovo will have to direct a 
good deal of  attention to getting “right” the mechanisms for promoting accountability, transpar-
ency, strategic prioritization, and citizen participation.  
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Sequencing Fiscal 
Decentralization Reform
Drawing on international experience, a set of  process steps a newly decentralizing country may consider as it 
implements a plan for public sector reform.
While there is extensive knowledge about how to design fiscal decentralization policies, consider-
ably less is understood about how a decentralization program should be sequenced and imple-
mented. Countries embarking on decentralization often struggle with decisions about its essential 
components, the order of  introduction of  decentralization policies and activities, the number of  
years necessary to fully implement a program, and the components of  the transition strategy. This 
note argues that the sequencing of  decentralization is an important determinant of  its success. 
The consequences of  a poorly sequenced decentralization program can range from minor delays 
and complications to macroeconomic instability, and, even, to chaotic situations with failed public 
services. 
If  sequencing matters, what is the best way to proceed? While it is recognized here that no one 
process or model fits all decentralizing systems, by drawing on the experiences of  other places that 
have undertaken fiscal decentralization reform one can develop a stylized approach to sequenc-
ing decentralization (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2005). Such an approach serves as a reasonable 
baseline against which to compare the ideal sequence to that of  real world practice where politics 
and administrative constraints matter and change final outcomes. This briefing note lays out six 
identifiable steps (Figure 1).
Step 1: National Dialogue
Ideally, the fiscal decentralization process begins with a national dialogue involving key stakehold-          
ers. This debate might be in the context of  an election cycle or part of  a discussion led by an ap-
pointed, broadly representative commission to consider a change in the pattern of  governance. 
The momentum for decentralization may originate from the “bottom up” such as a citizens-move-
ment, or from a centrally led “top-down” initiative; or, from both directions (e.g., the Japanese 
“integrationist approach” as discussed in Iqbal, Muramatsu and Kume 2001).  Regardless of  where 
the pressure originates, some form of  discussion about the desirability of  decentralization is an 
important first step. This process is already underway in Kosovo and serves as the context for 
these briefing notes. The national discussion should focus on the basic goals of  the decentraliza-
tion program and the options available for structuring decentralization. It should not, however, 
dwell on details.  The reason that the decentralization dialogue is important is that for decentraliza-
tion to be sustainable, key political and administrative stakeholders and citizens alike must buy into 
the desirability and general outlines of  the strategy.1 Ideally, this national debate will involve the 
1  “Sustainability” here refers to political consensus and sustainability. This concept is different from, but complementary and reinforc-
ing of,  the conditions for achieving  fiscal sustainability.  See Bird, 2003.
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main political parties, will have some degree of  formality (as in the case of  a national commission), 
and will be transparent. A further important ingredient for the success of  fiscal decentralization 
is a coalition of  strong advocates. These advocates will keep decentralization in the center of  the 
national debate and work to develop the coalitions necessary to effect a decentralization policy.
Step 2: Design of  the Fiscal Decentralization Program
The design of  the fiscal decentralization program should culminate in a comprehensive policy paper 
that lays out the framework for the fiscal decentralization. While the national consensus might 
be centered on the broad idea of  bringing government closer to the people, the “white paper” 
would lay out the plan for accomplishing this. It would outline the main components of  the fis-
cal decentralization program, provide a timetable for implementation, and serve as the basis for 
writing the law(s). Fiscal decentralization is a policy that is designed to achieve certain objectives, 
and therefore, it is critical that the objectives be clearly specified before the program is designed. 
This policy framework paper must be specific enough, and comprehensive enough, to guide the 
development of  the law and the implementation. At the same time, it must also be recognized that, 
for example, as the country’s fiscal architecture changes (see briefing note on Fiscal Architecture) 
what was the “right design” in the first year of  the program, over time, may no longer fit changing 
circumstances—thus the argument for establishing a continuing policy development and research 
process, along with institutions, public and private, to support that process (Yilmaz, Hegedus, Bell 
2003). The design phase must follow the national discussion that gives the mandate for decentral-
ization policy.
What if  decentralization goes forward without such a policy paper?  Two major problems are 
almost certain to occur. First, without a roadmap for the decentralization strategy, government 
policymakers will “make it up as they go.” This can lead to a fragmented decentralization strategy, 
pieces of  which do not fit together. The other problem with not having a documented framework 
is that changes to policy in the years that follow may not be consistent with the overall goals of  the 
fiscal decentralization program. 
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Step 3: Draft and Pass the Decentralization Law(s) 
The drafting and passing of  the decentralization law naturally follows from the national mandate 
and from the policy framework paper, and gives legal standing to the implementation of  the fiscal 
decentralization measures. The laws must be clear and true to the policy design. The decentraliza-
tion laws might stand alone, or some elements of  the decentralization program might be intro-
duced into the constitution (Basta Fleiner 2002).2  
On this matter, there are two further comments.  First, there may be (should be ) more than one 
law. For example, Hungary has enacted not only a general Law on Local Self-Government that 
lays out the basic structure for intergovernmental reform (See the note, “Legal Framework and 
the European Charter,” and also Peteri 2002), but also supporting laws on local elections, the sort-
ing out of  intergovernmental functional responsibilities, regulations on service delivery revenues, 
borrowing, debt and bankruptcy, asset management, and the capital city (Pallai 2003). Second, 
recognizing that there is great merit in providing constitutional protections for decentralization 
and local governance, it is also true that great care must be taken to keep constitutional language 
broad—that is, to draw a bright line between ensuring protections vs. loading down a constitution 
2  It is most important that Constitutions address broad principles and not become cluttered up with details that are appropriately 
statutory and regulatory. Constitutions are difficult to change and thus do not readily fit the chaining economic, demographic and 
institutional realities of  governance (see briefing note on Fiscal Architecture)
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with what is properly a matter of  statute and might prevent future reforms.
Recognizing that the “right mix” of  laws and constitutional protections may vary from country 
to country (and/or province to province since just as there are national constitutions there may 
also be provincial constitutions), a most important factor in getting a successful decentralization in 
place is to include in the law key elements of  the policy design. These key elements include that of: 
(i) expenditure assignment and authority; (ii) revenue assignment and authority; (iii) design of  the 
intergovernmental transfer system; and (iv) provisions for fiscal discipline. To summarize: 
Expenditures: finance follows function. It is important to get correct the order of  reform as regards 
how much should be spent by subnational governments, and how much revenue should be given 
to subnational governments. There is a conventional wisdom to the ordering. First comes the as-
signment of  expenditure responsibility to subnational governments, after which the assignment 
of  revenue-raising powers and central government revenue shares is determined. The logic behind 
this finance-follows-function rule is straightforward: one cannot establish the required level of  
subnational revenues independent of  having a reasonably clear sense of  the bundle of  services 
one expects a local government to deliver and then pay for. With that said, it is also true that to 
argue that finance follows function should not be taken as counsel for delaying a policy of  mobi-
lizing local “own” revenues. Recent empirical evidence indicates that simultaneous decentraliza-
tion of  tax and spending powers reduces the overall size of  the public sector (Ehadie 1994) and 
improves overall macroeconomic performance (Ebel and Yilmaz 2003).
The significance of  local revenue autonomy. It is important to a complete decentralization that subna-
tional governments have independent sources of  revenue. If  all financing is from revenue sharing 
and other forms of  transfers from higher-level governments, there is a danger that the lower-level 
government will become a spending agent for the center, with little accountability and operational 
efficiency (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997). 
Design of  the intergovernmental transfer system. An important sequencing question has to do with the 
design and implementation of  intergovernmental transfers. The correct order of  policy formula-
tion is to first ask which of  the many possible objectives should the intergovernmental transfer 
system accomplish, and only then design the reformed system. The major issue is that different 
types of  transfers have different objectives, and it is important to sequence grant design according 
to these objectives. One goal is to reconcile the difference between the assignment of  expenditure 
responsibility and the assignment of  revenue-raising powers. This goal of  vertical balance is argu-
ably the first task to tackle in designing the transfer system. The second step in grant system design 
is to implement conditional grants for those functions of  national/regional importance where it 
is feared that without central assistance under-provision might occur. Finally, equalization grants 
should be designed to address the horizontal imbalances that result after designing the first two 
components of  the transfer system (see briefing note on Intergovernmental Transfers). 
Subnational governments must face a hard budget constraint. Fiscal discipline, a key element of  a successful 
decentralization strategy, should be introduced at the start of  the program. If  subnational gov-
ernments are not forced to operate with balanced budgets, they become accustomed to looking 
to higher-level governments to cover their shortfalls. A hard budget constraint implies that those 
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local governments that are given autonomy will be asked to balance their budgets without recourse 
to any end-of-year assistance from the central government. Without a hard budget constraint, the 
moral hazard is that subnational governments will consciously overspend knowing that their losses 
will be made good. Furthermore, a soft budget constraint will tend to discourage own tax effort 
and encourage inefficient and even wasteful spending. As many countries have learned, it is diffi-
cult to break the culture of  soft budget constraint (see briefing note on Subnational Borrowing).
 
Step 4: Adopting a Set of  Implementing Regulations
In the disucssion above, is was recommended that the dialogue of  Step 1 be broad and avoid be-
coming bogged down in details. But, of  course, details matter, and thus it becomes important to 
develop implementing regulations that spell out how the fiscal decentralization will be put in place.              
Thus, for example, whereas the policy framework paper and the law on decentralization might call 
for the transfer of  civil servants from central to subnational governments, the implementing regu-
lations would address the detail of  this transfer of  how government officials, central and local, put 
the new system in place. It is in this step that one distinguishes between the content of  laws and 
regulations. The law should include those things that are understood to be relatively long term as 
decentralization policy. For example, provisions for the election of  local officials, basic expenditure 
and revenue assignments, the fundamental structure of  the equalization grant, and the civil service 
status of  local and central government employees are not likely to change over time—or at least 
should not change frequently—and, therefore,  properly belong in the law. However, other factors, 
such as the weighting parameters in the intergovernmental grant formula, provisions for revenue-
sharing rates, and administrative arrangements may change with economic development and other 
variable circumstances, and belong with the implementing regulations rather than the law.
Getting the implementing regulations out of  sequence can be quite disruptive of  the decentral-
ization program. If  these are written before the policy framework paper is completed, then the 
regulations themselves become an important part of  the decentralization policy. This is the “make 
it up as you go” approach, which was cautioned against earlier. The implementing regulations in 
this case would be written by different government ministries following more or less their own 
preferences and the different pieces are unlikely to fit any unified strategy. 
Step 5: Taking on the Set of  Implementation Tasks 
Implementation of  a decentralization program involves more than simply passing  a set of  laws 
with respect to the intergovernmental fiscal relationship. It also involves developing a strategy 
for implementation and a significant amount of  planning and fail-safe provisions in order to ac-
commodate any failures in the early stages of  decentralization. This planning is part of  the design 
phase of  the sequencing. Actual implementation comes after the implementing regulations are 
complete. Several issues need to be considered:
     
Using asymmetric decentralization. Uniformity is not a necessary condition for effective decentraliza-
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tion. In fact, a better route may be to begin fiscal decentralization with larger local government 
units and to let the smaller ones “grow into it.” Subnational governments have very different 
capabilities to deliver and finance services. Accordingly, it may be necessary to set up a system 
where these differences are explicitly recognized, i.e., where different local governments are given 
different financing powers and arrangements as well as differing expenditure responsibilities (Bird 
and Ebel 2006). 
Building capacity. An often important constraint to the implementation of  a newly decentralized sys-
tem of  government is lack of  administrative capacity of  local governments. When decentralization 
takes place and the administrative capacity is not in place, what may follow is poor performance 
in service delivery with all sorts of  inefficiencies, waste, corruption, and lack of  accountability. 
Systemic failure of  local governments to deliver services is in the long term the worst enemy of  
decentralized governance—sooner or later the “solution” found will be to recentralize the public 
finances. That said, the lack of  subnational administrative capacity should not be allowed to be-
come an excuse for delay of  the decentralization strategy. Governments, central and subnational, 
must be allowed to build capacity in a “learning-by-doing” manner.
 
Contingency funds. Like most other government policies, decentralization policy is designed and 
implemented in a context of  limited information and therefore there is always the risk that things 
may not turn out as expected. For this reason, it is important to provide the implementation pro-
cess with contingency funds to cover unforeseen circumstances. 
“Big bang” versus gradual implementation. A gradual implementation of  reform is thought by many to 
be more desirable than a hurried “big bang” approach. There are two good reasons why this might 
be preferred: (a) limited available information does not allow for predictions on how reform will 
work out in comparison to how it was planned  and (b) the cost of  reform can be substantial, and 
gradual approaches allow this to be spread out over a number of  years (IMF 2000). In short, grad-
ual approaches carry much less risk, and thus it  is probably best to argue in favor of  gradualism 
in its implementation. However, the type of  gradualism being proposed here must not be seen as 
a substitute for a comprehensive blueprint for decentralization reform. A gradual implementation 
approach should be based on an explicit plan with goals and the institutional changes necessary 
to achieve them. 
Transition measures: hold harmless versus “cold turkey.” Many forms of  fiscal decentralization reform 
imply that there will be winners and losers among the subnational governments. Sometimes, politi-
cally and/or economically powerful subnational governments may effectively veto the reform un-
less their concerns about the losers under the new system are taken into account. Usually, neither 
the local government service delivery system nor the local political system can withstand large one-
time shocks without causing turmoil in the delivery of  essential services. Some form of  phase-in 
of  the new system is called for.
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Step 6: Monitoring and Evaluation
The final step in the sequencing consists of  a well-designed and operational system of  monitoring 
and evaluation by the central (state) government and a well-designed accountability system across 
all governments. Many developing and transition countries may be characterized as having very 
centralized systems of  government, which are likely to remain centralized for quite some time. 
A plausible scenario in such countries is that fiscal decentralization will be to a large degree con-
trolled and regulated from the center.
 
In some cases, the control will reflect hesitancy on the part of  the higher-level government to re-
linquish powers to a new group of  bureaucrats. But in other cases, regulation and oversight can be 
seen as a needed feature of  the fiscal decentralization structure. The following are some examples 
of  the latter: As subnational governments move toward debt financing of  capital improvements, 
central governments will be called on to establish disclosure requirements and enforce borrowing 
limits. The center must monitor the fiscal performance of  local governments and identify those 
in financial difficulties as well as those exerting weak revenue mobilization efforts. The success of  
central government financing instruments (transfers, subsidies, local taxes) should be monitored 
annually and fine-tuned periodically. Another example is the need for the center to ensure com-
pliance with the terms of  conditional grants, expenditure mandates and taxing limits. Moreover, 
there is need for the center to provide technical assistance to local governments in several areas. 
Smaller local governments, especially, require assistance in areas such as accounting, treasury, tax 
administration, data processing, and project evaluation.
The steps outlined above might be thought of  as a normative approach to ordering the elements 
of  a sustainable fiscal decentralization strategy. This sequencing allows each step to build on the 
necessary prerequisites, and therefore could minimize the chances for failure of  the system to 
accomplish its objectives. In the real world, however, there are important constraints that steer 
countries away from such an optimal sequencing. And sometimes, these departures are in the best 
interests of  getting the job done. But clearly, while some departures may be admissible in terms 
of  the costs and disruption involved in the decentralization process (for example, getting the 
implementation started without complete implementing regulations), some other departures may 
be too costly (for example, decentralizing borrowing powers without providing for a hard budget 
constraint for subnational governments). 
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Building the Capacity to Govern 
Improvement in governments’ political, administrative and fiscal capacity to implement reforms requires  human 
resource development, organizational strengthening and institutional change.
What Is State Capacity? 1
The Origins of  the Concept
The concept of  state capacity—whether at national, regional, or local level—originally emerged in 
the context of  developing countries. The purpose of  its use was twofold. It was used to explain 
• why the efforts of  some developing countries (e.g., Japan and South Korea) to “catch up” to 
the West in terms of  economic and social development succeeded, while others failed; and 
• why international (Western) technical/development assistance was effective and useful in 
some recipient countries, while completely obsolete in others.
These differences amongst countries shed light on the problem of  (lacking) state, or governmen-
tal, capacity. In the post-communist countries, after the initial years of  transition, the problem of  
state capacity yielded a new dimension: as many post-communist states were unable to adequately 
fulfill even basic functions, capacity building became a real “growth industry.”
The Concept of  State Capacity
In its simplest form, state capacity can be defined as “the ability to translate concern into policy” 
(VanDeVeer and Dabelko 2001, 20). Based on another markedly different value content, a World 
Bank paper defined state capacity as “the ability of  the state to undertake collective actions at the 
least cost to society....[State capacity] encompasses administrative capacity of  state officials...and 
the deeper institutional mechanisms” (World Bank 1997, 77). 
State capacity has two major components: political capacity and administrative capacity.
(a) Political capacity refers to the existence of  effective and sustainable political institutions 
and mechanisms to ensure that policies reflecting the country’s needs are formulated and 
that implementing apparatuses are held accountable. 
(b) Administrative capacity on the other hand refers to having adequate organizational re-
sources to enable the effective preparation, implementation, and monitoring of  govern-
ment policies. 
1  Comments received from György Gajduschek (MKI/Hungarian Institute of  Public Administration) are gratefully acknowledged
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 State capacity is often analyzed by means of  so-called governance indicators, such as 
those compiled by Freedom House, the World Bank Institute, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Bertellsmann. Broadly speaking, these 
indicators are numeric measures of  the capacity of  various countries to conduct “good 
government.” They are composed of  a detailed hierarchy of  sub-indicators, which in 
turn, are measured via expert polls, macroeconomic  indicators, and/or secondary data 
published by other organizations. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that while most 
governance indicators are primarily oriented to measuring either the outputs/results or 
the processes of  government, “capacity” mainly refers to its input side (e.g. human, orga-
nizational, institutional, and cultural resources).
Capacity Building
Capacity building is a term encompassing all conscious efforts to increase state capacity. Capacity 
building programs can be run by domestic governments as well as by international entities such 
as multilateral donor organizations or foreign governments. However, in transition countries the 
term most often emerges in the context of  Western technical assistance.
Capacity building can have a broad spectrum of  specific target areas:
• governmental entities, including both political  and administrative;
• NGOs, trade unions, and political parties;
• expert organizations (think tanks, scientific and technical facilities or communities); and 
• the broader public.
Whatever the actual target areas of  a capacity building intervention, its immediate objective is to 
enhance one or more of  the three fundamental prerequisites of  a capable government. These are 
summarized in the below table.
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Table 1. Elements of  State Capacity: Possible Objectives of  Capacity Building Efforts 
Objective of  Capacity Building Effort Examples of  Specific Activities
Development of  human resources: en-
hance the supply of  professional personnel 
(either its quality or its quantity).
Provision of  training for civil servants
Elaboration of  training curricula and materials, training of  
trainers
Development of  civil service training organizations/sys-
tems
Technical assistance to improve the legislative framework 
of  public service
Strengthening of  organizations: improve 
organizational structures and management 
processes to ensure better organizational 
performance.
Redesigning/restructuring central government ministries
Introduction of  new management or budget mechanisms 
in a local government
Institutional reform: create and/or modify 
(political or social) system-level institutions 
determining the “rules of  the game” in the 
economic and political fields.
Constitutional reform changing basic elements of  the 
political system
Overarching policy/legislative change effecting broad sec-
tors of  the society
Source: VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001, 21.
Past Experience Regarding Capacity Building
The “Third World” Experience
A major lesson drawn from administrative development efforts of  earlier decades is that a highly 
autonomous, neo-Weberian “developmental state” seems to be a prerequisite of  successful develop-
ment. That is, a strong state capable of  
(a) avoiding attempts by strong interest groups to gain control over national government 
policies and activities (e.g., large national or multinational monopolies’ efforts to circum-
vent national labour and environmental protection, or tax regimes—cf. “banana repub-
lics,” or the capturing of  government policies by powerful regional/ethnic minorities or 
local strongmen); 
(b) effectively countering national and regional security risks and exerting effective physical 
control over the country’s territory.
Such a “developmental state” ideally rests on a highly committed, disciplined, and professional 
civil service (often integrated by some “universalistic,” as opposed to subnational or clan-cen-
tered, ideology). Its motto could be “enlightened state versus backward society and particularistic 
groups.”
 
13
Building the Capacity to Govern 
Subsequent experience, however, has shown that in many cases the strong isolation of  govern-
ment from other societal actors leads to the incapacitation of  government policies. In other words, 
while the strong and unilateral influence of  a few interest groups is highly detrimental to capacity 
building efforts, the presence of  a broad spectrum of  relatively empowered societal players can be 
highly conducive of  state capacity.
The Experience of  Transition Countries
For the past fifteen years, capacity building has been the most permanent and emphatic element of  
Western technical assistance to transition countries. Most often, capacity building efforts consist 
of  two components:
(a) The preparation of  some kind of  advice; for example, the elaboration of  draft legislation, 
or an action plan for changing organizational (structural) arrangements or management 
processes within the government machinery; and
(b) The delivery of  some form of  training, provided either directly to the final beneficiaries, 
or indirectly, through the creation of  training resources (e.g., compilation of  training ma-
terials and “train-the-trainers” programs).
Additionally, capacity building programs sometimes have (usually minor) investment components 
such as the construction of  office space or the purchase of  equipment. While these capacity 
building programs have definitely had certain positive effects, they have also had some important 
drawbacks. On a technical level, the planning, organizational and implementation arrangements 
systematically produced certain dysfunctions, of  which some examples are: 
• Many of  the projects seem to be very expensive. For example, in the field of  civil service 
training—training unit costs being directly comparable—donor-funded activities were, 
on the average, 20 to 50 times more expensive than locally run training activities.
• Most of  the capacity building efforts utilized a project-type implementation framework; 
that is, implementing organizations and experts were contracted for the duration of  the 
given project, usually a period of  one to three years. Individual- and organizational-level 
learning was often minimal for two reasons: (i) in the project startup phase newcomers 
have to learn everything anew, and (ii) knowledge gathered throughout the project can 
disappear if  the project organization ceases to exist and the experts involved leave the 
project setting (or even the country).
• Another problem with the project-type implementation framework seems to have been 
that while project plans/Terms of  References are, naturally, difficult to change in the 
implementation phases, they often prove to be either unfounded or outdated as a conse-
quence of  important changes in the project’s context.
Cultural and management problems were often pervasive. In the interest of  brevity, I will highlight 
only a few problem areas.
• Decision-makers benefiting from capacity building measures (i.e., local participants from 
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the recipient country) lacked sufficient assertiveness vis-à-vis the donor and implement-
ing organizations, which often led to the simple omission of  their insights and intentions 
from the project design.
• This was often exacerbated by a host of  skill-, knowledge- and management-related in-
sufficiencies which together led to a surprising lack of  coherent and rational/goal-ori-
ented thinking and action on the side of  the recipient country. An obvious aspect of  
this problem was a complete lack of  effective coordination of  capacity building projects 
on the recipient side. Especially in the earlier years of  transition, practically no recipient 
country managed to set up a central coordination unit responsible for “channeling in” 
assistance efforts/resources.
• Finally, an important problem was the often mechanical and senseless copying of  institu-
tional and procedural models, and/or the related rhetorical universe, of  certain Western 
countries (cf. “international best practice” as the ultima ratio of  administrative moderniza-
tion debates!). Formulating problems and relevant solutions as “agencialization,” “citizen 
participation,” or—for the sake of  example—“gender issues,” in a context where often 
the very basic prerequisites of  state (or even economic and societal) functioning are miss-
ing can be highly misguided and even destructive. 
Subnational Capacity  
Most of  the systematized and published evidence on capacity building is related to central govern-
ment capacity. The available knowledge related specifically to capacity building issues in the field 
of  decentralization is relatively scarce. On the basis of  what limited information is available, the 
following observations seem justified:
(a) A strong version of  decentralization might, in some cases, weaken the institutional and 
material resources of  local government capacity building because the central govern-
ment’s policy on capacity building may become too narrowly focused on central govern-
ment organizations, and thereby “leave local governments on their own.” For example, 
the—often legally/constitutionally guaranteed—autonomy of  local governments in set-
ting up and managing their own organization, or setting up and implementing training 
policies, might prevent central government from designing and implementing adequate 
measures to ensure that 
• adequate organizational and management standards are in place and minimum 
requirements enforced;
• effective policies and measures for training local government personnel are 
elaborated;
• sufficient organizational and material resources to implement local government 
training are in place (including the institutional infrastructure of  training as well 
as the necessary budgetary resources for training).
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(b) Another aspect of  the above problem is related to the mechanisms of  organizational and policy 
learning across local governments. In the absence of  a carefully designed and maintained institu-
tional mechanism ensuring the exchange of  experience among local governments many of  the 
capacity building opportunities will fail to be utilized. This can be a very serious problem, since in 
many cases the most useful and relevant resource for capacity building is the experience of  similar 
local governments within the same country. Actually, national (as opposed to international!) best practices 
are the most important domestic resources for local government capacity building.
Guidelines 
General Objective of  Capacity Building 
Guideline 1. Strengthen state autonomy in relation to powerful domestic and international actors. One of  the key 
factors limiting state capacity is that powerful national or foreign actors—such as large business 
corporations or regional strongmen—“capture” government policies and programs. Therefore a 
central objective of  capacity building is ensuring government’s autonomy vis-à-vis such powerful 
actors. This requires the creation of  a committed, professional and disciplined civil service exhibit-
ing the virtues of  classic bureaucracy—as opposed to the often-cited recommendations of  New 
Public Management to “let managers manage.”
Guideline 2. Strengthen a broad spectrum of  societal partners in a balanced, proportionate way. At the same 
time, “getting close” to those governed is also important. Therefore the proportional and balanced 
development of  a broad spectrum of  societal partners—such as NGOs, advocacy groups, think 
tanks, and the broader public—should be included among the objectives of  capacity building 
policy.
Resources of  Capacity Building
In the initial phase(s) of  administrative transformation/decentralization, capacity building is mostly 
driven by external assistance (including technical assistance). From the outset, however, much em-
phasis has to be put on the long-term creation and utilization of  domestic resources. Therefore:
Guideline 3. “Don’t leave local governments on their own”: make sure that an effective general framework for local 
government operations exists. Ensure that “strong decentralization” doesn’t translate into “leaving local 
governments on their own.” It is not possible to establish a capable local government system with-
out the carefully designed, decidedly implemented and long-term involvement of  central authori-
ties. Such central government involvement is necessary, for example, in (i) setting and enforcing 
organizational and management standards in local government administrations, and (ii) creating 
and maintaining training infrastructure and training programs for local government employees.
Guideline 4. Create institutions for enabling local governments to learn from one another. In the long run, one 
of  the most important and relevant resources of  local government capacity building is policy 
and organizational learning across domestic local government organizations and practitioners. To 
make such learning happen, adequate forums for the exchange of  experience and knowledge 
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should be created and maintained, and their use encouraged. 
Designing and Managing Foreign Assistance for Capacity Building
Guideline 5. Assertively follow your own agenda in “hosting” Western assistance. In the course of  designing 
assistance programs, those involved in providing technical assistance (including donor organi-
zations, implementing organizations, as well as their experts) tend, naturally, to push their own 
agenda. In order to ensure the relevance of  capacity building efforts, however, the recipient side 
should be able to assertively put forward issues or solutions relevant for the domestic context 
and—if  necessary—refuse those pushed by the donor side. Moreover, instead of  opportunistically 
accepting the donors’ view of  the problem, strive to identify and formulate those issues/solutions 
in a way that is relevant and meaningful in the domestic reality of  decentralization. 
Guideline 6. Give preference to permanent organizations over temporal ones. Instead of  relying exclusively on 
temporal, project-type organizational arrangements in the course of  implementing capacity build-
ing measures, try to promote the creation/utilization of  permanent structures and organizations. 
This is likely to enhance the sustainability of  results as well as to increase the opportunities for 
organizational learning.
Guideline 7. Use domestic expertise more extensively. In the design and implementation phase of  assis-
tance projects promote—if  necessary, even by risking conflict with the donor—the use of  domes-
tic experts. The possible inferiority of  the technical quality or analytical strength of  their work is 
often effectively counterbalanced by their much closer familiarity with problems and the resulting 
relevance of  their conclusions—not to mention their command of  the local language, which so 
often acts a barrier and severely limits the work of  foreign consultants.
Guideline 8. Coordinate foreign assistance centrally. Set up a strong central coordinating unit, directly 
responsible for providing political leadership and coordinating foreign aid in the field of  capacity 
building. 
________
Building the capacity to govern is one of  the most urgent and critical matters facing a newly 
decentralizing, intergovernmental society.  Indeed, capacity development it is at the heart of  the 
successful implementation of  all the several reform policies addressed in the other briefing notes 
that accompany this volume. Weak organizations, institutions, and human resource capabilities will 
undermine the state as guarantor of  public welfare and security and the enabling of  civil society to 
hold government accountable for its actions and to fight corruption (OECD  2006). Weak capacity 
also has a negative impact on the ability to use international assistance in an effective and sustain-
able manner.  That capacity building for both central and subnational governments is a challenging 
and complex matter is as clear as is the reality that there are many examples of  a society’s failure to 
address this challenge and complexity. But, what is equally clear is that many places have been most 
successful in “developing and unleashing capacity” (OECD 2006). A careful consideration of  ca-
pacity development issues exposed above can contribute to making Kosovo one of  these places.
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Capacity in Kosovo
For supporting decentralization sound policy design and implementation capacity has to be developed in Kosovo.
How Policies Are Perceived in Postwar Kosovo 
Kosovo is struggling to become an example of  a success story of  democratic reforms in the 
region. It has undertaken serious commitments that hopefully in the near future will support its 
move toward EU integration. However, partly due to such ambitions, the government’s com-
mitments tend to be of  a more long-term character, rather than immediate solutions that can be 
implemented with present capacities. Moreover, with the powerful support of  the international 
civil administration Kosovo is undergoing transition at a more rapid pace than other similar post-
conflict and post-communist societies.
For more than two years, UNMIK1 was the only authority in Kosovo that initiated, developed and 
implemented policies at all levels of  governance. On 14 January 2000, Special Representative of  
the Secretary General passed Regulation No. 2000/1 on the establishment of  the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure2 (JIAS) as a temporary local governmental structure. JIAS functioned 
until the first free and democratic elections, but had no decision-making role and therefore mainly 
served as a structure for incorporation of  local leadership in Kosovo’s administration.3 
At the municipal levels as well, international administrators were responsible for the function-
ing of  municipalities and local services, and performed their duties jointly with administrative 
councils representing municipal institutions and parties, and administrative boards.4 Therefore, at 
both levels in the joint administrative institutions, real policymaking, decision-making, and control 
belonged to international representatives. 
Even with the first elections and the establishment of  the Provisional Institutions of  Self-Govern-
ment (PISG), there was little or no improvement in the domestic capacity to develop and make 
1  UNSC Resolution 1244 vested UNMIK inter alia with the authority to perform basic civilian administrative functions, as well as to 
organize and oversee the development of  provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government. The full text of  
the resolution is available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm.
2   JIAS was composed of: the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), administrative depart-
ments, municipal councils and boards.
3  The establishment of  JIAS served as an argument for dissolution of  all parallel structures that by the end of  the war either claimed or 
attempted to exercise various forms of  public authority in Kosovo. The parallel structures consisted of  the “Provisional Government 
of  Kosovo,” the “Presidency of  the Republic of  Kosovo” and the “Parliament of  the Republic of  Kosovo.” However, neither the JIAS 
nor the establishment of  PISG after the elections was able to achieve the dissolution of  parallel structures that were organized, sup-
ported and directed by Belgrade, and which continue even today to operate in Serbian communities of  Kosovo. 
4  Regulation No. 2000/1 on the JIAS, foresaw that the Municipal Administrative Board would, as its name suggests, be responsible for 
municipal administration. The Board was chaired by the International Administrator of  the Municipality (appointed by the SRSG) who 
monitored the work of  the Board and had the authority to appoint and remove other members. As for Municipal Councils, its members 
represented the citizens of  a municipality and were appointed by the Municipal Administrator. The Municipal Council was a consulta-
tive body and made recommendations to the International Municipal Administrator on any matter within his or her authority.
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policy in Kosovo. Due to lack of  local capacities in the newly created government, and also due to 
UNMIK’s standing (as the main public authority aiming at gradual transfer of  powers to PISG), 
governmental policies in Kosovo were driven by an international presence that even today is the 
main source of  analyses, policy development and, together with PISG, policy implementation. 
Within this arrangement, policies were mostly either imposed on the Kosovar government or 
given ready for approval, and while the government wished to prove zealous, particularly toward 
policies aimed at improving communities, most often it did not question the process by which such 
policies had been created. Moreover, the government committed itself  to the implementation of  
policies without any prior assessment of  the capacities required for their implementation. 
In addition, even when the policymaking process was handled within PISG, policy advice and 
analyses came mostly from foreign experts who were either employed for this purpose within 
PISG on different supporting projects, or at international organizations—and local officials had 
little idea how to use the policy advice and analyses. Often, such advice and analyses were not au-
thentic, but were simply borrowed and with a few changes adapted to Kosovo without taking into 
consideration unique aspects of  the local situation; thus ultimately the policies were not relevant. 
It is unavoidable that policies should reflect the traditions, culture, history and values of  the public 
that they will affect.
Decentralization Policy: The Existing Obstacles 
For more than six years Kosovo has been an oasis where many donor countries, international gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations, and other actors have offered assistance in the 
policy development process. Yet little progress has been made in building local capacities, with the 
result that the local level is unable to absorb the full range of  assistance on offer. Further, the lack 
of  local ownership over the policy process has proved to be a main obstacle toward the realization 
of  policies, for without a sense of  ownership policies have simply been accepted without prior 
assessment. The imposition of  the decentralization policy in Kosovo by UNMIK and the interna-
tional community within a very short period of  time is the most striking example. 
Decentralization policy in Kosovo—which was initiated by UNMIK as a tool for convincing the 
Serbian community of  the need for their integration into Kosovo’s public life—is primarily based 
on ideological goals rather than on analysis or assessment of  actual needs on the ground. Thus 
far, decentralization policy has not resulted in much improvement of  the situation, and only in a 
few limited cases has it enhanced the efficiency of  self-governance. The limited success of  decen-
tralization policy is mainly due to a lack of  authority, insufficient budgetary resources, and lack of  
capacity to undertake new responsibilities at the subnational level. 
Therefore, as practice has shown in many countries, if  the decentralization process is not imple-
mented properly, distribution of  powers to a secondary level of  government may contribute to 
further aggravation of  the existing situation. The approach taken by the Kosovar government and 
UNMIK is that the present form of  decentralization is experimental until 2008, when a decision 
will be made on whether it is compatible for Kosovo. 
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For places like Kosovo, decentralization can aid the democratic transition by increasing local par-
ticipation in public decision-making and administration, empowering communities, and encour-
aging transparent and accountable local governance. But decentralization needs to be addressed 
cautiously in highly sensitive environments like Kosovo—which is not only a postwar territory 
but strives to establish the rule of  law, fight corruption and organized crime, and build upon weak 
managerial traditions. 
The process of  decentralization in Kosovo has been highly politicized and exclusive, proceeding 
without the participation of  most social groups. The lack of  transparency has resulted in dis-
satisfaction and a misconception of  the nature and purpose of  decentralization among the wider 
population.5 Moreover, unequal development of  institutional, infrastructural and human capacities 
between existing municipalities and new ones to be established under the decentralization policy, 
increases the risk of  an asymmetric decentralization in Kosovo that will further deepen horizontal 
inequalities. 
An appropriate legislative framework is also a priority for Kosovo. In some areas Kosovo clearly 
lacks a sufficient number of  laws and regulations, while in others it suffers from the existence of  
several sets of  laws regulating the same issue. The Kosovar government is trying to build a legal 
framework from scratch by approving new laws that conform with international and EU stan-
dards, while continuing to apply two sets of  former Yugoslav laws6 in addition to UNMIK regula-
tions. The uncertain nature of  the legal framework has a deleterious effect on the policymaking 
community (analysts, researchers and policymakers) and on policy implementation. 
Lack of  a permanent mechanism for assessing the compatibility of  different laws precludes an 
assessment of  the impact of  legal regulations prior to their adoption. Therefore, taking into con-
sideration that the Constitutional Framework of  Kosovo does not allow for the establishment of  
such mechanisms, it is of  crucial importance for Kosovo to create them within the government 
administration. But merely establishing mechanisms for the impact assessment of  laws is not 
enough, concrete steps must be taken in order to make them functional and capable of  identifying 
the best options for society.  
Finally, in Kosovo one of  the most serious impediments to sound policy development is the lack 
of  credible and valid data. In the absence of  appropriate data it is impossible for policy researchers 
and analysts to evaluate potential future impacts of  policies. 
5  In a survey conducted by the author between June–October 2005 with citizens, only 18% of  respondents could state the aims of  
decentralization in Kosovo, while 82% reported hearing about the process but couldn’t recall its exact aim. 
6  According to Regulation 199/24 on Applicable Law in Kosovo, among others applicable laws include: legislation that was applicable 
in Kosovo before 22 March 1989 and laws applicable in Kosovo after 22 March 1989 that are not of  discriminatory nature. 
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Building Policy Development Capacities: 
What Should Be Done? 
Like any other government in the world, Kosovo needs to develop sound public policies in all 
segments of  life that will aim at improving overall social and economic conditions. Considering 
that successful decentralization is the main test for Kosovo in front of  the international community 
to prove its full commitment for functioning democracy, it is  crucial to develop a strategy for 
sustainable organization and management of  policy design and development in the field of  
decentralization. 
Decentralization Is Part of  Good Governance
Kosovo clearly needs to develop policies that would present decentralization as an integral and 
necessary part of  good governance, as well as to build better partnership with civil society or-
ganizations and media for promotion of  citizens’ participation and inclusion in policy design at 
all levels. It should be noted that while strides have been made, several areas that collectively 
contribute to good governance are lacking, among which most notable is transparency and ac-
countability.
Capacity for Policy Analysis and Design
While external assistance that was given until now to Kosovo is still needed and helpful, the gov-
ernment and civil society have to generate their own policy analysis and research, as well. In most 
transition countries where public sector wages are uncompetitive, substantive expertise remain 
outside the government structures, thus making it difficult for governments to obtain permanent 
expertise (Verheijen 2005). Therefore, developing a strategy for offering competitive conditions 
for attracting experts within governmental structures might be a way to improve existing policy 
capacities in Kosovo. 
Professional Civil Service 
In this regard, it is necessary for Kosovo to build a professional civil service with strong policy 
analysis skills that is able to provide credible and useful solutions for policymakers. The govern-
ment of  Kosovo is undergoing a difficult process of  consolidating the civil service capacities and 
due to budget constraints is often forced to limit hiring sufficient number of  staff  for conducting 
even regular administrative functions within ministries and municipal authorities. 
In postwar Kosovo, the need for training of  government officials was understood more as a need 
for training central government officials, rather than municipal ones. However, recent develop-
ments of  the decentralization policies have been accompanied by acknowledgement of  the impor-
tance of  training for municipal staff. 
Within municipal government it is important for policy practitioners to learn about the role of  
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policies in each society, their influence and their efficient use. Therefore, it is crucial for them to 
understand and learn properly the processes how policies are made, and especially to understand 
the importance of  the transparent policy development. 
Parallel System of  Policy Design
Different organizations operating in Kosovo within the last six years have helped directly in build-
ing capacities within PISG. They also empowered many local NGOs in becoming important fac-
tors in the policy development and decision-making process in Kosovo. Organizations such as 
KFOS, UNDP, EAR, USAID, in consultation with PISG, have developed numerous projects for 
development of  policy design capacities, either by offering research fellowships in this regard, 
or by providing foreign or local consultants. Practice showed that due to lack of  experience and 
knowledge in the field of  policy development, these supporting consultants in most cases had to 
take upon the responsibility for developing policies, while governmental officials served more as 
technical support for them and less as partners in producing actual policies. 
In the future attention should be given to strengthening policy capacities within central and local 
government, that will be able to properly handle policy development in different fields. Like in 
many countries in transition availability of  foreign funding for supporting different civil society 
groups led to development of  a parallel system for policymaking. This shortened the government’s 
possible civil service capacities. 
While there is a need to continue the provision of  foreign and local experts to the Kosovar gov-
ernment, the approach should unquestionably be changed. The practice of  involving governmen-
tal officials more intensively in the policymaking process is crucial. This could be done through 
involving them in the process more actively from the earlier phases of  developing ideas, writing, 
analyzing and lobbying a particular policy within the government. The working strategy for exter-
nal experts should be mainly offering consultations, feedback and training to local officials, who in 
turn would be doing the main work. Thus, such a strategy would enable establishment of  sustain-
able capacities within the government of  Kosovo. 
Another way to improve the policy capacities in Kosovo is to follow the trend of  some transition 
countries, where leading universities are occupying the policy and consulting market niche (Livny 
2005). Typically the university faculties and academic institutions were engaged in the policymak-
ing process through projects supported by different donor organizations. A sustainable coopera-
tion should be established, where master, doctoral and other students would conduct different re-
search in the field of  decentralization. In addition, research institutions could be established within 
universities, where faculties would conduct different policy analyses and research, that would en-
able the government to strengthen capacities. In future they might provide qualitative and policy 
relevant analyses for the government. 
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Transparent and Inclusive Policy Development
Policy advices that are produced by different social actors, representing interests of  various groups, 
are crucial for developing policies that deal with the core issues of  society. Therefore, Kosovo 
should avoid becoming a society where policy advices are not needed and decisions are mainly 
based on authoritarian central and local authorities. 
The previous practice of  PISG and UNMIK in developing the general framework for decentral-
ization in Kosovo was to carry out policy preparation behind closed doors. Usually, once they 
were framed by the international community and gained the support of  the local leadership, these 
policies were brought to public as already agreed decisions. In most cases the public never learned 
how or why a policy was designed in a particular way. 
Therefore, it is very important for Kosovo to establish the practice where public opinion will have 
an impact on future decisions. This could be achieved through organization of  regular public de-
bates and public consultations, which would be held prior to decisions by authorities; where the 
public could give its opinion and express views on whether a policy would improve people’s life, or 
whether there are other greater policy priorities. Once a policy has been developed, and before be-
ing presented in its final version, a similar public debate should be organized. This time the public 
consultation would be aimed at confirming whether the developed policy is in conformity with the 
public’s requirements and actual needs. Transparency and increased public participation in policy-
making would give policies greater legitimacy, and bode better for their future implementation.
For successful implementation of  policies, nowadays it is imperative to get the media’s support. 
The influence of  the media has become so great that it can steer the public’s attention toward dif-
ferent issues. It is not uncommon in many countries for the media to remain highly politicized and 
influenced by the government, even though democracy requires an independent media that serves 
the interest of  the general public. 
So far in the process of  developing decentralization in Kosovo, PISG and UNMIK have not co-
operated with the media at a satisfying level. It has often happened that the media, through differ-
ent channels, found out and published information on many decentralization policies that would 
otherwise not have been made available to the public. In order to earn back the trust of  the public 
in the process of  decentralization, it is imperative for the government and UNMIK to change their 
approach toward the media and increase transparency in this regard. The attention of  the media 
should be captured not only by releasing much more information on government activities, but 
by establishing regular contacts that will help build a circle of  trust between media, citizens and 
government.  
However, improved communication should extend not only to the government but also to external 
policy analysts. There are many ways that different policymakers can develop better cooperation 
with the media and better publicize their activities; e.g., by regularly providing tip sheets, journalism 
forums, source directories, and surveys (Popper 2005). 
On the other hand, especially in newly created municipalities, the public should be informed about 
how services are provided and about the responsibilities of  government representatives toward 
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them. Thus, establishing a program that would promote cooperation and exchange of  informa-
tion, including good and bad practices regarding the decentralization in Kosovo, could significantly 
improve the level and quality of  transparency.  
Role of  the Civil Sector in Policy Development
Practices of  countries in transition have shown that non-governmental stakeholders are not usu-
ally welcome to participate in decision-making processes relating to highly politicized issues such 
as decentralization, judiciary reform, and administrative reform (Kourylev and Evenson 2005). 
However, EU standards encourage development of  effective mechanisms that enable active coop-
eration between governmental and non-governmental sectors.
With some exceptional cases, the practice in Kosovo has shown that civil society has not been ac-
tive in producing policy analysis. This is so because Kosovo still does not have a strong and sustain-
able civil society; it is still highly dependant on foreign funding and support.7 Therefore, Kosovo 
needs to strengthen policy capacities within different civil society groups, interest groups and think 
tanks, that can contribute to broader encouragement for public involvement in coordinating and 
producing policies, both at national and municipal level. In this regard, it is important to organize 
trainings for civic actors that would teach them how to do policy research and analyses. 
In Kosovo the lack of  capacity is such that, without the assistance of  different foreign donor 
organizations, the government is incapable of  producing policy analyses to inform future deci-
sions. The trend so far has been that as foreign donations targeting domestic policy capacities are 
reduced, the government of  Kosovo will need to turn to policy consultants in different spheres. 
Therefore, the government will undoubtedly need external policy advice in the relatively near fu-
ture, so it should take steps to strengthening policy institutes, think tanks, consultancy groups or 
companies that are most likely to provide them with policy analyses and research. 
How to Make Policies Successful? 
The most important component of  any successful policy is the appropriate communication and 
advocacy for the ideas expressed. Therefore, communicative capacities should be developed in 
tandem with policymaking capacities.  
It is crucial that the political will for reforms exist and that the government shows a readiness 
for accepting internal and external policy advice, as the basis for future decisions. Moreover, it is 
important to develop policies that are relevant for and can be implemented in a particular context, 
given available capacity and resources.
It is very important that policy options provided through analysis are in accordance with existing 
budgetary constraints and political feasibility (Young and Quinn 2005). In Kosovo, particular at-
tention should be given to such factors, since practice has showed that there is often insufficient 
financial means for the realization of  approved policies. The decentralization policies in Kosovo 
7  In postwar Kosovo, only a small number of  registered NGOs has managed to build reputations that enable them to operate continu-
ously without experiencing the serious funding shortages that most organizations face. 
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have proved to be very unsuitable for implementation, as the present political situation in particu-
lar regions has not been taken into account. 
Above all, it is imperative for all stakeholders to develop a sense of  ownership and responsibility 
toward policy development and implementation. This can be done only through a combination of  
all the above-mentioned elements that are necessary for developing successful policies.  
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Local Economic Development in a 
Post-UNMIK Kosovo
The role of  local governments in promoting a friendly public sector environment enables economic development.
The question of  Kosovo’s political status will be decided soon, but for many issues and long-term 
concerns, such as the creation of  a viable and sustainable economy, the final decision regarding sta-
tus will be just the starting point on a long road of  urgently needed reform and investment at both 
national and local levels. This statement is in no way intended to belittle the question of  status; in 
fact, all twelve of  the Kosovar municipalities that have developed comprehensive local economic 
development (LED) strategies since 20021 cited the omnipresent status question as a major threat 
to their development. Nevertheless, despite potentially inflated local expectations, there is no evi-
dence that the resolution of  the status question will automatically usher in a wave of  investment 
and economic growth. This means that like everywhere else in the region, both national and local 
authorities, in conjunction with the private sector, will need to carefully strategize about how to 
improve their business climates and how to maximize their economic strengths and opportunities, 
while minimizing their weaknesses and threats. 
This briefing note focuses on the continued need to improve Kosovo’s business enabling envi-
ronment and to encourage local economic strategic planning in the post-status period. It also 
highlights some of  the salient issues that Kosovar municipalities will need to contend with, and 
elucidates international good practices and lessons learned that may be utilized to overcome exist-
ing economic or administrative hurdles.
Kosovo’s Business Enabling Environment
Kosovo’s postwar economy has been characterized by a reliance on financial transfers from in-
ternational donors and the diaspora. Today, with the postwar construction boom largely over and 
negligible production or export taking place, most business in Kosovo revolves around small-scale 
trade (European Stability Initiative 2004). Much of  that trade and associated labor take place 
outside the formal economy, helping to explain why most of  Kosovo’s budget revenues still de-
rive from import duties collected along its boundaries (European Stability Initiative 2004). In a 
region where high unemployment rates plague most every economy, Kosovo stands out with an 
unemployment rate approaching 45 percent (World Bank 2005). Add to this equation the fact that 
Kosovo’s population is the youngest and among the fastest growing in Europe and it becomes 
evident that unless large numbers of  meaningful and productive jobs are created in the near to 
medium term, Kosovar stability and democracy will remain tenuous.
1  The strategies have been developed under the Developing Economies Locally Through Action and Alliance (DELTA) program 
implemented by Riinvest Institute and financed by the World Bank and the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative 
(Open Society Institute–Budapest). The 12 municipalities are: Drenas, Ferizaj, Gjilan, Istog, Kacanik, Klina, Lipjan, Peje, Podujeva, 
Prizren, Viti, and Vushtrri. The Research Triangle Institute, sponsored by USAID, has been doing follow-up work with a number of  
these cities on concrete action plans and spatial analysis for encouraging LED.
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The above macroeconomic considerations notwithstanding, there are reasons for optimism. A 
2005 study on business conditions in Kosovo concluded that “Kosovo proved to have a far more 
business friendly environment than any other member of  the Yugoslav Federation and even out-
performed some of  the recent entrants to the European Union in some areas (USAID 2005).” 
Areas in which Kosovo fared strongly in this regard were: (i) number of  procedures (5) and time 
needed (23 days) to start a new business; (ii) time needed (9 months) to dissolve a business; and 
(iii) labor market flexibility. These strengths are extremely important and bode well for the entre-
preneurs needed to drive economic growth.   
Less favorable however are other indicators highlighted in the same study. These include: (1) capi-
tal requirements needed to establish a business; (2) access to credit; and (3) contract enforcement, 
particularly with regard to debt collection (USAID 2005). So while processes may be relatively 
simple and straightforward when it comes to starting a business, costs may be prohibitively expen-
sive. For example, the minimum capital requirement needed to establish an enterprise is roughly 
three times the monthly per capita income of  €130 (USAID 2005; World Bank 2006). Also dis-
couraging is the €220 charge for registering collateral in order to try and access the credit market. 
These factors may to some extent help explain the bloated informal economy despite the relative 
procedural ease of  starting a business.
While it may be relatively easy to reduce some of  the above costs, there are additional, more fun-
damental domestic inhibitors of  economic growth that need addressing, particularly for Kosovo’s 
municipalities. Not least of  these is the impact of  UNMIK’s Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), which 
is responsible for managing all “socially owned property.” A review of  twelve municipal economic 
strategies carried out in the summer of  2005 notes, “the KTA is an anomaly that was most likely 
created with the best of  intentions, but which now seems to be a principal barrier to the [eco-
nomic] growth of  the municipalities (Budds 2005).” If  municipalities are unable to manage a large 
portion of  their local properties and assets, they lose a vital tool in helping to attract investment, 
retain businesses and generate direct incomes/rents to fund local services. 
Although according to the above-mentioned USAID report the business registration process is 
highly efficient, if  not exactly affordable, there is a growing sense in Kosovo that it is overly cen-
tralized. In the past, business registration took place at the municipal level. Now entrepreneurs 
can register only at the Ministry of  Trade and Industry in Pristina or at one of  its regional offices. 
Municipalities have noted that it is often difficult to get information from the ministry offices, 
particularly if  their local political party differs from the one in power centrally (Budds 2005). With 
only partial or delayed information on local businesses, municipalities have a reduced ability to 
develop and conduct proactive business development, training and/or retention programs; and are 
similarly constrained in the elaboration of  comprehensive local economic development plans.
The list of  obstacles cited above is in no way meant to be exhaustive, but simply reflects some of  
the problems most frequently cited by municipalities with regard to economic development. Ad-
dressing these issues, of  course, will shape the platform from which Kosovo’s private sector will 
either grow or contract. 
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Local Economic Development Strategy-Making
Strategy development for local economic development is an essential tool that municipalities can 
use to generate private-sector growth. A favorable business climate and a local economic develop-
ment (LED) strategy for economic growth are mutually reinforcing. A friendly enabling environ-
ment should foster the successful implementation of  a strategy, while a strategy should highlight 
areas where the business enabling environment can be improved. 
LED strategic planning is essentially about maximizing the potential of  a range of  factors includ-
ing location, physical infrastructure, human resources, capital and finance, knowledge and technol-
ogy, industrial structure, quality of  life, investment climate, institutional capacity and community 
(Wong 2002). LED strategies administered and implemented at the local level can increase the 
potential of  employers to generate jobs (Abrams and Murphy 2005).
By actively reviewing its economic base, a municipality or community can develop an understand-
ing of  the opportunities for, and obstacles to, growth and investment. At the municipal level, busi-
nesses both large and small often choose to locate or develop in an area because of  agglomeration 
economies, that is, the benefits derived from sharing markets, infrastructure, labour pools and in-
formation with other firms. The economic advantage of  an area therefore depends on the quality 
of  governance and management, and on the policies affecting the availability, or lack of, business 
infrastructure such as electricity, transport, telecommunications, sanitation and developable land. 
Factors affecting worker productivity in the local economy can include the availability and quality 
of  housing, health and education services, skills, security, training opportunities and public trans-
port. These hard and soft infrastructure factors are major determinants of  a community’s relative 
advantage, and the quality and provision of  hard and soft infrastructure forms the cornerstone of  a 
successful local economy. The vast majority of  businesses in a municipality are, after all, small and 
local, and reliant on the effective functioning of  the municipality (Abrams and Murphy 2005).
Ideally, an LED strategy will form a component of  a broader strategic development plan that in-
cludes social and environmental components. The LED strategy provides a focus for strengthen-
ing the local economy and building local capacity. The timeframe for an LED strategy is typically 
three to eight years and should include annual implementation plans which are directly linked to 
the municipality’s budget.2 
The recent introduction of  a modern property tax system in Kosovo is a promising development 
for linking local revenue generation with improved local public services. Property tax collections 
rose to 25 percent of  total municipal own source revenues during the first half  of  2005, increasing 
roughly 14 percent over the same period in 2004. Revenues generated locally from property taxes 
and license fees can only be invested in hard infrastructure projects such as roads, water supply, 
waste collection, etc.3 These investments are critical for laying the foundation for economic devel-
opment.
2  For more information on the World Bank and Open Society Institute methodologies for LED strategy development, based on 
OECD good practice, see World Bank 2004.
3  This short overview of  recent changes in tax legislation is provided by Sejdi Osmani, Director of  Administration, Riinvest Insti-
tute.
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Twelve of  Kosovo’s thirty municipalities have undertaken comprehensive LED strategic plan-
ning efforts sponsored by the World Bank and the Open Society Institute in the past four years. 
Six additional cities—Dardana, Kastriot, Malisheva, Sharr, Shtime and Gjakove4—have recently 
embarked to do the same. That leaves nearly half  of  Kosovo’s municipalities, including the cit-
ies of  Pristina and Mitrovica, without a commitment to comprehensive LED planning. The final 
status agreement may also see the creation of  new municipalities which will need to develop such 
a strategy. Furthermore, municipalities that have already developed strategies should continue to 
review and revise them on a periodic basis, and may need technical assistance in doing so. Finally, 
recognizing that when it comes to Mitrovica a political settlement will need to be in place before 
LED strategic planning can truly take place, inclusive LED strategy-making may act as a bridge and 
help foster Albanian-Serbian dialogue on some areas of  common interest.
Having all this in mind, a number of  policy options are offered below regarding the business envi-
ronment in Kosovo and the importance of  LED strategic planning. Following which, a number of  
specific suggestions are made to help ensure that LED strategy development is done in the most 
optimal way possible.
Policy Options
1) The post-UNMIK central government (whatever form that may take) could reduce the 
costs associated with registering a business and collateral. The medium-term rewards 
from having tax-paying businesses and improved employment rates will outweigh the 
need for high cash payments to open an enterprise and provide access to the capital mar-
kets.
2) The Kosovo Trust Agency’s responsibilities concerning the management of  municipal 
land might be transferred to Kosovo’s municipalities, not the central government. Strong 
regulations would then need to be put in place to make sure, especially in the case of  
ethnically mixed municipalities, that a representative committee works together to make 
decisions on properties and/or assets of  common interest.
3) The business registration process could be devolved back to the municipal level, along 
with performance indicators for efficiency and transparency which would need to be met 
by all municipalities. A joint and public database of  registered businesses could be created 
that would allow both local and central authorities to access the information.
4) The central and municipal governments could publicize the positive findings of  the busi-
ness environment survey and get the message out that it is simple to start a legitimate 
business in Kosovo. If  costs could be reduced in the near-term, and once a final status is 
agreed upon, the government might choose to legitimately advertise itself  as the “friend-
liest business environment in the region.”
5) An economic development officer could be appointed in each municipality with the spe-
cific responsibility to push for the implementation of  the economic strategic plan. This 
4   The Gjakove plan is sponsored by UNDP.
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should involve facilitating partnerships between the different levels of  government, the 
private sector and the donor community to realize specified goals and objectives. The 
LED officer should take the lead in ensuring the business administrative and regulatory 
environments are running as smoothly as possible under the existing legislative frame-
work. Even if  municipal governments are unable to hire additional personnel to play 
this crucial role, the position may be created by shifting existing personnel around. Ide-
ally this person would also have been intimately involved in the development of  their 
municipality’s plan for economic growth. If  no such plan exists, they can take the lead in 
organizing the effort (or submitting a proposal to a donor to help with the financing and 
technical assistance). Donors interested in sustainable economic development in Kosovo 
may undertake to provide comprehensive training to these local development officers 
(and potentially their teams).
Finally, the following points provide a concise overview of  some of  the critical lessons learned 
in Central, East and South-East Europe over the past decade of  LED strategy development ef-
forts.5 
Planning Insights
• Strategy objectives and projects are often not prioritized. By default this means that 
everything is a priority, which unequivocally translates to nothing is a priority. Without a 
clear indication of  what the most pressing needs are, and in what order to address them, 
the municipality will find itself  back where it started.
• Strategic goals are often vague and generic. If  LED goals are not well defined from 
the outset, or do not adequately reflect identified municipal assests, the LED strategy is 
inherently weakened. Every municipality has unique, positive characteristics that can be 
exploited and maximized.
• Lack of  political agreement and support from all sections of  the community can 
seriously hinder LED efforts. Any LED strategy that seeks to improve the local econ-
omy will require broad and continuing support across the political spectrum throughout 
the timeframe of  the straregy. It is all too evident that unless political “buy-in” and agree-
ment has occurred, a change in the political composition of  a municipality will result 
in the LED strategy being ignored or usurped in favour of  more politically expedient 
programs.
• Strategies should be locally written. Where a municipal LED strategy is devised and 
compiled by an individual or team of  external consultants, the strategy itself  is unlikely 
to be implemented with the enthusiasm, commitment or conviction that a locally written 
strategy would be. In building local capacity to take responsibility for implementing the 
LED strategy, it is better to have an imperfect locally produced strategy that is owned by 
5  This list derives from an unpublished LGI study led by Pawel Swianiewicz entitled “Local Governments and Development—What 
Works and What Does Not?” and the operational LED programs that LGI and the World Bank have supported in Albania and Kosovo. 
The Swianiewicz reports can be viewed at: http://lgi.osi.hu/documents.php?m_id=98. For a full list of  these recommendations, see 
Abrams and Murphy 2005.
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the community than a strategy that has been produced externally (but might look fan-
cier).
• Private sector engagement is essential. Economic development is led by private sec-
tor growth. It is the business community that best understands the obstacles impeding 
local economic development and their input is critical in addressing those impediments. 
Business representatives bring capital and entrepreneurial resources to the process, re-
sources that can be harnessed in a variety of  partnership initiatives to spur development. 
Businesses operate under the guidelines, rules and regulations of  the local economy, and 
are best positioned to suggest changes to the regulations that shape the local business 
environment.
• Mayors and municipal assemblies should sign a commitment to the process, with 
identified performance targets and personnel allocations. 
Implemenatation Insights
• Unclear action plans and/or weak monitoring systems reduce strategy impact. 
Strategy goals and projects not only need to be prioritized but the priorities need to have 
detailed and feasible action plans. Project descriptions should serve as blueprints for ac-
tivity. They should include a list of  contributors (specifically naming what each group can 
and will assist with), a timetable, a realistic budget, risks to be mitigated, and clear ways to 
monitor and evaluate the progression and impact of  the project. The blueprint will allow 
anyone in the municipality, since staffs change, to pick up and manage the project at any 
time. The monitoring and evaluation mechanism (that is, a clear set of  measurable indica-
tors) is intended to ensure that the project is adapted if  needed to increase its impact, or 
cancelled if  it turns out to be a net loss initiative.
• Too great a focus on external (i.e. state and donor) funds is commonplace. The 
principal rationale for the strategy should be to more efficiently manage self-generated 
and existing resources, as well as to create a more favorable investment environment via 
internal reforms. While external funds are of  natural importance, municipalities have less 
control over this domain and therefore may end up with strategy components that cannot 
be implemented. Often a strategic plan has been a precondition for donors to “invest” 
in a municipality. While this approach clearly makes sense, one must also avoid a situa-
tion where the municipality sees the strategy foremost as a way to leverage external funds 
rather than as a tool for better allocating own source revenues.
• Weak link between strategy and municipal budgeting process. This point relates 
to the one above. The strategy should serve as a guide to the annual budgeting process. 
Priorities identified should be matched to existing resources, with co-funding and private 
sector contributions (and partnerships) sought whenever possible.
• Local strategies should be integrated into their respective regional or national 
economic strategies. The adoption of  new programs or the introduction of  new poli-
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cies at higher levels may be of  great use to the municipalities.
• For sustained success, strategies should be reviewed annually to adjust to chang-
ing environments. New opportunities arise; new threats emerge. One cannot expect the 
same policy to be successful year after year without modification.
• Quality of  life factors enhance economic development. Green spaces, cultural at-
tractions, sports facilities, cleanliness and other quality of  life attributes can advance eco-
nomic development. A city that is pleasant to live in is one that is more likely to retain 
local businesses and attract new ones.
• Municipalities can strengthen their positions through horizontal collaboration. 
As highlighted earlier, detriments to economic growth are often external factors, rang-
ing from macroeconomic state policies to national tax rates to centralized processing of  
business-related matters. When municipalities are faced with the same barriers, horizontal 
networking—via associations of  municipalities or through informal ad hoc structures—
can result in a strengthened position vis-à-vis the central government.
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Territorial and Administrative Structures
Local government systems with large-or small-size municipalities can be managed efficiently under different 
political, service delivery and administrative structures.
European Models of  Territorial Organization
Throughout Europe tremendous variation can be observed in territorial organization at local level. 
Consequently, there is no single model of  territorial organization. England sits at one extreme, 
with an average local government of  over 120,000 inhabitants, and France at the other, with over 
30,000 communes and an average size well below 2,000 residents. Territorially consolidated mu-
nicipalities tend to prevail in Northern Europe (Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands), while fragmen-
tation is more typical of  Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, France). Similar variation can be found 
among local governments in the post-communist countries of  Central and Eastern Europe, here 
we find large local governments in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland or (former) Serbia and Montenegro, 
and fragmentation of  municipalities in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, and to a 
somewhat lesser extent, in Latvia and Estonia. In the fragmented model, well over 50% of  munici-
palities have less than 1,000 residents, with extreme lows falling to below 100 or even 50. 
Historically, two major waves of  territorial reforms can be observed in European countries. The 
territorial consolidation reforms of  the 1950s, and later in the 1960s and 1970s, were inspired by 
the desire to accrue economies of  scale in the delivery of  local services. Of  the countries that un-
derwent reform during this period, many were West European (England, Netherlands, and Scan-
dinavian countries) and several were Central East European (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
and Hungary). 
The fall of  the Socialist regimes in 1990 saw a reversing of  the trend toward consolidation, and 
several countries of  Central and Eastern Europe—Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, 
and some countries of  South-Eastern Europe—initiated reforms of  territorial fragmentation. Al-
though there was no similar trend in Western Europe, still there too one could hear voices arguing 
that the benefits of  territorial consolidation had earlier been overestimated. 
This diversified and dynamic picture suggests that the choice of  territorial model is not an obvious 
one, and requires balancing the advantages and disadvantages of  various solutions. 
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Arguments For and Against Territorial Consolidation
Although theoretical discussions and results of  empirical studies on the impact of  the size of  mu-
nicipalities on local government functioning are quite complex and often conflicting, the dominant 
tone of  conclusions drawn might be summarized as follows:
• Territorial consolidation makes more radical decentralization of  functions feasible. Very 
small local governments are unable to take on responsibility for several important func-
tions, such as primary schools or solid waste disposal.
• Some functions benefit from economies of  scale (with the result that unit costs of  goods 
and services are lower in larger local governments). The best documented in several 
countries is economy of  scale in administrative services. 
• Larger local governments can hire professional administrative staff  more easily.
• In territorially consolidated systems there is less pressure for equalization mechanisms, as 
there is usually less variation among revenues from own sources.
• In consolidated systems it is easier to minimize the “free rider” effect; namely, when 
consumers from one local government benefit from services financed and delivered by 
another. In larger local government units spillovers are more manageable: external costs 
can be internalized. 
• Larger local governments can usually better influence local economic development be-
cause they can better mobilize resources for crucial projects and have more coherent 
land-use planning. (Although some authors argue that territorial fragmentation supports 
economic development by stimulating competition between local governments.)
• Territorial fragmentation supports direct forms of  local democracy. Citizens in small 
jurisdictions are usually more interested in and satisfied with local government function-
ing, and feel (and actually are) better informed. 
• Larger municipalities require a different type of  representation in which political parties 
and institutions matter more; direct participation is more complicated.
• In ethnically mixed territories, there is an additional argument related to the autonomy of  
communities with a strong feeling of  distinctiveness, which in some cases may lead to the 
creation of  smaller local governments
As we can see from above, there are a number of  arguments in favor of  both consolidation and 
fragmentation. Ultimately, the choice of  systems depends on which values of  local government 
we want to promote. 
 
222
Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Notes
Table 1. Territorial Organization and Service Delivery Options 
Size of  
Municipal 
Governments
How Most Local Functions are Provided Risks
 1 Small
Narrow scope of  functions for local 
governments; most services delivered by 
the state administration.
Limited decentralization; central 
provision often less effective than 
provision by democratic local 
governments.
2 Small
Narrow functions of  villages and small 
towns; larger towns deliver several services 
for  surrounding settlement units (formally 
separate local governments).
Accountability and financing problems 
in delivery of  services for small local 
governments.
3 Small
Wide scope of  functions for local 
governments. Several services delivered 
through contractual arrangements: by 
“contracting out” (buying services from 
the private sector) or “buying in” (small 
local governments purchase services from a 
larger town nearby). 
Difficult to implement in countries 
with weak market of  private providers. 
Local governments reluctant to enter 
“buy in” agreements.
4
Small, with 
middle tier 
Narrow functions for basic tier 
governments; upper tier responsible for 
majority of  vital functions.
Not applicable for small countries.
5 Small
Wide scope of  functions delivered 
through voluntary cooperation of  local 
governments.
Political and administrative costs 
of  cooperation. Accountability and 
transparency problems.
6 Large
Wide scope of  functions delivered 
by consolidated (amalgamated) local 
governments.
Small communities risk losing identity. 
Fear of  domination by the main 
settlement units.
“Distance” to decision-making and 
administration is great.
The last two options (5 and 6) appear to be the most viable for Kosovo and are briefly discussed 
in following sections. Taking into account the size of Kosovo, it is reasonable to focus on territo-             
rial organization at the municipal level, leaving aside the issues of  number of  tiers and/or size of  
regional level governments. 
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Cooperation of  Local Governments: Remedy for Weaknesses 
of  the Fragmented System?
In a situation in which individual local governments are too small to provide some functions ef-
fectively, voluntary cooperation with neighboring municipalities is often seen as the solution. This 
is frequently seen as an alternative to the creation of  large local government units through the 
amalgamation process. Moreover, such a solution allows residents to benefit from the more direct 
local democracy of  small local units. 
However, in practice, the experience of  voluntary cooperation is not always positive, and empirical 
research provides examples of  both success and failure in this respect. First of  all, local govern-
ments are often reluctant to cooperate—even if  cooperation is a logical and effective solution. 
Second, if  and when they cooperate, local governments often enter into conflicts which detract 
from the benefits of  cooperation. 
Cooperation among local governments also has its political and economic costs, which are some-
times difficult to accept. Cooperation impinges on the political ambitions of  local leaders, who 
are forced to concede some of  their power. Moreover, it incurs transaction costs associated with 
more complicated organizational-managerial settings. Finally, cooperation produces transparency 
and legitimacy problems in a situation where authorities of  the “cooperative arrangement body” 
are not directly elected and their decisions are not transparent to local communities. 
Numerous empirical studies have concluded that effective cooperation of  local governments re-
quires the following preconditions:
• Strong incentives for cooperation provided by central government and/or by another 
tier’s authorities (international projects, such as those sponsored by the EU may play a 
role). These incentives might have a dual character: (i) financial—in which cooperating 
authorities are rewarded by a system of  special grants or other form of  financial support; 
(ii) functional—in which cooperative agreements may result in transfer of  additional 
competencies to local governments. The French experience with cooperative agreements 
among very small local governments (especially in the metropolitan and agglomeration 
areas) provides a very good example of  the practical impact of  such incentives.
• Cooperative political culture among local elites. In general, chances for effective coopera-
tion is higher in societies characterized by higher levels of  interpersonal trust or other 
features associated with high social capital.
• Strong leadership. Cooperation is more frequent in areas where there is a strong, widely 
accepted political leader, who may be an engine of  joint activities. 
Other solutions which are sometimes discussed for territorially fragmented systems are less likely 
to be viable in Kosovo. They include contracting out services to private sector entities (which re-
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quires a developed market of  private providers, as well as an administration which is skilled enough 
to handle complex contractual arrangements) and purchase of  services by small local governments 
from their larger neighbors (which is perhaps even more difficult than voluntary cooperation in 
joint delivery of  services). 
Guidelines for Amalgamation Reforms
Territorially consolidated systems have many advantages but also incur a number of  risks. The 
most common arguments raised against amalgamation reforms (or more generally, against territo-
rially consolidated systems) in various countries are presented below:
• Amalgamation may lead to ethnic tensions. In countries with a diversified ethnic 
structure, amalgamation may lead to the merging of  villages inhabited by different ethnic 
groups into a single local government unit. One group might feel dominated by or, in 
fact, be dominated by another. This issue should be kept in mind when drawing up a map 
of  territorial organization. 
• Access to local (administrative) services. The distance to the central town or village 
in the municipality may be significantly greater than before amalgamation reform. This 
is one of  the typical arguments raise by opponents of  territorial reforms. The increased 
distance may be a real issue, especially in countries where roads are underdeveloped, the 
public transportation system is not very good, and in rural areas where access to private 
cars may be limited. 
 There are several solutions to reduce the effects of  this problem. Municipal (communal) 
administrations may establish local branches in individual villages, so amalgamation does 
not result in more difficult access for individual citizens. Such branches do not need to 
open on a daily basis, but should be accessible frequently enough to serve the needs of  
local citizens. This solution is technically easier nowadays, due to the widespread avail-
ability of  the Internet and other computer technologies. Original documents kept in the 
“central communal office” may be made available for use in “village branches” as well. 
• Protecting interests of  small villages that are part of  amalgamated communes or 
municipalities. The typical fear of  amalgamation is related to the possible domination 
of  the largest settlement unit; and such a fear is not only psychological, domination by the 
“communal center” over the “communal periphery” is a very real possibility. There are 
examples of  municipalities in Bulgaria where ninety percent of  councilors are recruited 
from the largest town, leaving citizens of  small villages greatly under-represented. This 
creates obvious problems for local democracy and democratic accountability, but also 
creates a risk of  biased policies. For example, the vast majority of  investment funds may 
be concentrated in the central town, while small villages remain underinvested. Such in-
equity leads to the frustration of  village communities but is also harmful to the interest 
of  the country as a whole. 
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A partial solution may be found in the electoral system. If  the system is proportional, 
with all councilors elected within one ward, strong domination by the largest settlement 
unit in the council is quite probable, even if  the population of  the town is similar to the 
aggregate population of  all villages. The danger nearly disappears in majority systems, in 
which the municipality is divided into as many wards as the number of  councilors elected. 
Such a system ensures that no part of  the municipality will be without representation, 
and that none of  the settlement units can dominate within the council or during local 
decision-making. The issue is even more controversial when the mayor is directly elected 
by all citizens. In such an instance, the more or less balanced geographical representation 
of  the local council plays a crucial role, and the council has to have the power to control 
major decisions taken by the mayor.
• Amalgamation is dangerous for local democracy. As mentioned above, in small mu-
nicipalities councilors are closer to citizens and are better informed about public prefer-
ences, and as a result, they can more easily formulate and implement policies that are clos-
er to citizens’ preferences (also because small communities are more homogenous). In 
small municipalities citizens are usually better informed about local public issues; there is 
more trust in public authorities; and citizens are more satisfied with their local politicians. 
It is difficult to refute these arguments. But one may try to minimize the disadvantages 
associated with large municipalities, and as mentioned above, institute a simple majority 
system of  election with one-councilor wards which may help to maintain links between 
voters and local representatives in enlarged local governments.
• Local identity of  villages. The choice of  territorial organization is not only a matter 
of  access to services or representation of  interests, but other concerns such as citizens’ 
pride of  their “small homelands” and identification with smaller territorial communities 
are values worthy of  protection. If  a territorially consolidated system is in place, it is 
worthwhile to consider strengthening village governments and, especially, the position 
of  village leader (village head). Further, responsibility for decisions on some functions 
can perhaps be delegated to villages. There are many international examples of  solutions 
going in that direction (decentralization within Scandinavian local governments; English 
parishes; and some positive examples of  rural local governments in Central-East Euro-
pean countries, such as Poland or Bulgaria). 
One must not forget about requirements formulated in the European Charter of  Local Self-Gov-
ernment concerning changes to municipal boundaries. In each case, the change of  boundaries (or 
annexation of  one local government by another) requires public consultations; although the con-
sultations are not necessarily binding for decision-makers, they must be conducted in accordance 
with Council of  Europe standards. 
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Large City Administration 
In transition countries capital cities, as concentrations of  economic, administrative and political power follow spe-
cific models of  decentralization to utilize the benefits of  coordinated policies and to ensure accountability.
Statement of  the Issue 
Urbanization and the Need for Metropolitan Governments
In 1950 45% of  the population of  Southern Europe lived in urban areas, whereas by 1980 it 
had increased by more than a third (62%). Today it is 66% (UNDP 2005). The United Nations 
estimates that by 2015 it will stand at 70%.1 At present, Kosovo is 45 percent urban.2 As a conse-
quence of  this rapid urbanization, the urban built-up area extended in a process of  agglomeration. 
New urban clusters were formed in which individual cities or towns were connected by continuous 
built-up development, and each city or town continued to act autonomously. Lack of  coordination 
and cooperation between individual municipalities in adjacent urban areas created a need for a new 
form of  government. 
One simple solution was the territorial expansion of  the central city by annexation and the formu-
lation of  a consolidated (one-tier) government, like with the creation of  Greater Berlin in 1920, or 
the amalgamation of  Antwerp with seven adjacent municipalities in 1983. However, because many 
municipalities resisted annexation, a new form of  government emerged, the metropolitan government. 
Under this form, individual cities retained their limited autonomy, but area-wide functions (trans-
portation, water service, etc.) were transferred to a new broader level of  government made up of  
representatives of  the newly formed area, who were either directly elected by their constituency 
or indirectly through representatives of  the individual municipalities involved. The creation of  
Metropolitan Toronto, in 1953, was the first important example of  this approach. In this case the 
province federated the city of  Toronto and its twelve suburbs as a metropolitan corporation. 
In the United States, a similar structure was introduced in Miami-Dade County, which has had a 
“two-tier federation” (city and county) since 1957. Cities are the “lower tier” of  local government 
providing police and fire protection, zoning and code enforcement, and other typical city services 
within their jurisdictions; these services are paid for by city taxes. The county is the “upper tier,” 
and it provides services of  a metropolitan nature, such as emergency management, air and sea 
port operations, public housing and health care services, transportation, environmental protection, 
solid waste disposal, etc. These services are funded by county taxes assessed on all incorporated 
and unincorporated areas.
However, unlike Miami-Dade County, the majority of  US urban areas found the metropolitan gov-
1  Southern Europe includes Albania, Andofra, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro. Slovenia, Spain, and TFYR Macedonia.  Since these latest estimates are for 2005, there are no 
UN-comparable data for Kosovo.  UNDP 2005.
2   Thus, Kosovo is less urban than the former Serbia and Montenegro, which is 52. UNDP 2005.
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ernment structure politically unacceptable because of  the limitation it places on local autonomy. 
Instead, cooperation among municipalities was achieved with the creation of  special-purpose dis-
tricts that provide specialized services (transportation, sewerage, electricity, etc.) to more than one 
municipality and are empowered to tax residents of  the district for services provided. 
Decentralization and Large City Governments
After the transition of  the 1990s, large cities represented another type of  problem for countries 
of  Central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Large cities were part of  the centralized, 
multi-layer public administration (oblast, rayon, micro-rayon). With the collapse of  the Socialist 
political system, large cities (especially capital cities) constituted a special political and administra-
tive problem depending on how committed the new political leadership was toward real decen-
tralization. The concern was that autonomous large cities, with their concentrations of  economic, 
administrative and political power, might play a destabilizing political role in an immature demo-
cratic system. 
The political weight of  large cities has greatly increased in the countries of  the Baltic, the former 
republic of  Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, as the share of  the population living in the capital cities 
of  these newly formed countries typically exceeds 20%, but in some cases even 30% (32% in Riga, 
Latvia; 39% in Tallinn, Estonia; 40% in Tirana, Albania). 
Capital Cities: Special Laws
Capital cities, as centers of  political power and administrative authority, are special cases that require 
special legislation. A country’s economic power is frequently concentrated in its capital city, which 
simultaneously serves as the core of  its political identity and legitimacy. Most of  the countries in 
the region introduced special legislation related to capital (and large) cities, not merely because 
of  their special political and economic role, but also because of  the overlapping responsibilities 
of  government and capital cities. The laws on capital cities define the political and administrative 
structure of  the capitals, and their relation to higher levels of  government (regional and central). 
Decentralized City Structure: Arguments 
For and Against 
There are very strong arguments for decentralized governing structures in large cities.  Large cities are 
composed of  urban (and sometimes rural/suburban) areas with different social, economic and 
residential character, thus local preferences can be very different across the various parts of  the 
city. The suburban districts in Belgrade or the outer districts of  Budapest struggle with very differ-
ent problems than their inner district counterparts. The subdivision of  large cities into units with 
direct political representation (own local governments) allows for more emphasis to be given to 
the unique features or particular needs of  different urban neighborhoods and—according to the 
public choice theory—could lead to better solutions in public service provision. 
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In a decentralized system, individual districts based on local self-government will compete with 
one another in a sense to provide the best local services at the lowest local rate of  taxes. Within a 
fair regulatory framework, this competition will result in better services for the entire city. In Bu-
dapest, different inner districts have developed different rehabilitation strategies—an example of  
districts competing and learning from one another. 
This competition between districts has lowered the risk of  reform failure that a one-program-for-
all solution always presents. In the same way, decentralized systems have more room for innovative 
solutions than the typically more bureaucratic organization of  a unitary large city. An additional 
argument in favor of  decentralized systems is that smaller sub-units of  a city have greater political 
legitimacy and increase accountability of  the leadership to their constituency. 
Decentralization, however, could lead to a fragmented city structure, in which citizens living in differ-
ent parts of  the city do not have the same access to public services. Citizens of  a large city expect 
the same standards for basic services (such as water, electricity, education, social services, etc.), 
and large differences in the quality of  and/or access to services would be politically unacceptable. 
Broad autonomy for districts of  large cities could easily result in such inequalities in service deliv-
ery, which are caused partly by different management approaches and partly by the economic and 
social composition of  the sub-city units. 
A fragmented city structure could increase the social polarization of  the city, with the poor segre-
gated in the worse part of  the city. One extreme illustration of  such polarization, the practice of  
some wealthy districts in Budapest, is for district authorities to offer housing in other less affluent 
districts to poor or problematic residents. 
However, the strongest argument against decentralization is that the provision of  most area-wide 
services is much more efficient in a unitary city (economies of  scale). Water services, sewerage, 
public transportation, etc., can be much more easily provided in a one-tier government than in a 
multilevel government structure. 
There is no perfect solution, as the appropriate governing structure of  large cities will depend on 
several specific factors: the nature of  public services, the size and location of  the city, the history 
of  cooperation among municipalities, and other factors.  
Models, Differences in Approaches, Variants 
The experiences of  many countries with the organization of  local self-governments in large cities 
suggest three predominant models:
1. The polycentric model is composed of  different numbers of  independent municipalities 
which have the same rights and duties. There is no central authority; the cooperation 
between municipalities is voluntary. Cities organized according to the polycentric model 
have difficulty providing basic services of  equal quality at an equal price. Planning, espe-
cially of  the infrastructure, is very difficult, and rivalries between the municipalities may 
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develop. 
2. The unitary model is “traditional” and composed of  a single authority. There are no munici-
palities below the city level. Cities organized according to the traditional unitary model, 
through annexation, lose sight of  the particular interests of  the city’s particular parts. As 
the city encompasses surrounding municipalities, its administration is increased and thus 
a greater centralization of  power occurs.
3. The two-level model is a combination of the above two models and is composed of  one 
central authority and a various number of  sub-systems, often referred to as blocks. The 
two-level model, theoretically at least, offers the advantages of  the polycentric and uni-
tary models without their disadvantages by having one main municipality with several 
blocks subordinated to it. However, in practice, their cooperation is frequently called into 
question due to lack of  clearly defined and assigned competences. 
While the conceptual differences are clear between these ideal types, in reality the actual models 
are not easy to categorize. The governing structures of  large cities in CEE/fSU countries tend 
to move towards a certain type of  two-level model. Nearly every capital city in the region has a 
second level of  government, the second or district level, which is vested with certain rights and 
represents a form of  administrative decentralization or sub-city government. 
Tallinn, a capital city of  438,000, is a good example of  administrative decentralization. Tallinn has 
eight districts with very limited autonomy that serve as local decentralized units of  the central 
city administration. The districts have indirectly elected councils. The Tallinn Statute regulates the 
relationship between the city government and its districts. It is very significant that the districts’ 
budgets are part of  the city budget, as with any other city-level budgetary department. However, 
the districts have quite broad responsibilities, in the areas of  education, culture and public main-
tenance, and are also responsible for central city services in communal and social areas (i.e. street 
maintenance, water issues, local business promotion, etc.). The district authorities organize and 
collect taxes (advertisement tax) on outdoor media in their districts. They also have to organize and 
maintain parks and other green areas in their district. 
Budapest is a good illustration of  the sub-municipality model of  two-level government.  The capital 
city has 1.7 million inhabitants and 23 district governments that enjoy the same status and rights as 
other local governments in Hungary. The city government has different responsibilities (city-wide 
services such as public transportation, district heating, water, etc.) than the districts (housing, basic 
health services, education, etc.), and there is no hierarchical relation between the city and district 
governments. Districts have their own budgets and  own revenues (including certain local taxes). 
A revenue-sharing scheme radically diminishes the horizontal inequality among the districts. The 
districts have their own directly elected mayors and councils, who enjoy sound legitimacy. 
The Law on the City of  Skopje was passed in 2005, after four years of  preparation. A major debate 
prior to the passing of  the law was whether districts in Skopje have the same rights as municipali-
ties in Macedonia, which was one interpretation of  the Constitution. The law on Skopje defined 
the special status of  the ten districts and conferred upon them rather broad responsibilities, in-
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cluding elementary education, social services, local roads and parks, etc. The districts have own 
revenues (local taxes and user charges), which they must share with the city government. Mayors 
and council members are directly elected. A coordinating body comprised of  mayors helps to en-
courage cooperation between districts and the city government.
In the 1980s, after a wave of  creating metropolitan governments, the trend towards decentraliza-
tion intensified. There was a demand to strengthen the local representation of  neighborhoods, which are 
typically smaller than districts. The starting point in Europe was the need for public participation 
in urban rehabilitation programs, which led to the formation of  the sub-municipality structure. 
There are two types of  approaches to neighborhoods: (1) the neighborhood initiated organization 
and (2) the city initiated organization. 
In 1999, for example, Los Angeles approved the concept of  neighborhood councils. Neighborhood 
councils are designed to give community members a forum for addressing issues in their neighbor-
hood, as well as the capacity to improve their neighborhoods. A special department, the Depart-
ment of  Neighborhood Empowerment, helps the work of  the spontaneously formed neighbor-
hood councils. In Europe, Amsterdam’s first neighborhoods were established in the early 1980s. 
Amsterdam-Noord and Osdorp were the first to have their own authorities with extensive inde-
pendent powers, with their own budget and team of  civil servants. The idea was that neighbor-
hood authorities like these would contribute to more efficient and effective decision-making, and 
that people would be more involved in local government. The experiment in Amsterdam-Noord 
and Osdorp went well and in the years that followed the number of  neighborhood councils in-
creased to sixteen. 
Several countries now make it possible for large cities to set up sub-district units of  government, 
which can guarantee a higher level of  local participation and legitimacy. In Hungary, for example, 
the sub-local governments in Budapest typically represent homogeneous residential areas having a 
common history. Their operation (scope of  responsibility and financing) depend entirely on local 
council decision. The sub-municipalities of  ethnic and national minorities are organized under lo-
cal governments but not on a residential basis. 
The governing structure of  large cities in the CEE/fSU region has been continuously changing 
because of  macroeconomic and sectoral changes. The importance of  intergovernmental (city–region 
–country) cooperation and public-private partnerships has increased, especially in the EU accession coun-
tries. New models of  cooperation are typically sector-specific. Efficient public transportation, for 
example, requires the cooperation of  the typically state-owned railway, long-distance bus company, 
and city-controlled local public transportation companies. In the case of  privatization, this model 
has to have a PPP element as well. 
In Budapest, after fifteen years of  transition, the Budapest Transportation Association is only now 
in its first stage of  development as transport conditions are standardized in different segments. 
The Parking Association is another example of  intergovernmental (city and district) cooperation 
in Budapest, which aims to offer a standardized parking services and fee system, and sharing of  
revenues among participating district local governments. 
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A new element in intergovernmental relations is the emergence of  regions in CEE/fSU countries. The 
relation between region and large city is a key question, which mirrors the problem of  relations 
between the government structure of  a large city and its adjacent urban/rural areas. Typically, large 
cities have the same rights as regions, as in Warsaw, Prague, and (federation) Moscow, although 
some are part of  a region, which again raises the issue of  cooperation between the region (not 
including the large city) and the large city. Some form of  metropolitan government can help to 
integrate the municipal governments of  the region. 
Regional governments have been criticized for their large size and, as cities have less influence 
over the decision-making process, a new form of  government, the city region, has been proffered to 
replace the dominance of  the region. The city region encompasses the administrative area of  a city 
(conurbation) and its hinterland. The extent of  a city region is usually proportional to the intensity 
of  activity in and around the main city center. In a German context, the Lander of  Berlin, Bremen 
and Hamburg qualify as city regions because of  their historical and constitutional status as “free 
cities.” In the United Kingdom, city regions have been offered as an alternative to regional assem-
blies. In the East Midlands, the three major cities of  Nottingham, Leicester and Derby with their 
connected hinterlands form a city region of  2.6 million people, which has established a partner-
ship including the Government Office of  the East Midlands and the East Midland Development 
Agency with several sub-regional programs. 
Assessment of  Options 
There is no real unidirectional trend in the governance of  large cites, as economic and political effi-
ciency can be reached under different governing structures. The basic choice facing decision-mak-
ers is whether sub-city units will have the same legal status as local governments in the country, or 
will their existence depend exclusively on the law of  the city. Warsaw (before 2002) and Budapest 
are examples of  the first option, while Tallinn and Prague are examples of  the second. 
In the first option, the operation of  government can be complex and costly, and may involve the 
risk of  political conflict between the tiers. Thus voluntary cooperation between the two tiers be-
comes crucial, and the risk of  reforms failing due to non-cooperative behavior is high. However, 
with their incentive structure and closer relation to the voters, local (district-level) solutions are 
more radical and more efficient. Horizontal inequality among districts has to be diminished by a 
well-designed equalization grant.
In the second option, the level of  decentralization depends on the special design of  the sub-
city units. The districts have dual accountability (both to the city government, on whom their 
responsibilities and revenues depend, and to their constituencies). The advantage is political and 
administrative simplicity, which is guaranteed by the fact that city governments (through financial 
incentives) can enforce cooperation among district governments. The disadvantage is the dual ac-
countability, and specifically, the weakness of  local participation. 
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An evaluation of  the policy options should take into consideration the actual expenditure and 
revenue assignments of  the different levels with special emphasis on how much autonomy the de-
cision-making bodies have. The crucial question on the revenue side is whether the district govern-
ment has local tax revenues (or user charges) that could contribute to the political accountability of  
decision-makers, and prevent a one-sided rent-seeking attitude. On the expenditure side, property 
management is a key issue; namely, whether the district government has autonomy over property 
management (and at least partly enjoys the revenue from it), or not.  
Lessons from Transition and Developing Countries 
Large city administration in CEE/fSU countries displays wide variation, but in individual cases 
three factors play a very important role in the formation of  the governing structure of  large cit-
ies. 
The first factor is the political choice in relation to the political decentralization of  the large cities 
and their sub-city districts. In some cities in the region, mayors are not directly elected, and the 
government retains some degree of  discretion over the political control of  the large (especially 
capital) city. However, a basic political question independent of  the chosen model is the territo-
rial structure of  the city. Territorial changes (number of  districts, change of  border, etc.) typically 
require changes to the Constitution. 
The second factor concerns the existing institutions and institutional solutions. In the decentraliza-
tion process, it is very rare that new institutions are built up from scratch: the typical solution is the 
step-by-step modification of  the existing system. Therefore, the development of  systems is mostly 
pragmatic and evolutionary. And in this respect, sometimes the law or the implementation of  the 
law changes the institutional structure. 
The third factor is the sector-by-sector structural changes made in response to the challenges of  
transition, accession to the EU, and globalization trends. Sectoral changes influence decentraliza-
tion by redefining the role of  the different levels of  government and the private sector. For ex-
ample, the privatization of  the primary health sector (GP) in Hungary practically eliminated the 
role of  local governments in this area. 
On the basis of  experience, the reform of  large city administration should follow these steps:
1.   Make the basic policy choice on the political structure of  the city (territorial consideration, 
region-city-district relation).
2.   Define the tasks (on the basis of  analyses of  the different sectors of  the city) that can be 
transferred to the lowest level of  government (proposal should be pragmatic and evolu-
tionary).
3.   Define the revenue assignment of  the city and districts (based on the law on local gov-
ernment finance). Consider giving some revenue autonomy to the lowest level without 
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risking the creation of  high inequity in the city.
4. Design a budget system that includes an equalization element.
5. Consider the possibility of  the neighborhood association as a sub-district unit with 
    limited local responsibility.
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NGO and Government Partnership
Under the existing legal and financial regulations in Kosovo, municipalities have to develop better cooperation with 
non-governmental organizations at local level.
Role of  Non-Governmental Organizations 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a significant role in every country. They perform 
multiple functions, and fulfill the vacuum left by other sectors of  society: 
a) NGOs deliver a variety of  human services, from health care and education to social services and 
community development. They are well known for identifying and addressing unmet needs, for 
innovating, for delivering services of  exceptional quality, and for serving those in greatest need.
b) NGOs have indispensable capacity in identifying unaddressed problems and bringing them to 
public attention, in protecting basic human rights, and in giving voice to a wide assortment of  so-
cial, political, environmental, ethnic, and community interests and concerns. NGOs are key players 
to push for changes in government policy or in societal conditions. Their advocacy role is vital, as 
they are in a position to serve as a link between individuals and the broader political process, pro-
viding a way to bring group concerns to broader public attention and to push for policy or broader 
social change. In this direction, NGOs are crucial mechanisms for providing space and tools to the 
minorities in the decision-making process. 
c) NGOs do community building, in creating what scholars are increasingly coming to call “social 
capital,” those bonds of  trust and reciprocity that seem to be crucial for a democratic polity and a 
market economy to function effectively. By establishing connections among individuals, involve-
ment in associations teaches norms of  cooperation that carry over into political and economic 
life. NGOs also perform a broader expressive function, providing the vehicles through which an 
enormous variety of  other sentiments and impulses—artistic, religious, cultural, ethnic, social, 
recreational—also find expression. 
An essential condition for the emergence and development of  effective NGOs and a dynamic 
civil society is a legal framework that guarantees free association and assembly. These freedoms 
are already fundamental components of  many liberal constitutions in countries in all regions of  
the world.
Legal Framework of  the NGO Sector 
The basic legal document that regulates registration and operation of  NGOs in Kosovo is UN-
MIK Regulation 1999/22 on the Registration and Operation of  Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions. With the term “non-governmental organization,” the regulation refers to an association, 
society, foundation, charitable trust, non-profit corporation, or other juridical person that is not 
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regarded as part of  government and that is not operated for profit—viz., if  any profits are earned, 
they are not and cannot be distributed as such. The regulation’s definition of  non-governmental 
organization does not include trade unions, political parties, profit-distributing cooperatives, or 
churches. 
The regulation fully recognizes the right of  individuals to associate and work together for a com-
mon interest and public good. If  an association wishes to form a legal entity separate from the 
legal personality of  its members, the regulation provides simple procedures to do so. For example, 
only three persons are required to register an association, whereas one person is needed for a 
foundation. 
Other positive features of  the NGO regulation are that both physical and legal persons have the 
right to form non-governmental organizations, and that it recognizes foreign and international 
NGOs and regulates their registration and operation in Kosovo.
Under the regulation, the government has very limited powers to deny registration of  an NGO, as 
the reasons for denying registration are clearly enumerated. Moreover, the regulation does not re-
quire NGOs to register; NGOs need only register if  they wish to operate as legal entities. A further 
stipulation requires that the registration authority issue a registration certificate—or if  registration 
is denied then an explanation for the denial—within 60 working days of  receipt of  an application 
to register. One of  the weaknesses of  the NGO registration system is that inactive NGOs are not 
automatically removed from the registry. 
The NGO regulation acknowledges the registration of  two types of  organizations: (1) NGOs 
whose purpose is for public benefit; and (2) NGOs such as professional associations that are 
formed for the mutual benefit. In general, NGO founders have significant freedom to decide on 
their organization’s governing structure. NGOs that obtain public benefit status are released from 
paying tax on custom duties, as well as from other tax and fiscal obligations.
Finally, the regulation gives NGOs the right to engage in economic activities that support the 
organization’s goals. NGOs are permitted to generate income from any lawful activity, and to man-
age their own property in furtherance of  their statutory purposes. 
NGOs and Churches 
Religious groups have the right to establish themselves as NGOs. Most of  the newly registered 
religious groups in Kosovo are registered as NGOs, in order to operate as legal entities. The more 
traditional religious communities in Kosovo, such as the Islamic Community, Orthodox Church, and 
Catholic Church, tend to operate as legal entities based on the former Yugoslav legislation. However, 
PISG and UNMIK are currently working for adoption of  the new law on religious communities that 
would strengthen religious freedom, and prepare a more favorable legal environment for more active 
involvement of  religious organizations in society. However, even now, religious organizations as legal 
entities have the right to establish NGOs, and engage in all kinds of  lawful activities. 
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Tax Regulations Affecting NGOs 
Tax Exemptions. Registered NGOs with public benefit status are exempt from the profit tax to the 
extent that the income is used exclusively to further the organization’s public benefit purposes 
(Section 5(a), Profit Tax Regulation). This includes income derived from foreign grants and dona-
tions. 
Deductibility of  Charitable Contributions. Donations by legal entities and individuals made for hu-
manitarian, health, educational, religious, scientific, cultural, environmental protection, and sports 
purposes may be deducted from income up to a maximum of  5% of  taxable income (Section 9, 
Corporate Income Tax Regulation; Section 16, Personal Income Tax Regulation). The donation 
must be made to an NGO that has received and maintained public benefit status or to “any other 
non-commercial organizations that directly perform activities in the public interest and not-for-
profit,” including medical, educational, and other specified types of  institutions (Section 9.2, Cor-
porate Income Tax Regulation; Section 16.2, Personal Income Tax Regulation). 
Deductions are not allowed if  a contribution directly benefits a person related to the donor. An 
NGO is prohibited from accepting more than €1,000 from a single source per day, unless it re-
ceives a written exemption. An NGO is required to disclose in its annual report any source of  
contribution that exceeds €5,000 per year (Sections 4.1, 4.3, and 4.6, Regulation 2004/2 on the 
Deterrence of  Money Laundering and Related Criminal Offences). 
Value Added and Turnover Taxes. The standard VAT rate is 15%. NGOs with public benefit status 
do not have preferential status under VAT regulation. 
Property Tax. A tax is levied on all immovable property in Kosovo. Municipal assemblies annually 
set the rate of  the property tax, which can vary between .05% and 1% of  the market value of  
immovable property. NGOs with public benefit status are exempt from property tax, provided 
that they use the property exclusively for their stated public benefit purposes. Exemption is also 
extended to foreign donor agencies carrying on work in the fields of  humanitarian aid, reconstruc-
tion, civil administration, or technical assistance, as well as religious institutions approved by the 
municipalities in agreement with the Tax Administration, if  their property is used for religious 
purposes. 
Size of  NGO Sector
A favorable legal environment for registration of  NGOs and the affluence of  international donor 
funding after the war resulted in rapid growth of  the NGO sector. There are today over 2,500 
registered NGOs in Kosovo, although it is estimated that only 10% are active. Many experts hold 
the number of  registered NGOs in Kosovo to be quite high, but in comparison with other CEE 
countries this does not appear to be the case—the Czech Republic, with a population of  10 mil-
lion, has over 95,000 registered NGOs.  
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The NGO community in Kosovo is quite diverse. NGOs provide a variety of  services, especially 
basic services such as health care, education, relief, housing, water and energy. In other areas such 
as economic development, environmental protection and governance, the number of  non-gov-
ernmental service providers is small but growing. The advocacy role of  NGOs in Kosovo is also 
expanding. 
Forms of  Cooperation between Government and NGOs
Government support. In Western European countries direct government financing is an important 
source of  income for the non-profit sector, on average government financing in these countries 
constitutes 40–60% of  the sector’s total income. 
Central and local governments in Kosovo do provide support to NGOs, but unfortunately data is 
unavailable on the level or extent of  support provided. However, information from organizations 
working with local governments—such as Mercy Corps International, Community Development 
Fund (CDF), Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, and the World Bank—indicates that local 
governments are indeed financially supporting these community groups (NGOs), especially in 
building and repairing infrastructure.
The activities of  formal NGOs in Kosovo are mostly funded by international donors; although, 
over the past few years both central and local governments have begun distributing small grants. 
NGOs more often receive in-kind support from municipalities, usually in the form of  free-of- 
charge premises belonging to municipalities. The Multi-ethnic Children and Youth Peace Centre 
in Mitrovica and the Roma Women’s Center in Prizren, for example, receive office space free of  
charge from their respective municipalities.
Government contracting. Through this type of  cooperation, an NGO obtains the right and obligation 
to perform activities (tasks and services) that traditionally fall within the competence of  the state. 
The assignor (a central or local authority) provides financial support to the assignee (an NGO) as 
a subsidy or as a consideration under the contract. As an alternative, the government can provide 
in-kind assistance, such as premises or other support in its capacity of  a contracting party. Coop-
eration is of  particular importance in providing social services. 
For two years now, beginning with the enactment of  the Law on Public Procurement, NGOs in 
Kosovo are in a better position to compete for government contracts to provide goods and ser-
vices. The number of  NGOs receiving grants and contracts from the government has increased 
accordingly. 
NGO participation in local government decision-making. UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on Self-Govern-
ment of  Municipalities in Kosovo provides a progressive framework for public participation at 
municipal level. It establishes a number of  requirements for public involvement in the local deci-
sion-making process and stipulates that municipalities adopt implementing legislation.
The UNMIK regulation on self-government requires municipalities to observe several minimal 
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requirements regarding public involvement in municipal decision-making:
• Meetings of  the municipal assembly and its committees must be open to the public, in-
cluding representatives of  the press.
• Persons must be allowed to inspect documents held by the municipality.
• A municipality must hold at least two public meetings each year. The date and place of  
the meeting is to be publicized at least two weeks in advance.
• A right to petition the municipal assembly about any matter within the powers and re-
sponsibilities of  the municipality must be guaranteed.
Importantly, under the regulation on self-government, municipal assemblies (the highest repre-
sentative bodies of  municipalities) must adopt a statute that regulates the implementation of  the 
responsibilities established by the regulation. The statute, among other things, must provide that 
municipal regulations are adopted only after publication of  draft regulations and public consulta-
tions. 
Municipalities may provide for additional mechanisms of  public participation by regulation or stat-
ute. The municipalities of  Gjakova, Deçan, and Vitia, for example, have adopted municipal regula-
tions that provide several mechanisms for promoting public participation. The statutes go some 
way towards expanding upon the requirements set forth in the regulation on self-government, but 
fail to provide clear guidelines on how citizens may take advantage of  various opportunities to 
participate. 
The statutes provide that the municipality may use several different enumerated types of  public 
consultation, as well as any others that may be appropriate in a given context. The municipality 
must provide a reasoned justification of  the choice of  public consultation. It must allow adequate 
time for participation and, before making any final decision, must take into account and make 
public the outcome of  the consultation or participation. The president of  the municipality and all 
committees of  the municipal assembly have authority to arrange for public consultations on mat-
ters within their competencies, and must publicize the form of  consultation at least fourteen days 
in advance and allow adequate time for public comment.
The regulation on self  government also provides that municipalities must use at least four separate 
types of  public consultation before adopting a municipal regulation: (1) information campaigns; 
(2) contacts with focus groups and interested parties; (3) public notice and comment period; and 
(4) impact assessment studies.
Despite a forward-looking legal framework that’s favorable toward public participation, a lack of  
understanding prevails among municipal officials, civil society groups and the public in general of  
the opportunities available for participating in municipal decision-making processes in Kosovo. 
Only three of  the thirty municipalities in Kosovo have established proper rules, procedures, and 
guidelines for public consultation and participation—and even these are not applied with sufficient 
frequency. 
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Main Obstacles to Local Social Partnership  
Taking into account the capacities of  the NGO sector, the tradition of  civic participation built 
during the 1990s, and the favorable legal basis, we cannot be very satisfied with the level of  social 
partnership at local level in Kosovo. There are a number of  different explanations, of  which the 
most acute are:
• Low level of  NGO accountability. (Although many well-known NGOs that receive fund-
ing from international donors have learned what it means to be accountable to donors.)
• Insufficient development of  mechanisms for outsourcing services to the NGO sector.
• Absence of  legal recognition of  sub-municipal units of  government.
• Lack of  conformity between laws and regulations governing NGOs with public benefit 
status and tax laws; implementation is especially inconsistent.
• Unsatisfactory use of  the work of  volunteers, caused by (1) absence of  legal recognition 
of  volunteer work, and (2) inadequate incentives provided by NGOs for encouraging 
people to volunteer. 
Lacking a Sub-municipal Level 
Over half  the population of  Kosovo lives in villages. Unfortunately, due to the election rules, 
and the formal absence of  sub-municipal units of  government, much of  this population is not 
properly represented and does not receive services to which it is entitled. Many village representa-
tives report that their villages are neglected by larger settlements, which are responsible for many 
aspects of  their service delivery. 
Many villages in Kosovo have no voice in municipal assemblies, as they have no representatives 
elected to the assemblies. Indeed, in many municipalities there are more villages than assembly 
members; while in other municipalities some villages may have three representatives and other 
villages none. 
Such a state of  affairs is especially unacceptable in Kosovo, as it has a long tradition of  sub-mu-
nicipal structures called bashkёsia lokale/mesna zajednica (BL), by which citizens were able to satisfy 
most of  their basic needs (culture, education, local development). 
After the abolition of  Kosovo’s autonomy in 1998, the Albanians developed parallel social struc-
tures (education, culture, social welfare), which were not part of  government institutions. In this 
context, an informal local NGO sector developed very rapidly, and replaced public functions. The 
NGO sector was very active and mostly financed from local sources until the beginning of  the 
war in Kosovo. Although most of  the NGOs were ethnically Albanian, they were oriented toward 
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helping the whole of  society in the area of  social services, human rights, and gender issues. 
During those years, volunteerism flourished, and nearly every adult Kosovar was engaged in a 
volunteer activity. The tradition of  BL grew, and Kosovo developed very early strong partnership 
with those sub-municipal structures. It would be difficult to imagine the operation of  the Mother 
Theresa Society network without the strong support of  BL activists, or the presence of  the Coun-
cil for the Defense of  Human Rights and Freedoms in every village in Kosovo without the active 
use of  BL resources, the basic units of  the government that it managed to retain. 
Conclusion
Kosovo is in a favorable position as far as the tradition and the newly established legal environ-
ment for NGOs is concerned. The public in general appreciates the work of  NGOs, especially 
taking into account the fact that we as a nation were able to survive the Milosevic regime with the 
smart and prompt development of  the NGO sector. Nearly all inhabitants have had some kind 
of  experience with the nonprofit sector, including present governmental officers, and there is a 
friendly environment for building strong partnership between the NGO sector and government. 
A proper relationship with the NGO sector requires proper organization of  local democracy. 
In this regard, we are in an advantageous position, with a rich tradition of  BL (sub-municipal 
structures) and a favorable legal basis. The UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on Self-Government of  
Municipalities in Kosovo (Section 5) provides the legal basis for municipalities to establish coop-
eration with villages, settlements, and urban quarters. This provision is quite broad and could be 
interpreted as allowing municipalities to establish sub-municipal structures for carrying out activi-
ties within the sphere of  municipal responsibilities. Section 6 of  the same regulation provides for 
municipal cooperation with NGOs that provide services in areas within the general responsibility 
of  the municipality. 
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Local Government and the Right to 
Freedom of  Association
Association of  local governments in Kosovo is critical for effective advocacy and efficient service provision.
The right of  municipalities to association and mutual cooperation is vital to the integrity and ef-
fective operation of  local governments. In this briefing note, the terms association and cooperation are 
used to refer to two types of  associations of  local governments:
1. Political associations of  municipalities established for advocacy purposes, representing 
and defending interests of  municipalities, and also for providing services to their mem-
bers (e.g. information, training); and 
2. Technical, service-oriented associations for delivery of  public services. 
 
European Charter of  Local Self-Government
The European Charter of  Local Self-Government of  1985,1 of  the Council of  Europe, demon-
strates the far-reaching consensus of  European states on the importance of  local self-government. 
Article 10 of  the charter, on Local Authorities’ Right to Associate, recognizes the right of  local 
authorities to cooperate and to associate with other local authorities of  the same or another state. 
The right to associate is an important aspect of  the development of  local autonomy; and the inde-
pendence of  associations of  local authorities from state influence strengthens local government. 
The first paragraph of  Article 10 is a broad guarantee of  local authorities right to association. 
Paragraph 1 reads: Local authorities shall be entitled, in exercising their powers, to cooperate and, within the 
framework of  the law, to form consortia with other local authorities in order to carry out tasks of  common interest. 
This paragraph provides for cooperation between local authorities on a functional basis, and there-
fore, under this provision local authorities may, through joint projects with other municipalities, 
seek greater efficiency or perform tasks that are beyond the capacity of  a single authority. Such 
cooperation may take the form of  the creation of  consortia or other kinds of  partnership of  self-
government authorities. 
In order to facilitate the right of  local authorities to association, states ratifying the Charter are 
encouraged to develop an enabling legal framework. The right in most countries is codified in laws 
(Belgium, Spain, France) and sometimes even in constitutions (Greece, Poland, Portugal). 
Paragraph 2 of  Article 10 states: The entitlement of  local authorities to belong to an association for the protec-
tion and promotion of  their common interests and to belong to an international association of  local authorities shall 
be recognized by each State. The creation of  associations of  local authorities, as provided by paragraph 
2, is decided for general purposes and not on a functional basis. 
1  The full text of  the Charter is available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/122.htm.
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Local governments may cooperate with their respective level counterparts in other countries; how-
ever, the manner of  such cooperation must respect any laws and regulations as may exist in each 
country and take place within the framework of  the powers of  the authorities in question.2 
Associations of  local governments serve primarily three aims:
• Advocacy: promoting the interests of  local authorities. 
• Service provision: delivering services to local authorities; e.g., training, databases.
• Communication: serving as a platform where municipalities meet. The three directions 
of  communication are: (a) communication between municipalities for the exchange of  
ideas and best practices; (b) bottom-up communication, ideas formulated at local level 
are communicated to central level; and (c) top-down communication,  ideas about new 
legislation are communicated to local level.
It is important to emphasize that an association of  local governments also has a political dimen-
sion. In defending the interests of  municipalities, an association of  local governments should not 
however be likened to an interest group, for an association does not represent specific groups pur-
suing particular economic or professional ends but represents all citizens served by the member 
local governments. 
As a general rule, an association represents all local authorities of  a particular kind on a regional 
or national basis. However, the official Explanatory Report of  the Charter explicitly states that the 
right to belong to associations of  this type does not imply central government recognition of  any 
individual association as a valid interlocutor.
Inter-municipal Cooperation 
Inter-municipal cooperation is a well-suited means for local governments to increase their capacity 
to carry out their growing tasks and responsibilities, without sacrificing autonomy and identity, as 
is necessary with far-reaching amalgamations (see briefing note “Joint Service Delivery”). 
As municipal responsibilities become increasingly complex and demanding, municipalities should 
continually seek out the best way to provide the services needed by their communities. One tool 
to assist in addressing this challenge is the establishment of  different types of  intergovernmental 
cooperation. Such cooperation is quite attractive, since its goal is more effective and efficient lo-
cal government functioning. However, forms of  cooperation of  local government require careful 
design, in order that they strictly observe the main purpose of  their existence: to serve the public 
interest, i.e., the interests of  the citizens.
The functioning of  an association is improved if  higher levels of  government do not interfere to a 
great extent in its decision-making processes and voting procedures. An association can strengthen 
its managerial capacity by recruiting an autonomous and professional managerial team, that is 
2  It should also be mentioned that the provisions of the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Ter-                 
ritorial Communities or Authorities of  21 May 1980 applies to this type of  cooperation, although some forms need not be restricted to 
frontier areas. The full text of  the Convention is available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/106.htm.
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bound by performance contracts including negotiated standards of  service. 
The role of  national legislation should be limited to ensuring that noncompliance with financial 
payments is dealt with effectively, assuming that all partners contribute resources. It is also pos-
sible, even practical, to grant taxing and borrowing powers to associations; however, the granting 
of  such powers is a sensitive issue, requiring careful consideration to ensure that the principles of  
accountability and representation are observed.
An important part of  a local government association is its governing document. The governing 
document, in addition to defining the scope of  the association, should also clearly identify the func-
tions and responsibilities of  partners; determine performance expectations; circulate trustworthy 
information among partners; and establish managerial structures and accountability lines—includ-
ing mechanisms for joint evaluation of  results. An association should also develop an adequate 
management reporting scheme to partners, donors and citizens.
Cross-Border and International Cooperation of  
Municipalities in Kosovo
Individual municipalities and associations of  municipalities in Kosovo have the right to cooper-
ate internationally but must do so in accordance with the law.3 In this regard, municipalities are 
required to notify the central government of  any international cooperation agreements, which are 
subject to supervision of  legality.
Cooperation with municipalities from other countries may take different forms, such as cross-
border cooperation (e.g., regional partnerships, “Euroregions”), international twinning programs, 
membership to international municipal associations, city to city partnerships. 
Present Associations of  Municipalities in Kosovo
Despite a sound legal basis for establishment of  municipal associations, UNMIK and PISG have 
not always been ready to agree to the establishment of  such independent entities. When the As-
sociation of  Kosovo Municipalities (AMK) was formed, UNMIK hesitated for several months 
before registering it. It was formed at the beginning of  UNMIK rule4 in Kosovo, and it was quite 
difficult for UNMIK to accept the existence of  any institutions in Kosovo that were not under its 
supervision. However, with the support of  the Council of  Europe and OSCE, UNMIK in the end 
conceded to registering the association, which operates today as a legal entity in Kosovo.
The AMK was established (i) to provide a forum for cooperation and joint action between munici-
palities and with the central ministries, and (ii) to promote the principles of  the European Charter 
of  Local Self-Government. The AMK has observer status in the Congress of  Local and Regional 
Authorities in Europe and is a member of  the Network of  Associations of  Local Authorities in 
3  International cooperation between municipalities must accord with all of  the following: Kosovar legislation, relevant municipal stat-
utes and/or statutes of  associations, as well as the statutes of  the relevant international partner municipality(ies) or association(s). 
4  The Association of  Kosovo Municipalities was established on 30 June 2001.
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South-East Europe. Policy papers developed by the AMK are already contributing to donor strate-
gies and improved local-central dialogue. These include statements (particularly on youth, gender 
and social housing issues) to promote European standards of  performance for local government 
in relation to gender balance and minority inclusion.
In January 2003, the representatives of  the municipalities of  Zvecan, Zubin Potok, Leposavic and 
Kosovska Mitrovica formed the Union of  Serb Municipalities in Kosovo. UNMIK criticized its 
establishment, and considered it an attempt to divide Kosovo into Serb and Albanian populated 
areas. However, the Union is clearly consistent with the spirit of  the European Charter. 
Up to now, no information has been made public about whether the Union has applied for regis-
tration at the Ministry for Public Services. Nonetheless, the Union is quite active, and is presently 
calling for a boycott of  Kosovar institutions by all Serbs in Kosovo. The situation is aggravating, 
and the Union has even taken upon itself  to impose a “state of  emergency” in the municipalities 
populated by Serbs.
Even though it is quite difficult to cooperate with Serbian dominated municipalities, more effort 
should be made to encourage the Union of  Serb Municipalities in Kosovo to register. There is also 
a need to educate the municipalities populated by Serbs about the enabling legal framework that 
exists in Kosovo. In addition, the international community, and especially EU countries, should 
continue to pressure the government of  Serbia to allow Serbs in Kosovo the autonomy to decide 
for themselves how they would like to cooperate, and the types of  municipal cooperation they 
would like to establish.
Issues at the Kosovo Final Status Negotiations5
In May 2005, Mr. Kofi A. Annan, UN secretary general, appointed the Norwegian Ambassador 
Kai Eide as his special envoy to undertake a comprehensive review of  the situation in Kosovo. The 
purpose of  the review was to assess whether the conditions were in place to enter into a political 
process designed to determine the future status of  Kosovo, in accordance with Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999). In the beginning of  October 2005, Ambassador Eide submitted a detailed 
report on Kosovo’s progress in implementing a set of  internationally endorsed standards, covering 
eight areas—including democratic institutions, the rule of  law, human and minority rights, refugee 
returns, economic development and Pristina-Belgrade dialogue. Despite the fact that Ambassador 
Eide concluded in his report that “standards implementation in Kosovo has been uneven,” he 
recommended to proceed with the discussions on status.6
In his report, Ambassador Eide considers decentralization a necessary tool for achieving a sustain-
able return of  minorities. According to him, a broad decentralization process, similar to those in 
Macedonia and the Presheve (Presevo) Valley (southern Serbia), will be necessary in order to create 
5  For more discussion, see Belgrade/Pristina Proposals for Minority Protection, Local Self-Government Reforms—Any Progress? available on the 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy’s website at http://www.gcsp.ch/E/meetings/Issues_Institutions/Europe/Meeting_Conf/2006/
Minorities-Kosovo/Deda.pdf.
6  For a comprehensive review of  the situation in Kosovo, see Annan’s letter to the president of  the Security Council at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/Kos%20S2005%20635.pdf
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a “breathing space” for minorities. According to the report, part of  the decentralization process 
would be creation of  “a number of  new municipalities where primarily Kosovar Serbs would have 
a considerable majority.” In those municipalities, Serbs could have more competencies in police, 
justice, education, culture, media and economy, while “horizontal connections between municipali-
ties with Serb majorities” and “modalities for special connections with Belgrade” could be allowed. 
He stressed though that the establishment of  “horizontal links” between Serbian municipalities 
must be done without endangering Kosovo’s central institutions.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan accepted the report prepared by Ambassador Eide, and rec-
ommended its approval to the Security Council. On 24 October 2005, the UN Security Council 
endorsed his recommendation to launch a political process to determine Kosovo’s status. On 1 
November, Mr. Annan announced his intention to name former Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari 
to be his UN special envoy to lead the international process. Ahtisaari began his mission in late 
November 2005.7 
The first round of  talks between the two negotiating teams from Belgrade and Pristina in February 
2006 focused on decentralization, as one of  the core issues to be addressed in the context of  the 
status resolution.
According to the UNOSEK team, the Kosovo Negotiating Team was very constructive with re-
spect to the right of  municipalities to freedom of  association and mutual cooperation. Kosovar 
representatives assured UNOSEK that the future Law on Local Self-Government—in accordance 
with the European Charter of  Local Self-Government and the best international practices—will 
explicitly provide for the right to freedom of  association for municipal governments, and allow 
municipalities to form consortia or partnerships to jointly carry out municipal tasks. 
In this regard, the Kosovo Negotiation Team even elaborated forms of  partnership, or consortia, 
in an attempt to encompass all generally acceptable forms of  inter-municipal cooperation.
1. Shared public services. Two or more municipalities agree to use the public service structures 
of  one or all participating municipalities to carry out specific municipal tasks in the par-
ticipating municipalities. 
2. Joint in-house company. One or more municipalities form a legal entity (company) vested 
with the authority to perform certain municipal functions, and which may also principally 
engage in commercial activity. 
3. Out-sourcing. One or more municipalities outsource certain municipal tasks to a private 
operator(s), who are to ensure quality standards. An example would be the contracting 
of  a commercial company to carry out waste collection and recycling in one or more 
municipalities.
As far as the right to form associations for advocacy purposes at the central level of  government, 
this right is already guaranteed by UNMIK/REG/2000/45 on Self-Government of  Municipalities 
7   Documents on the work of  the United Nations Office of  the Special Envoy of  the Secretary-General for the future status process 
for Kosovo (UNOSEK) can be found on its website at http://www.unosek.org.
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in Kosovo8 and UNMIK/REG/1999/22 on the Registration and Operation of  Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations in Kosovo.
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Benefits, Costs and Rules of  Fiscal 
Decentralization 
To bring all these briefing notes together—a final note that provides a set of  operational guidelines for the decen-
tralization dialogue and the practicalities of  policy implementation.
The growing interest in fiscal decentralization in Kosovo is part of  a worldwide pattern. In fact, 
it is the rare place that does not put strengthening of  subnational government on its development 
policy agenda. The purpose of  this briefing note is to address two of  the overarching aspects of  
decentralization: the cost and benefits and the set of  problems surrounding its implementation.
  Some Benefits and Costs1
What are the major advantages to be gained from investing more fiscal powers in local govern-
ments? The first, and most important, are the welfare gains that come from moving government 
closer to the people. This is the economic efficiency argument that drives the thinking of  most 
economists who work on this subject (Oates 1972; Musgrave 1983). The argument is straight-
forward. Let us assume that people’s preferences for government services vary, e.g., because of  
religion, language, ethnic mix, climate or economic base. Let us assume further that people have 
sorted themselves so that those with like preferences live in the same region. If  subnational gov-
ernments respond to these preferences in structuring their budgets, decentralization will result in 
variations in the package of  services delivered in different regions. People will get what they want 
and so the welfare of  the population will be enhanced. Under the same circumstances, but with 
a centralized system, service provision would be more uniform and people in different regions 
would get less of  the service mix that they want. 
The potential benefits from decentralization, then, include: (a) more accountability on the part 
of  government officials because they are on the hook for service delivery to the local population 
that elected them, and (b) more willingness on the part of  the local population to pay for services, 
because they get what they want. If  one advocates fiscal decentralization, one must believe this 
story, as it is the primary argument. Some further argue that successful fiscal decentralization ad-
dresses several of  the problems common to developing countries: revenue mobilization, innova-
tion in economic decision-making, accountability of  elected officials, capacity development, and 
grassroots participation in governance. 
A second important benefit is the promise of  increased revenue mobilization. This happens be-
cause decentralization can broaden the aggregate tax base by reaching the traditional income, 
consumption and wealth tax bases in ways that a central government cannot.2 The instruments 
1  This note draws on Bahl 1999. For more lengthy discussions of  the pros and cons of  fiscal decentralization, see Bahl and Linn 1992; 
Litvak, Ahmad and Bird 1998; Bird and Vaillancourt 1998; Tanzi 1996; Martinez 1997; and Dillinger 1994.
2  In this essay as well as throughout this volume, no final political status for Kosovo is presumed. Thus in many cases “central” govern-
ment can be thought of  as referring to a relationship between a highly autonomous provincial government and “sub-provincial” local 
governments. However, if  Kosovo were to gain independence, it should then be noted that one of  the key tools of  macroeconomic 
stabilization—viz, monetary policy—would likely rest with the supranational European Central Bank.  
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available at the subnational level for this purpose include payroll taxes, levies on the sales or assets 
of  firms, licenses to operate, betterment charges and property taxes. If  this hypothesis is correct, 
subnational government taxes are not raised at the expense of  reductions in central level taxes. 
Furthermore, the claim of  subnational governments on central revenues via intergovernmental 
transfers are reduced by increased local revenue mobilization.
There can also be costs associated with fiscal decentralization and perhaps this is why not all places 
choose this policy route. Heading the list is macroeconomic control.3 Central governments would 
like the flexibility to respond quickly to changes in the economy, for example, to raise taxes or cut 
expenditures to deal with a deficit. If  the government is locked into a fixed share of  revenue allo-
cated to local governments, the ability to cut the deficit by reducing expenditures is significantly re-
duced. The pressures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for more 
austere economic policy to bring about internal or external balance usually requires maintaining an 
acceptable level of  the fiscal deficit and limiting the level of  domestic credit. In a truly decentral-
ized economy, both targets are more difficult to achieve than in a centralized economy. 
A second cost of  decentralization is that the center will lose some control over infrastructure de-
velopment because local governments will have some discretionary spending power. The net result 
of  fiscal decentralization could be a shift of  resources from central governments that have higher 
rates of  savings and investment to provincial and local governments that spend at a greater rate on 
consumption of  goods and services. Fiscal decentralization could therefore lead to a lower rate of  
spending on infrastructure, perhaps jeopardizing national growth.
Another line of  thinking is that national priorities for capital investment do not conform to local 
government choices. The national government is interested in investments in infrastructure that 
have regional and national benefits; for example, irrigation, national roads, and power. Subnational 
governments will be focused on capital investments with regional and local benefits.
A fourth point is that revenue centralization gives a greater potential for equalization. In countries 
where the claim of  local governments on the overall tax base is small, the central government 
can create a larger pool of  funds for allocation among local governments on an equalizing basis. 
Moreover, if  the local governments are not given independent taxing powers, the fiscal disparities 
to be equalized will be smaller. However, just because the central government has more funds to 
allocate, it does not necessarily follow that they will allocate these funds on an equalizing basis. In 
fact, most countries do very little equalization through their grant systems.
3  More detailed discussions of  this topic may be found in Bahl and Linn 1992; Prud’homme 1995; Ter-Minassian 1997; Tanzi 1996; 
and Spahn 1997. A reading of  these papers shows that there is anything but uniform agreement on this point.
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Implementation Rules for Fiscal Decentralization
There is no one right way to do fiscal decentralization. Much depends on the policy objectives that 
the government most wants to achieve. It follows that the success of  any fiscal decentralization 
policy will be hostage to the implementation plan. The following are twelve rules, more or less 
generic, that might be used to guide fiscal decentralization.
Rule #1: Fiscal Decentralization Should Be Viewed as a System
Intergovernmental fiscal relations must be thought of  as a system, and all the pieces in this system 
must fit together.5 Thus, implementation should begin with a design of  the comprehensive system, 
and should lay out the plan for each element of  the system. A little reflection will lead one quickly 
to the conclusion that fiscal decentralization involves a lot more than fiscal matters. In fact, the 
electoral system and civil service arrangements are arguably as important as the taxing and spend-
ing components. The other key pieces are subnational government revenue-raising power, bor-
rowing powers, expenditure assignment, and budgetary discretion. A “one-off ” piecemeal reform, 
encompassing only one element of  the system (e.g., the sharing of  nationally levied and collected 
revenues) or a transfer system is not likely to lead to success (see “Sequencing  Fiscal Decentraliza-
tion Reform” in this volume). 
Getting all the pieces on the table is the first part of  the rule; making the pieces fit together is 
the second. For example, Indonesia’s recent “big-bang” decentralization in 2000 considered both 
expenditure assignment and revenue assignment, but the planning was done by two different min-
istries, with little coordination. There did not seem to be a concern about making the two sides of  
the budget fit together.
Rule #2: Finance Follows Function
The second rule is to get the correct order of  reform. First should come the assignment of  expen-
diture responsibility (function) to local governments, and then the assignment of  revenue respon-
sibility (finance) should be determined. The key for this sequencing is that one cannot establish 
the level of  subnational government revenues required independent of  an estimate of  expenditure 
needs. If  one begins this process by fixing revenues, the correspondence between expenditure 
assignment and revenue allocations is lost. Moreover, it becomes difficult to sell a hard budget 
constraint if  the process begins with an insufficient revenue assignment.
Rule #3: There Must Be a Strong Central Ability to Monitor, Evaluate 
and Lead Decentralization
Places such as Kosovo that are in transition out of  the legacy of  Socialism are for the most part 
characterized by highly centralized systems of  government and tend to remain centralized for 
4  These rules were first developed in Bahl 1999.
5  In this briefing note, intergovernmental fiscal relations refer generally to the division of  fiscal powers and responsibilities among levels of  
government. Fiscal decentralization refers to an intergovernmental system where the balance of  power moves more toward the subna-
tional government sector than has been the case. 
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quite some time. If  control by the center reflects political resistance to relinquish powers to a new 
group of  bureaucrats, it will likely thwart fiscal autonomy such that the promised benefits of  a 
decentralized society will be lost. But, if  the control exercised is in the form of  oversight and con-
sists of  monitoring, evaluating and leading, then the payoffs may be high. The following are some 
examples of  the appropriate types of  such oversight:
• Establishing and maintaining a uniform structure of subnational government accounts          
that are regularly and properly audited.
• Setting disclosure requirements with respect to debt financing of capital improvements           
and enforcing rules-based borrowing limits (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003).
• Monitoring the fiscal performance of local governments, and identifying those in finan-           
cial difficulties as well as those exerting weak revenue mobilization efforts.
• Annually reviewing the performance success of government finance instruments (trans-         
fers, subsidies, local taxes) combined with a willingness to make needed policy adjust-
ments. 
• Confirming compliance with the terms of conditional grants, expenditure mandates and           
taxing limits. 
• Providing technical assistance to local governments; the smaller local governments, in           
particular, are likely to require assistance in areas such as accounting, treasury, tax admin-
istration, data processing and project evaluation.
Typically, central and provincial governments in transition countries are not up to these tasks 
because they do not have sufficient administrative capacity to lead the development of  local gov-
ernment finances. Two ingredients necessary to this job are (i) a fiscal analysis unit, probably best 
located in the finance ministry with adequate staff  to continuously monitor local government 
finances; and (ii) an extensive data system that will allow quantitative monitoring and evaluation. 
Placement within the finance ministry affords the opportunity to coordinate activities with those 
responsible for other fiscal control measures, e.g., tax policy and borrowing. 
Another option is to create an independent unit whose primary duty is policy research and advice. 
South Africa’s permanent Fiscal and Finance Commission is such a unit. Uganda’s Local Govern-
ment Finance Commission is also permanent, but India’s central and state finance commissions 
are only constituted every fifth year. Most countries, however, do not have such units. 
There are also problems with the availability of  a comprehensive data system to support the work 
of  the fiscal analysis unit. A census of  government finances that systematically reports actual fi-
nancial outcomes for every subnational government is essential information if  the performance of  
the intergovernmental system is to be monitored, analyzed for its strengths and weaknesses, and 
forecasted. Yet, it is not common in transition countries to have an up-to-date information system 
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that describes the finances of  subnational governments in detail. Rarer yet is a fiscal analysis model 
that is used to track the performance of  local government finances. 
Rule #4: One Intergovernmental System May Not Fit All Subnational 
Governments
Many believe that there must be a uniform intergovernmental fiscal system under which all sub-
national governments must operate. Certainly there are good arguments for this. If  all subnational 
governments have the same expenditure responsibilities and revenue-raising powers, management 
of  the system is much easier. Moreover, there is no hint of  political favoritism as ad hoc differen-
tiation among local units is not permitted. 
However, there is another view, that uniformity may not be a necessary—or desirable—condition 
for effective decentralization. For example, a better route may be to begin fiscal decentralization 
with the larger local government units and to let the smaller ones “grow into it.” Subnational 
governments have very different capabilities to deliver and finance services, and certainly different 
capabilities to borrow. It may be necessary to set up a system where these differences are explicitly 
recognized, i.e., where different local governments are given different financing powers and expen-
diture responsibilities (Bird and Ebel 2006). Places that are in the lower tier of  capability could rely 
more heavily on grants; while more developed places could rely more heavily on local taxation and 
could borrow to finance capital outlays. 
Rule #5: Fiscal Decentralization Requires Significant Local Govern-
ment Taxing Powers
Voters will hold their elected officials more accountable if  local public services are financed to a 
significant extent from locally imposed taxes and charges, as opposed to the case where financing 
is primarily by central government transfers. The local tax must be visible to local voters and large 
enough to impose a noticeable burden. Minor taxes and nuisance taxes will not do the trick. 
Rule #6: Governments Must Keep the Fiscal Decentralization Rules 
That They Make 
The fiscal decentralization plan is usually made by ministry officials, where lawyers draw up the 
decentralization laws, and training is then provided to local officials. In short, it is the higher level 
of  government that makes the rules by which the new system will operate. Very often, these rules 
take the form of  implementing regulations, rather than laws or constitutional imperatives. But, the 
higher level does not always keep the rules that it makes. For example: 
• The promise of budgetary discretion is often followed by the imposition of unfunded             
expenditure mandates on local governments and/or an under funding of  agreed upon 
transfers.
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• The reassignment of expenditure responsibilities to subnational governments is made,          
but without the reassignment of  commensurate revenue support.
• The abolition or capping of subnational government revenue-raising powers without an           
offsetting reduction in expenditure responsibility is a common problem. A good example 
occurs when a higher level of  government puts a cap on a local tax. This compromises 
local revenue efforts and undercuts local self-government autonomy.
Rule #7: Keep It Simple
Subnational government administrative systems often cannot handle complicated intergovern-
mental fiscal arrangements. The same may be said of  the central government systems necessary to 
monitor and evaluate intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. Simple fiscal decentralization struc-
tures will require the local governments to allocate fewer resources to administration, and will 
lower the monitoring and evaluation costs facing the central government. Complication is often 
introduced into the intergovernmental fiscal system by well-meaning policy analysts, because they 
do not properly take into account the capability of  the administrative system to handle these re-
finements. 
This is not to say that simplicity alone should drive intergovernmental reform. Indeed, there are 
complications that cannot and should not be avoided, e.g., disclosure requirements for local gov-
ernment borrowing, uniform accounting systems that follow accepted principles, and prescriptions 
for audit procedures. But the basic rule is to protect simplicity by limiting the number of  objectives 
to be accomplished by each policy instrument and to be mindful of  the administrative capacity of  
the local and central governments to administer (enforce) the system being designed.
Rule #8: The Design of  the Intergovernmental Transfer System 
Should Match the Objectives of  the Decentralization Reform
There are many different kinds of  intergovernmental transfer systems, with many different types 
of  impact on local government finances. Some stimulate local spending; some are substituted for 
local revenue effort; some are equalizing; and some lead to more local government fiscal autonomy 
than others. Countries often enter into grant design without fully exploring the alternatives and 
their differential impacts. Intergovernmental transfers have two dimensions: the size of  the dis-
tributable (or “divisible”) pool, and the distribution of  this pool among eligible local government 
units. Some have referred to the divisible pool dimension as having to do with the vertical fiscal bal-
ance between the central and subnational governments, and the allocation dimension as having to 
do with horizontal fiscal balance. Both dimensions must be part of  the policy design.6
6  Bahl and Linn 1992, Chapter 13.
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Rule #9: Fiscal Decentralization Should Consider All Levels of  Gov-
ernment
There is an inter- as well as intra-governmental dimension to intergovernmental fiscal relations. In 
some countries, provincial governments are too large to allow a level of  citizen participation that 
insures voter preferences will matter, or that accountability of  government officials will result. In 
such cases, fiscal decentralization must be carried through to the lower level of  government. One 
must take care, however, to not overly fragment (make too many small) general purpose govern-
ments (Bird, Ebel, and Wallich 1995). 
Rule #10: Impose a Hard Budget Constraint
A hard budget constraint implies that those governments that are given autonomy will be asked to 
balance their budgets without recourse to any end-of-year assistance from the central government. 
This is another of  those rules that higher levels of  government must keep; and local governments 
must believe that they are “on their own.” Enemies of  the hard budget constraint include fiscal 
measures such as the following:
• deficit grants, i.e., year-end grants to cover revenue shortfalls;        
• bailouts on delinquent debt; and    
• direct coverage of year-end shortfalls on certain items of expenditure.         
Many “post-socialist” transition governments prefer to hold to a paternalistic approach to inter-
governmental fiscal relations. The fiscal year begins with a vertical imbalance between local gov-
ernment expenditure needs and revenue authority, and perhaps even an uncertain level of  grant 
distribution from the center. A year-end budget deficit is, in effect, planned, and deficit grants are 
a guarantee that local governments come to depend on. This was the case of  Budapest for the first 
four to five years of  its “self-governance” until, recognizing the dependency trap, the city under-
took a policy to aggressively utilize their legal spending, tax and regulatory powers (Pallai 2003). 
Rule #11: Recognize That Intergovernmental Systems Are Always in 
Transition and Plan for This
Some elements of  a fiscal decentralization program will be short-lived, e.g., their relevance may 
diminish with economic development. There are many examples of  this: disparities among regions 
within a country change; the quality of  the basic infrastructure changes; priority areas for invest-
ment change; and the technical capacities of  local governments change. Central governments must 
incorporate some degree of  flexibility into their fiscal decentralization plans in order to adjust to 
such changes. How does a government do this while keeping a transparent structure to the inter-
governmental fiscal system? The following are some possible answers to this question.
• Establish, as Kosovo has, an intergovernmental grants commission that reviews the al-
location of  intergovernmental transfers every few years, and recommends changes in the 
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system. This approach, which must be expert and transparent, gives local governments 
enough certainty to plan their finances over a multi-year period and at the same time pro-
vides flexibility to accommodate change.
• Allow for changes in the local tax structure to capture changes in economic structure. As               
some local areas develop and urbanize, it may be possible to piggyback onto central and 
provincial taxes, broaden the tax base so as to pick up non-traditional sectors (e.g., the 
self-employed, small shops), or to use special benefit taxes such as tolls or special land 
assessments. These advances in tax structure should be encouraged.
• Provide for explicit “graduation” provisions for local governments. There should be a            
specified period for review to determine whether any given local government could grad-
uate to the next highest class of  local fiscal autonomy.
Rule #12: There Must Be a Champion for Fiscal Decentralization
It seems a paradox that fiscal decentralization can be such a popular policy in transition countries, 
but then have few enthusiastic champions. For decentralization to succeed there must be a strong 
internal champion that understands the costs and benefits of  establishing such a program.
One can use ad hoc reasoning to try and identify the centers of  strong support for decentraliza-
tion policy. Such a categorization is presented in a “stylized” manner in Table 1. The strongest 
supporters are listed in the top cells of  the table and the weakest in the bottom cells. Decentral-
ization is a grass roots movement, which means that voters and elected politicians, including the 
president/prime minister, should be natural champions. But, if  decentralization conflicts with 
macroeconomic stabilization policy, that support will be less firm. Hyperinflation or recession of-
fers far more of  a threat to re-election chances than does the absence of  a good decentralization 
program. 
Parliament will embrace programs that voters embrace, and therefore is a potential champion of  
decentralization. However, members of  Parliament may also be particularly interested in how pro-
grams benefit their own constituency (and their popularity); hence they may be less enthusiastic 
than policy analysts about the need for transparency. 
Though local governments can be expected to favor decentralization, the rich and poor among 
them may take very different views on the preferred version of  decentralization. The more well-
off  local areas will favor increased fiscal discretion and a laissez-faire approach to fiscal decentraliza-
tion while the poor will opt for a redistributive system based on a guaranteed revenue flow.
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Table 1. Strong, Weak and Ambivalent Supporters of  Fiscal Decentralization
Potentially Strong Supporters Comments
The People and Their Elected Represen-
tatives Demand for more participation in governance at the local level.
The President and/or Prime Minister
Decentralization is a popular policy with the electorate. How-
ever, the president/PM must also be very mindful of  stabiliza-
tion concerns with decentralization, since inflation and unem-
ployment are usually the greatest danger to his/her political 
standing. 
The Parliament or Congress
Decentralization is a popular policy with the electorate. Parlia-
ment would like to identify with specific local projects that they 
could “bring home,” therefore, they may favor a less transparent 
and less structured system.
Urban Local Governments
“Give us the autonomy to tax and spend.” Urban local govern-
ments are often most concerned with how their autonomy is 
circumscribed, and how their access to their tax base is limited. 
External Donors
Donors provide encouragement and some technical assistance 
to get the process underway, but external assistance is no substi-
tute for in-country champions and capacity development.
Potentially Weak Supporters
Ministry of  Finance
Would propose strict limits to decentralization in order to 
continue to wield the main fiscal tools for stabilization policy 
purposes.
Ministry of  Economy
Would like to control the type of  investment made, as well as 
the regional distribution of  investment. Typically interested in 
programs with big externalities vs local benefit programs.
Line Ministries Would like to control the standards of  public service delivery, 
and often would like to hold an approval or sign off  power.
Ambivalent Supporter
Ministry of  Local Government
Would favor a greater guaranteed share for local governments, 
but would like to control the distribution of  those resources. 
Weaker local governments
Would like a guaranteed transfer of  resources from the urban 
and wealthier local governments to the rest. More interested in 
a transfer system than in a local taxing system.
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Finally, some of  the external donors and advisors will champion fiscal decentralization. The World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank tend to see decentralization as part of  a devel-
opment strategy that will lead to a more satisfactory and balanced growth, and promote decen-
tralization as a country strategy. The IMF takes a more cautious and qualified view because of  
its concern with any policy that might promote fiscal instability. These external advisors can play 
an important catalytic role. When they bring funding as the carrot, they oftentimes catch the at-
tention of  government officials and stimulate the government to begin looking harder at the de-
centralization issue. But unless the government itself  is enthusiastic, the harder look will not lead 
to meaningful policy reform and in fact will be quickly forgotten when the money is gone. The 
implementation stage is never reached.
There are three major detractors of  fiscal decentralization policy. The finance ministry as the 
keeper of  the tools to address macroeconomic instability will not want to give up its control over 
these tools. Typically, the ministry of  finance will favor an ad hoc over a transparent regime. If  
this ministry is on record as favoring decentralization, it will tend to be a very controlled form of  
decentralization. One might look for the following features in such a program: 
• limited freedom for local governments to set tax rates for any major taxes;             
• strictly controlled borrowing powers;   
• budget approval by higher level government, or stringent expenditure mandates;         
• an ad hoc system of intergovernmental transfers, that would give the central govern-            
ments some flexibility to withhold full distributions in hard times; and
• centrally controlled wage and salary rates for local government employees.         
The ministry of  economy could be a significant opponent. This ministry will be interested in a 
system that allows central rather than local direction of  investment. If  investment decisions are 
decentralized to any significant extent, it will compromise national planning on the distribution of  
capital expenditures by function and by location. 
And, the line ministries often oppose decentralization on grounds that seem more paternalistic. 
Their view is that the local governments do not have the technical capacity to deliver services or 
to plan resource allocation; hence there must be strong central direction. Line ministries, if  they 
are persuaded on fiscal decentralization, will be more comfortable with conditional grants and 
mandated expenditure requirements.
Concluding Comment
Despite the rhetoric, fiscal decentralization is often held back. Until recently the advantages of  
centralization and the political power of  the centralists have been too strong. But the world has 
changed, and the case for decentralization is becoming more irresistible. It may be slowed by an 
unstable world economy, as most new policies will be, but its time may have come. Governments 
around the world are increasingly elected on a platform of  citizen participation in governance; 
economic development has eroded some of  the arguments in favor of  fiscal centralization; and 
the service delivery capabilities of  local governments have improved dramatically. Moreover, some 
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view granting local autonomy as better than separatism as a policy direction. The enemy now is 
poorly conceived decentralization policies. Design must match objectives, and implementation 
must face up to the many dimensions of  decentralization. 
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